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ABSTRACT 
 
State finances continued to deteriorate over fiscal 2010, suffering from the cumulative 
impact of lower revenues, ballooning general fund spending and the general rise in the 
level of unemployment. The phasing out of the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act is likely to constrain even further the fiscal space of local governments throughout 
the country, potentially endangering a fragile economic recovery. In order to face 
rapidly rising budget gaps, forty states enacted mid-year budget cuts totaling $22 
billion for FY 2010. The fiscal retrenchment approach to budget policy appears to gain 
ground amongst embattled states, with governors proposing drastic cuts in their fiscal 
2011 executive budgets to meet balance-budget requirements. The legacy of the 1970s 
tax revolts, having made tax hikes difficult to enact, also contributed to corner states 
into spending reduction strategies. 
 
The study of cutback management has heavily focused on how and why reduction 
targets are adopted by state executives and legislators, as well as on their subsequent 
effects on local economies. The literature is however scarce on proposing a framework 
for efficient structuring of budget cuts at the state level. Stricken by uncertainty, many 
governors are driven toward across-the-board cuts, treating general fund expenditures 
as a fungible commodity. With states facing increasingly painful budgetary choices, 
weighting their implications and analyzing potential alternatives become critical to 
evaluate prospects for regional economic recoveries.  
 
 In this dissertation, a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) Multiobjective Linear 
Programming (MOLP) model is proposed and applied to the case of New York State. 
The SAM multipliers provide a powerful instrument to evaluate the short-term impact 
of austerity measures while linear programming (LP) offers an optimization 
framework to close efficiently the state‘s budget gap.  Attention focuses on the 
existence of several conflicting objectives that the decision maker tries to optimize 
simultaneously. Four procedures are introduced to solve the model: the augmented 
weighted Tchebycheff method, an elistist genetic algorithm, the weighted sum method 
and constraint programming.  
 
The theoretical framework established in the following chapters as well as its 
application to the Deficit Reduction Plan proposed by Governor Paterson in fiscal 
2009 show promising results. The model indeed converges to a set of Pareto optimal 
solutions that are by essence, more efficient with respect to growth, employment and 
labor income than the original plan. It constitutes one of the first practical applications 
of multiobjective optimization to policy design through a Walrasian general 
equilibrium framework.  
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
« Point de banqueroute, point d’augmentation d’imposition, point d’emprunts. Pour remplir 
ces trois points, il n’y a qu’un moyen : réduire la dépense au-dessous de la recette» 
 
Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, Letter to Louis XVI, 24 August 1774  
 
1.1 Background 
 
The increasing decentralization of the provision of public services in the United States 
propelled the states – along with their subsidiaries, local governments – at the 
forefront of public finance in the federal system. States collected a yearly average of 
over forty percent of the nation‘s total public receipts during the 2000s, while when 
combined with local governments they have come to represent approximately seventy 
percent of national expenditures on non-defense public goods and services (Inman, 
2010), forty-five percent of general government spending, eighty-eight percent of 
public investment and about ten percent of the U.S. GDP. At the state level, policy-
making spans a wide range of services, from funding public schools to administrating 
higher education institutions and penitentiaries and overseeing the development and 
maintenance of key public infrastructures. Moreover, states play a critical role in the 
health care system and enjoy extensive power in determining the level and nature of 
welfare benefits. Clearly, the influence of states on the U.S. fiscal policy cannot be 
ignored.  
2 
 
 
Figure 1.1. States collection of public receipts (in percent of total public receipts) 
   
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, The 2011 Statistical Abstract 
 
If their role in the provision of public services and in government spending has 
increased over the past decades, states have repeatedly experienced fiscal stress in the 
face of economic downswings. This was particularly true in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis and the recession that ensued. The National Association of State 
Budget Officers qualified FY 2010 as ―the most difficult challenge for states‘ financial 
management since the Great Depression‖ (NASBO, 2010:vii), a message largely 
echoed by governors across the political spectrum. State finances have indeed been 
affected by the scissor‘s effect of declining revenues and increasing expenditures. A 
weak labor market along with stagnating income levels, ailing business activity and a 
widespread deleveraging of both households and firms took their toll on tax revenues. 
35 
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49 
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The erosion of the fiscal space
1
 has been particularly noticeable in states with large 
social welfare responsibilities, among which Medicaid, unemployment benefits and 
social assistance are prominent. A volatile tax base, in particular a heavy reliance on 
corporate or personal income taxes, has also been demonstrated to contribute 
negatively to fiscal stress (Dye and McGuire, 1991). Certain states have however fared 
relatively well during the downturn, especially those which could rely on revenues 
from severance taxes on natural resources
2
.  
 
Figure 1.2. Budget Cuts Made after Budget Enactment ($ in millions) 
 
       Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 
 
The geography of the 2009-11 fiscal crisis of the states is thus not without parallels to 
the fiscal crunch of the early 1990s (Hansen, 1991), although their magnitudes are 
without comparison. States depending on tax inflows from hard-hit economic sectors – 
in 1991 as in 2009, the real-estate and financial sectors – suffered considerably more 
fiscal stress than their energy and natural resources-rich counterparts. This feature is 
                                                 
1
 The fiscal space can be defined as “the room in a government’s budget that allows it to provide 
resources for a desired purpose without jeopardizing the sustainability of its financial position or the 
stability of the economy” (Heller, 2005).  
2
 Namely: Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Texas, West Virginia and Wyoming.  
4 
 
nowhere more prominent than in New York and New Jersey, two states which public 
finances have relied extensively and increasingly on the performance of the financial 
industry (Deitz et al., 2010).  
 
Despite these similarities, the response and support of the federal government differed 
sensibly when comparing 1991 and 2009. The depth and the breadth of the fiscal crisis 
urged the federal government to relieve the crumbling finances of the states, a move 
that broke down a tradition of non-intervention established after the panic of 1837
3
 
(Inman, 2003). Another divergence has been the method used by states to tackle their 
burgeoning deficits. In the past, states tried to shield K-12 and higher education, 
Medicaid, public safety and aid to local governments as much as possible from cuts. 
The dynamic somewhat shifted with the recession that took place in 2001, when state 
governments relinquished revenue measures in favor of fiscal retrenchment.  
 
1.2 The Importance of Mid-Year Budget Cuts  
 
The magnitude and likelihood of budget cuts swell when states carry out large 
episodes of budgetary adjustments during their fiscal year to close a widening budget 
gap. Mid-year budget cuts, as these episodes are called, are a clear sign of fiscal 
distress.  
                                                 
3
 In 1837, eight states (Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi and 
Pennsylvania) would default on the debt they accumulated to expand their railroad and canal 
infrastructures. The federal government, which previously assumed the charge of the debt taken by 
states to finance the revolution and bailed out the District of Columbia from a debt of $1.5 million in 
1836, refused to intervene.   
5 
 
Definition 1.1. Mid-year budget gaps: they arise when the revenue collections 
forecasts provided by state budget officers prove inferior to the financing needs of the 
government for the remainder of the fiscal period.  
 
Given the complex nature of econometric forecasting techniques and their relative 
inaccuracy in a context of financial crisis, mid-year budget gaps are likely to arise 
because (i) revenue collection or (ii) spending demands have been underestimated
4
.  
 
This is a source of complexity for financial management in times of economic crisis. 
Due to their constitutional obligations to maintain a balanced budget on an annual or 
biennial basis, states have indeed less leeway than the federal government in managing 
deficits. Fiscal measures taken by the states to address budget gaps can thus 
exacerbate economic downswings and play a pro-cyclical role in regional economies
5
, 
pro-cyclicality being commonly defined in the literature as a violation of the tax 
smoothing principle of holding constant tax rates and discretionary government 
spending as a fraction of GDP over the business cycle (Kaminski, Reinhart and Vegh, 
2004; Alesina and Tabellini, 2005). Pro-cyclicality is of particular concern in the case 
of mid-year budget gaps, since they usually follow fiscal year deficits. The state 
government, having already exhausted its most effective policies to reap low-hanging 
fruits, is confronted with difficult policy choices to eliminate mid-year budget gaps, 
even though their size is comparatively limited. Moreover, raising revenues is 
                                                 
4
 For a discussion of econometric models applied to state and local government revenue forecasting, 
see Grizzle and Klay (1994).  
5
 An empirical work for the European Union is Wibbels and Rodden (2006).  
6 
 
politically and institutionally difficult during the fiscal year. Without large revenue 
increases, balancing strategies are amputated from a very powerful tool. Thus remain 
at the disposal of governors and legislatures a limited toolkit to (i) balance their budget 
and (ii) cushion the bust in the economy: 
- Prevention measures: the so-called rainy-day funds, an innovation of the 
1980s; 
- Temporizing: delay capital expenditures; 
- Gimmicks: using ―off-budget‖ funds, underfunding pensions or selling assets;  
- Balancing: decreasing spending (increasing revenues being impossible). 
 
Given the often pro-cyclical nature of the fiscal policy choices selected by states 
during episodes of acute economic crisis and their debilitating effects on 
macroeconomic stability, economists have taken a keen interest in the study of 
budgetary decisions and their impact on regional economies. Mimicking the 
macroeconomic debate, discussions have focused on the respective merits of fiscal 
retrenchment and tax increase in mitigating economic contractions and subsequently 
assisting the recovery. As Johnson (2010) points out, the crux of the matter is to 
investigate ―how can [states] balance their […] budgets with the least possible harm to 
their still damaged and fragile […] economies‖. Proponents of tax increases usually 
refer to the influential paper of Joseph Stiglitz and Peter Orszag (Stiglitz and Orszag, 
2001), who argued that ―tax increases would not in general be more harmful to the 
economy than spending reductions. Indeed, in the short run (which is the period of 
concern during a downturn), the adverse impact of a tax increase on the economy may, 
7 
 
if anything, be smaller than the adverse impact of a spending reduction […]‖. More 
than a hundred economists from New York State, including Robert H. Franck, 
Christopher Barrett, Susan Christopherson, Lourdes Beneria and Erik Thorbecke of 
Cornell University, urged Governor David Peterson to adopt this position in an open 
letter published in 2008
6
. On the other side, the German treasury and the Bundesbank 
introduced in the 1980s the counterintuitive idea that fiscal contraction can actually be 
expansionary (Fels and Froehlich, 1986). Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) found 
supporting empirical evidences for Denmark and Ireland. The mechanism is explained 
by lower expectations of future tax liabilities which would boost private consumption 
and investment. The ―moderate‖ approach to this theory is that although it is highly 
unlikely that fiscal contraction is actually expansionary
7
, its negative impact on mid- 
to long-term economic growth is rather modest.    
 
1.3 Research Proposal and Structure of the Dissertation  
 
This dissertation does not to try to gain insights on the respective economy-wide 
impacts of various policy mixes and to identify accordingly the most efficient 
arrangement in terms of revenue and expenditure measures. Its purpose, rather, is 
narrowed to the management of fiscal retrenchments using mathematical 
                                                 
6
 http://www.fiscalpolicy.org/FPI_Release_EconomistsOnFiscalPolicy_December2008.pdf    Accessed 
October 5, 2010 
7
 In such a case, the aggregate government spending multiplier would be negative. The hypothesis has 
been discarded by Barro (1987) is his exposition of a neoclassical framework for fiscal policy. We may 
remark here that because we use a Social Accounting Matrix in this dissertation, government spending 
multipliers are postulated to be positive. Moreover, SAM is a static model, and therefore does not 
take into account the anticipations of economic agents.   
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programming. The research project has thus two components. The first one consists in 
the development of a quantitative structural model to analyze, compare and optimize 
the policy impact of mid-year budget cuts on an economic system. The second 
undertaking is the empirical application of the model to New York State.  
 
A Social Accounting Matrix Multiobjective Linear Programming (hereafter SAM-
MOLP) model is used to ascertain whether or not it is possible for state governments 
to improve the structure of their budget cuts so that their incidence on the regional 
economies of interest is minimized. The MOLP framework allows a careful and 
systematic investigation of the best set of alternatives available to policy-makers with 
respect to the values taken by key macroeconomic variables in general equilibrium, as 
determined by shocking the underlying Social Accounting Matrix. The issue is thus 
tackled simultaneously from a policy design perspective thanks to multiobjective 
optimization and from an economic impact perspective through the social accounting 
matrix. Because our interest is limited to discretionary savings – on which the state‘s 
executive and legislative powers have absolute decision power – the scope of the study 
is limited to the management of the general fund notwithstanding the federal funds, 
other state funds and bonds. This leaves us with the revenues not earmarked for 
specific items, or 41.7% of the $1.59 trillion spent by state governments in FY 2009 
(NASBO, 2009).  
 
9 
 
Definition 1.2. General fund: the general fund is the most important operating fund of 
states. According to the Division of Budget of New York State
8
 ―it receives all State 
income not earmarked for a particular program or activity and not specified by law to 
be deposited in another fund. State income for financial plan purposes consists of 
moneys deposited to the credit of the General Fund during the fiscal year from current 
revenues (taxes, fees, and miscellaneous receipts including certain repayments of State 
advances) and transfers. General Fund income finances disbursements from its two 
operating accounts — the Local Assistance Account and the State Purposes Account 
— and transfers to other funds‖. 
 
The remaining of this chapter is dedicated to the presentation and justification of the 
methodology selected for this research. The first part of the dissertation (Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3) aims at providing the reader with a description of the fiscal situation that 
the states and New York in particular found themselves following the Great 
Recession. In the second part, the core of the dissertation, Chapter 4 delineates the 
general framework for a social accounting matrix multiobjective linear programming 
model and its application to policy analysis. Lastly, Chapter 5 illustrates an empirical 
application of the general framework proposed in Chapter 4.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 http://www.budget.ny.gov/citizen/financial/glossary_all.html#g   Accessed November 6
th
, 2011 
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1.4 Methodology  
 
Perhaps because of its traditional definition as the scientific study and analysis of 
―how societies use scarce resources to produce valuable goods and services and 
distribute them among different individuals‖ (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2010:4) 
economics has repeatedly been proven to constitute a field of choice for mathematical 
programming applications. Thijs ten Raa (1994) even summarizes the economic 
problem as ―the maximization of some objective subject to constraints‖, a definition 
that is not without recalling that of linear programming. This remark comes as an echo 
to the seminal textbook authored by Robert Dorfman, Paul Samuelson and Robert 
Solow in 1958 entitled Linear Programming and Economic Analysis which argues that 
―there is no more frequent problem in economic analysis than the inquiry into the 
characteristics of the ―best‖ allocation [of various factors of production]‖. Indeed, the 
issues of allocation and efficiency lie at the core of economic theory.    
 
In order to systematically represent and analyze its object, traditional economic 
analysis formed early on the assumption that agents – in particular consumers and 
firms – are instrumentally rational9. Agents are then typically expected to behave such 
that they attempt to maximize a certain objective function subject to some constraints. 
Mathematical optimization offers a powerful tool to model such behaviors 
(Intriligator, 1971). The concept of rationality quickly extended to policy-making and 
policy analysis along with its corollary, efficiency, the production of ―the highest 
                                                 
9
 the Zweckrational of Max Weber (1921).  
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combination of quantity and quality of goods and services given technology and 
[scarcity]‖ (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2010:5). For policy makers, the utility function 
of consumers or the profit function of firms is mimicked by introducing a welfare or 
social utility function that the policy maker ought to maximize. In public economics, 
the government can maximize said welfare function through (i) allocation, (ii) 
distribution and (iii) stabilization (Musgrave, 1959).  Because in a democratic and 
open political system the government acts on behalf of the people it represents, the 
government‘s objective function is both unique and perfectly representative of the 
society‘s preferences, at least theoretically. 
 
Numerous authors came to criticize this idea. As Kenneth Arrow (1950) pointed out, 
the aggregation of ordinal preferences is a rather complex endeavor during which 
desirable properties may be lost. Moreover, it is unclear whether or not defining an 
aggregated objective function – granted it exists – is actually possible. Beyond 
mathematical difficulties, single objective linear programming (LP) –problems with a 
unique objective function to optimize – may be considered too simplistic and 
consequently unrealistic to model often complex and multi-faceted policy decisions. 
Not only governments rarely aim at achieving a single defined objective through their 
policies but also seldom can they be represented a monolithic entity. National 
governments usually keep a close eye on indicators reflecting the evolution of the real 
economy (GDP growth, unemployment rate, private capital formation, trade balance) 
and the nominal economy (inflation) as well as politically sensitive indicators of 
public finance management (debt burden, budget deficits). Additional layers of 
12 
 
complexity are added as the government legislates in the environmental area and as 
sustainability becomes a target of increasing importance for most policies.  
 
Optimization using linear programming has however come a long way since it was 
first introduced by the Soviet mathematician and economist Leonid Kantorovich
10
 
(Kantorovich, 1939) and refined by George Dantzig. Of particular interest to this 
dissertation is the development a large body of techniques dealing with the existence 
of multiple objectives that must be simultaneously optimized: multiobjective 
optimization (MOO)
11
. Multiobjective optimization finds its root in three domains
12
: 
equilibrium and welfare economics, game theory and pure mathematics. The existence 
of multiple objectives for a given issue is a necessary condition to use MOO, but it is 
not sufficient in itself. Indeed, at least two of the objectives defined must be 
conflicting for the multiobjective problem to be non-trivial. That is, they cannot 
simultaneously reach their optimal levels. In general, two objective functions are said 
to be conflicting when a decrease for one objective leads to an increase in the other 
objective (Collette and Siarry, 2003). The classical example of conflicting objective 
functions is environmental protection and industrial activity.  
 
In the case of a public investment and fiscal policy, the decision maker typically wish 
to achieve several objectives simultaneously including (i) maximizing employment, 
(ii) maximizing output, (iii) maintaining or improving equity, (iv) increasing or 
                                                 
10
 He received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 1975 along with Tjalling Koopmans for his 
contribution to the theory of optimum allocation of resources. 
11
 Also called vector optimization.  
12
 For a historical perspective on MOO, see Stadler (1979) and Stadler and Dauer (1992).  
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protecting tax revenues and (v) limiting inflation. These objectives, however, can be 
conflicting. For instance, increasing the number of jobs created by a project may 
require the policy maker to forsake potential tax revenues, or growth in output may 
come at the price of higher inflation. Traditional monobjective linear programming, by 
using a single objective function, conceals the existence of competing objectives in 
policy design, and calls to the decision maker‘s subjectivity to take into account 
existing tradeoffs that were not mathematically formalized. Multiobjective 
optimization offers a powerful tool to maximize – or minimize, or both, according to 
the problem at hand – ―at best‖ the various objective functions faced by policy makers.  
 
Given the characteristics enumerated above, it can be reasonably argued that 
multicriteria decision making
13
 – of which multiobjective optimization is a part – is a 
valid methodology to investigate policy making issues. We believe it is especially 
appropriate in the case public policy analysis dealing with spending programs, where a 
wide variety of factors must be taken into account, ranging from employment to 
pollution and the formation of private capital. The approach is not without its 
limitations though, and a devastating critique came from Robert Lucas‘ seminal paper 
on estimated econometric models (Lucas, 1976), an area in which there was much 
hope for MOO. In substance, Lucas observed that these models are ill-equipped to 
assess the economic impact of alternative policies, as the policy of reference is already 
―built‖ into the estimated econometric model when the equations structuring it are first 
                                                 
13
 Multicriteria decision making gathered other methods, such as the Analytic Hierarchy Process or 
goal programming.  
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determined. Because econometric models are so popular in policy evaluation, this may 
explain why applications of MOO to that purpose have been quite marginal.  
 
In this dissertation, it is proposed to circumvent the problems associated with the use 
of reduced econometric models by utilizing a class of economic model where the 
behaviors of agents and policy levers are isolated from the structure of the economy. 
Two classes of model fit the role: the input-output framework – and its social 
accounting matrix (SAM) extension – and computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models. The present research restricts itself to the social accounting matrix. 
 
Although the tools employed hereunder are somewhat new to the study of fiscal policy 
and to the issue of budgetary management, the problematic that frames the scope of 
this dissertation is not: it aims at optimizing policy decisions through the mathematical 
determination of a certain number of policy levers (the exogenous variables) and the 
values taken by associated policy objectives (the endogenous variables). In 
quantitative economic policy jargon, the model will be determined by four types of 
variables (Tinbergen, 1952), namely: 
- Data, assimilated to exogenous variables; 
- Policy Instruments, the variables determined by the decision maker; 
- Target variables, representing some measures that the decision maker wishes 
to optimize; 
- Irrelevant variables, contributing to the construction of a realistic picture of 
the economy but of little interest to the particular policy under scrutiny.    
15 
 
The mechanics of the resulting model is straightforward: the social accounting matrix 
provides a plausible economic system to quantify the effects of policy interventions 
(captured by the target variables), whereas the algorithm of the multiobjective linear 
program searches for efficient policies in terms of the criteria identified by the 
decision maker.   
 
The work laid out in the following pages is therefore prescriptive in nature. It attempts 
at providing policy makers in New York State – and possibly other states – with a tool 
to analyze the economic consequences of their budgetary decisions, in particular fiscal 
retrenchment policies. The study of cutback management has up until now heavily 
focused on how and why reduction targets are adopted by state executives and 
legislators, as well as on their subsequent effects on local economies. The literature is 
however scarce on proposing a framework for efficient structuring of budget cuts at 
the state level. Stricken by uncertainty, many governors are driven toward proposing 
across-the-board cuts, treating general fund expenditures as a fungible commodity. 
With states facing increasingly painful budgetary choices, weighting their implications 
and potential alternatives become critical to evaluate prospects for recovery. This 
dissertation hopes to fill the gap.  
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Chapter II 
FISCAL STRESS AND FISCAL 
RETRENCHMENT AMONG STATE 
GOVERNMENTS 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the fiscal crisis that struck the states in the wake 
of the Lehman bankruptcy and the policies they implemented in order to respond to it. 
It begins with a discussion of the causes of the fiscal crisis and the implementation of 
cutback management since the 1970s and then analyzes state fiscal conditions, tax 
policy, spending policy, and policies affecting local governments. This chapter 
describes the unstable fiscal environment states are navigating since the early days of 
the recession in 2007. It brings a particular focus on the fiscal years 2009 and 2010 as 
an immediate prelude to the mid-year cuts proposed by governor Cuomo in FY 2010 
which will be at the heart of the modeling exercise of this dissertation.  
In the case of deficits as much as in the case of tax revenues or spending policy, it is 
important to note that the aggregate figures discussed in the following sections can be 
heavily influenced by a limited number of large states. Cutbacks were much more 
severe in certain states than others, while all states did not enter the recession in the 
same fiscal position. Chapter III will give us the opportunity to detail the case of New 
York State.   
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2.1 The Causes of the Fiscal Crisis  
 
2.1.1 Optimal federalism: the example of the 2000s 
 
Before attempting to fathom what went wrong for the states following the recent 
recession, it is important to obtain a better understanding of the place of states in the 
fiscal architecture of the United States. Indeed, because each person in the United 
States falls within the jurisdiction of several public authorities, the study of a 
normative public sector theory becomes all the more complex. The founding 
principles of the discipline remain unimpaired though: government interventions – no 
matter the place of the public entity in the layer of jurisdictions – are justified in the 
presence of market breakdowns. In addition, the ultimate goal of government 
intervention is social welfare maximization, which takes on several aspects: 
efficiency, equity and stabilization of the economy during the business cycle. If these 
fundamental aspects of expenditure and tax policy are clear enough in theory, their 
applications in a real world characterized by a multi-layered federalist structure and 
the mobility of citizens is challenging. The theory of fiscal federalism has attempted to 
bring solutions to this conundrum by proposing to sort the functions of government 
and the people among the existing jurisdictions (Tiebout, 1956; Stigler, 1957; Break, 
1967; Oates, 1972).   
 
The intricacy of the theory of public finance did not prevent the emergence of a 
working fiscal and budgetary federal structure in the United States. The system 
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repeatedly proved satisfying and efficient during the post-war period, noticeably in the 
mid-80s, mid-90s and mid-2000s. At the state level, the efficient management of 
government finances corresponds to the determination of a level of spending, 
including transfers, such that the marginal cost of the service provided equals its 
marginal benefit (Inman, 2010). Thanks to fiscal federalism, U.S. states tend to 
perform well this function in normal time, with regular programs financed through 
taxes and capital expenditures through the issuance of long-term debt. Figures from 
the U.S. Census Bureau (2010) suggests that annual state spending averaged $4,430 
per capita in fiscal 2006, more than the $3,236 per capita collected. However, once 
transfers from the federal government are taken into account ($1,290 per capita), the 
gap vanishes, resulting in a surplus of about 2% of current spending ($96 per capita). 
As Inman (2010:15) notes: 
 
―In FY 2006, states were spending money on appropriate state functions, 
raising most of their money with efficient resident-based taxes, and running 
small fiscal surpluses on the current accounts. For the most part, the federal 
government provides assistance for those state services where there are 
arguably significant inter-state spillovers and does so with appropriate price-
based subsidies. By most measures, states were fulfilling their assigned role in 
our federal system of public finance in FY 2006‖ 
    
Using the example of the mid-2000s, it would thus appear that during periods of 
economic recovery and expansion, states tend to bring their budget in balance and 
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even record some surplus. This leads to ask the question: how much of the fiscal woes 
underwent by states in the recent economic contraction can be explained by factors 
that are beyond their control and how much can be traced back to pre-existing 
structural imbalances?  
 
2.1.2 The main factors of the fiscal crisis 
 
THE RECESSION 
 
The single most important contributor to the states fiscal crisis is certainly the 
recession, which lasted 18 months from December 2007 to June 2009 (NBER, 2010). 
In length, this episode of economic contraction outlived the previously longest 
postwar recessions of 1973-75 and 1981-82. The induced fiscal stress, fuelled by 
shrinking tax revenues and growing spending in social program, indiscriminately hurt 
states across the country, even if some regions resisted longer than others. This is a 
major difference with the national recession of 1990-91where the severity of the crisis 
impacted the Northeast and California alone.  
 
At the national level, the recession of 2007-09 was the deepest experienced by the 
United States since the Great Depression. The sole statistic of unemployment is 
illustrative: at the height of the boom, in January 2006, the national unemployment 
rate was only 4.7%. It more than doubled to 10% in the fourth quarter of 2009, and has 
fluctuated around 9% ever since (BLS, 2011). And the toll taken on state public 
finances has been substantial.    
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The annual average unemployment rates rose in 2009 in all states (BLS, 2010). 
Increases were particularly strong in Michigan and Nevada (+5.3 and +5.1 percentage 
points respectively) and in 7 other states
14
 which recorded changes larger than 4 
percentage points. Statistics were even grimmer when it came to stocks: 14 states and 
the District of Columbia had unemployment rates larger than 10%, with 9 states 
establishing new records in their annual series. This followed an already calamitous 
year for the job markets. Indeed, 39 states and the District of Columbia already 
recorded statistically significant unemployment rate increases, even though the change 
was of lesser magnitude than in 2009 (BLS, 2009). Certain states, such as Nevada and 
Florida, even witnessed a first bump in their unemployment rates as early as 2007 
while the trend of job creations in 40 other states and the District of Columbia stalled 
(BLS, 2008).   
 
For comparison, when the U.S. economy moved into a recession in 2001, 42 states and 
the District of Columbia experienced rising unemployment rates (BLS, 2002). The 
impact of the recession was however far softer than in 2008-10. The worst performer, 
North Carolina, had the largest increase at 1.9 percentage points and only 18 states 
reported rate increases of 1 percentage point or more. If the trend persisted in 2002 for 
47 states and in 2003 for 34 states, the magnitude of the increases remained relatively 
small, and as the economy gathered speed in 2004 annual average unemployment rates 
rapidly declined. During the recession of the early 1990s, the average unemployment 
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 Alabama, California, Florida, Indiana, North Carolina, Oregon and South Carolina.  
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rates increased in 31 states and 26 states in 1992 and 1991 respectively. Employment 
peaked up as soon as 1993, with 37 states recording lower unemployment rates.  
 
The exceptional nature of this crisis has unsurprisingly taken an extraordinary large 
toll on the states‘ finances, both from the revenue and expenditure point of view, as we 
will see in a subsequent section.  
 
MEDICAID 
 
If the poor macroeconomic performance of the United States since 2007 explains an 
important part of the budget deficits and growing debt of most states, another 
structural factor plays its part in the widening of budget gaps. With Medicaid 
enrollment growing by more than 17% to 50.3 million beneficiaries since the start of 
the recession, states have had to buff up their spending to support the program. This is 
all the more true that Medicaid, with 22% of total spending in FY2010, represents the 
single largest item on the states‘ budgets15. More than the recession and the increased 
in poverty it caused, the growth of Medicaid has been propelled by exploding health 
care costs and by the progressive withdrawal of higher FMAP support provided by the 
federal government through the Recovery Act.   
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 Up from 9.95% in 1988 and from 15.46% in 2000. 
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Figure 2.1. Evolution of enrollment and state expenditures in Medicaid 
  
Source: NASBO for Medicaid expenditures, the Kaiser commission (2011) for 
enrollment 
 
FEDERAL MANDATES  
 
The supremacy clause of the Constitution ensures that when a legislative action is 
taken by the federal government in an area where it has concurrent powers with the 
states, the latter must comply with the piece of legislation it enacted. These laws, 
known as federal mandates, bore a costs for states, even though unfunded federal 
mandates are now less common than they were in the 1980s and early 1990s
16
 (Sidlow 
and Henschen, 2005). In the 1980s indeed, the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations reported that the costs of unfunded mandates were 
actually increasing at a faster rate than federal assistance, with 63 statutes 
concentrating the bulk of the additional compulsory spending (ACIR, 1993). Among 
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 The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 requires the Congressional Budget Office to estimate 
the cost of intergovernmental mandates exceeding $50 million. This does not mean however that 
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these, 25 were mandated during the 1970s and 21 during the 1980s. By comparison, 
62 intergovernmental mandate costs exceeding the $71 million legal threshold were 
identified by the Congressional Budget Office between 2000 and 2010, but none had 
the magnitude of the Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986 (between $2 billion 
and $3 billion), the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986 ($3.15 billion) 
or the Water Quality Act of 1987 (approximately $12 billion) (Dilger and Beth, 2011). 
For the sole fiscal year 1991, ACIR estimated that federal mandates cost between $2.2 
billion and $3.6 billion to state and local governments, which contributes to explain 
why they may have been singled out as a source of additional fiscal stress during the 
recession of the early 1990s.  
 
Even though the cost of federal mandates for states, in particular those concerning 
Medicaid, has not been the subject of a thorough study, it is likely that they have not 
contributed significantly to the deterioration of the states‘ public finances over the last 
decade.  
 
SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 
 
As will be detailed hereunder, the second biggest item of spending for state 
governments and the largest one for local governments is elementary and secondary 
education. Consequently, demographic changes leading to larger school-age cohorts 
have large effect on public finances. Although aggregated statistics may be misleading 
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in a country as large and diverse as the United States
17
, they give a good 
approximation of the potential strain caused by demographic evolutions on the 
education of states.  
 
The enrollment in U.S. public schools was up 0.1% in 2007, but actually declined in 
22 states and the District of Columbia
18
 (NEA, 2009). In 2008, it was up 0.16%. Over 
the period 1999-2009, the annual percentage change in Fall enrollment varied between 
0.1% and 0.9%, but has remained under 0.25% ever since 2006.  
 
The increase in school enrollment has thus followed a slow pace over the 2000s, in 
stark contrast with the early 1990s when the population attending elementary and 
secondary schools was increasing at an annual rate of nearly 2%. Given that states 
have significantly cut back on elementary and secondary education spending (-1% in 
2008-09 and -6.2% in 2009-10), it is clear that there has been a transfer of burden 
from the states to local school districts.  
 
COURT RULINGS 
 
An often forgotten potential cause for fiscal stress is the rulings passed by state and 
federal courts that increase costs or reduce revenues for states. Prisons overcrowding 
and mental health issue have traditionally constituted the bulk of decisions. Other 
                                                 
17
 The total U.S. resident population increased by 10.6% between 1997 and 2007, with Nevada 
experiencing the largest increasing (+45.4%) and Louisiana the largest decrease (-2.9%).  
18
 Including New York (-0.5%). The state counted 2,711,603 students enrolled in its public schools in 
Fall 2008, the third largest population after California and Texas.  
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court rulings struck the organization of school finance systems when they were 
deemed less favorable to students from poor districts or disabled students or required 
states to provide larger payment to health care providers.  
 
A recent example is the decision offered by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
the case Brown v. Plata (Supreme Court, 2011) which ordered the state of California 
to reduce its prison population by more than 30,000 inmates as it failed to provide 
sufficient care to prisoners.  
 
VOTER INITIATIVES  
 
Proposition 13, an amendment to the Constitution of California passed in 1978, 
spearheaded a certain number of voters initiatives that limited budget flexibility. As of 
December 2008, 30 states operated under a tax or expenditure limitation (TEL). A 
majority, 23, had spending limits while 4 had tax limits. Only 3 states implemented 
both. The evidence supporting that TELs effectively limit the size and spending of 
state governments as well as improve their efficiency is quite mixed (Gordon, 2008; 
Waisanen, 2008) and seems to be heavily dependent on the legal specificities proper to 
each states.   
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Figure 2.2. State Tax and Expenditure Limits (as of 2008) 
 
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures 
 
EXCESSIVE SPENDING 
 
The legacy of structural overspending during the boom periods of the business cycle is 
not shared by every state but has been an acute issue in certain. Moore (1991) and 
Edwards et al. (2003), following the recessions of the early 1990s and 2000s, have 
suggested that some states were responsible for their poor fiscal performance during 
periods of economic stagnation because of the new spending programs they 
implemented during expansionary times. Even though the sustainability of states fiscal 
policy is still a heavily debated topic with an unclear terminology (Ward and Dadayan, 
2009), a small study by Mitchell (2010) finds a positive relationship between the 
growth of per capita spending and the size of the budget gap over the period 1987 – 
2007. Another study by Stansel and Mitchell (2008) focusing on the 2001 crisis and its 
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aftermath also found statistical evidence that overspending could translate into 
increased fiscal stress.    
 
According to data from the National Association of State Budget Officers and 
controlling for inflation and population growth, the total spending growth rate 
averaged 29% for the 50 states between FY 2000 and FY 2009. 19 states were above 
the average, with West Virginia (+152%), Vermont (+98%), Alaska (+86%), Oregon 
(+65%) and Colorado (+61%) at the top and Florida (-14%), South Carolina (-12%) 
and Georgia (+1%) at the bottom. Among large states having experienced repeated 
troubles during previous recessions, only Massachusetts (+43%) had a growth rate 
higher than the average. New York (+29%) and Pennsylvania (+27%) were close to 
the average. Spending growth was relatively moderate in New Jersey (+22%), 
California (+18%), Connecticut (+11%), Michigan (+5%) and Illinois (+2%).  
 
Figure 2.3. Total state spending growth rate (annual average, FY 2000 – FY 2009) 
 
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures 
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DYSFUNCTIONAL TAX SYSTEMS  
  
The revenue structure of each state differs widely
19
, but on average 51.7% of the 
states‘ general revenue came from taxes in FY 2008. They consist of income and sales 
tax, excise taxes and license taxes. They are completed by different charges and fees 
which represent approximately 10% of revenues. Among these two categories, tuition 
fees from higher education institutions and revenues from state hospitals are the two 
largest contributors. The rest consists of fees collected on public services such as 
transportation, tolls and waste disposal.  
 
Table 2.1. Taxes as a proportion of state and local governments‘ revenue (FY 2007) 
 States Local Governments 
Sales / gross receipts taxes 34% 10% 
Personal income taxes 26% 3% 
Property taxes 1% 44% 
Corporate income taxes 5% 1% 
Other taxes 7% 4% 
Nontax revenue 26% 38% 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
 
A tax system can be considered to be dysfunctional when it fails to fulfill four 
conditions: adequacy, stability, breadth and progressivity
20
.  
 
                                                 
19
 For instance, the largest item in Alaska’s revenue sources is “miscellaneous” (the royalties for oil 
exploitation) while Mississippi’s general revenue is essentially driven by transfers from the federal 
government. Nevada, because of its large tourism industry, is heavily reliant on the sales tax, hotel 
taxes and taxes on casino revenue. Total tax revenue in Oregon came mostly (77%) from personal and 
corporate income taxes.  
20
 The National Conference of State Legislatures utilizes a more comprehensive framework to judge of 
the quality and effectiveness of states tax systems. Among the principles it refers to are: reliability, 
equity, compliance, administration, responsiveness to interstate and international competition, 
economic neutrality and accountability (NCSL, 2010). We focus here on the two first dimensions.   
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- Adequacy relates to the ability of a tax system to provide sufficient revenue to 
fund the state‘s expenditures. A good proxy to measure the adequacy is the 
existence of structural budget deficits, i.e. a permanent imbalance between 
revenues and expenditures. A study by the Brookings Institution found that in 
the case of the California and the Intermountain West, only Colorado had no 
structural deficit. In California and Arizona, it amounted to 12% of general 
fund expenditures (Murray et al., 2009). It was 17% in Nevada.  
 
- Volatility of tax revenues has been a strong cause of increased fiscal stress 
among states. A study by the Rockefeller Institute of Government presented to 
the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives suggests 
that overall state tax collections collapsed by 11% in 2009, down to levels not 
seen since 2000 (Ward, 2010). On the contrary, local governments were 
relatively shielded from this trend because of the stability of the property tax.  
 
Figure 2.4. Year-over-year percent change in real state taxes and local taxes 
 
Source: Dadayan and Boyd (2010) 
Notes: (1) 4-quarter average of percent change in real tax revenue; (2) No adjustments 
for legislative changes 
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The volatility of states tax revenues – defined as the relationship of state tax 
revenues to the state‘s business cycle – during recession is not new. But it has 
certainly increased with the progressive transformation of the tax system of the 
―average‖ state, in particular its heightened reliance on the personal income 
tax. The income tax rose from representing 24% of total state tax revenues in 
1975 to more than 34% today, while the proportion of the corporate income tax 
has slowly declined from 8% in 1975 to 6% in 2009. Mattoon and 
McGranahan (2008) found statistical evidence that favoring income taxes as 
the main revenue source has made certain states
21
 much more sensitive to the 
business cycle, especially when they are cumulated with a tax on capital gains. 
But even states with relatively low tax volatility can face fiscal difficulty when 
the economic environment becomes unfavorable.  
 
Figure 2.5. Percent change in real per-capita state tax revenue 
 
Source: Boyd, 2009 
                                                 
21
 10 states have a statistically significant increased cyclical sensitivity: New York, Arizona, California, 
Georgia, Massachusetts, North Carolina, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Virginia.  
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- The breadth of the tax base has three dimensions. First and foremost, it 
depends on the nature of the different taxes a state enacts. States relying 
heavily on a single type of tax are more sensitive to economic downturns than 
states that can rely on alternative tax sources to fund their activities. The 
second dimension deals with the structure of the economy. As it moved from a 
durable goods consumption base to a service-oriented base the sales tax has 
come to cover a shrinking share of total household spending. Taxation of 
services – except those related to the sale of a tangible personal property – 
remains rare in most states (Hellerstein et al., 2009). Furthermore, as a society 
ages more and more of its households derive their revenues from non-taxable 
(or weakly taxed) sources such as pensions. This implies that the income tax 
base gets narrower. The last aspect of the breadth of a state‘s tax base is 
politics, with politicians often willing to shrink the tax base to satisfy voters or 
attract new industries on their territories.  
- In modern democracies, the regressivity of a tax system is the final component 
to observe to determine whether or not it is functional
22
. An analysis of the 
fairness of state tax systems yields widely different conclusions according to 
the states under consideration, in particular given the types of tax they collect. 
If the state income taxes are progressive, property taxes levied by local 
governments and sales and excise taxes are typically regressive. The Institute 
on Taxation and Economic Policy found that in FY 2007 ―nearly every state 
                                                 
22
 Fairness is thus incorporated as a defining element of a well-functioning tax system.  
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and local tax system takes a much greater share of income from middle- and 
low-income families than from the wealthy; that is, when all state and local 
income, sales, excise and property taxes are added up, most state tax systems 
are regressive (Davis et al., 2009). According to this study, the four best 
performers in the regressitivity category were the District of Columbia, 
Delaware, Vermont and New York.  
 
Figure 2.6. State and local taxes on residents in FY 2007 (% of total income) 
 
Source: Davis et al., 2009 
 
From an empirical point of view, the most comprehensive measure capturing the 
deterioration of a tax system is certainly its personal income elasticity, i.e. the 
percentage change in revenue resulting from a 1 percent increase in personal income. 
Between 1965 and 2007, the long-run elasticity of total state tax revenue for the 50 
states and the District of Columbia has been estimated to be 1.17 (Felix, 2008). This 
means that for each additional dollar in personal income, states have perceived on 
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average
23
 $1.17 more in tax revenues. The elasticity of tax revenue is dependent on the 
type of tax under consideration. It has been established that corporate income tax 
revenues sales tax revenues tend to have an elasticity slightly inferior to the unit 
(0.92), with the general sales tax closer to one than the sales taxes on alcohol, tobacco 
and gasoline. The personal income tax, although this is not universal, has a higher 
elasticity and a higher volatility (Bruce, Fox and Tuttle, 2006).  
 
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS POLICIES  
  
Since 1972 there has been a structural growth in the number of state inmates
24
 which 
skyrocketed from 174,379 to 1,404,503 in 2009. Cumulated with prisoners in local 
jails and federal penitentiaries, it is estimated that approximately 1 in 100 American 
adult is behind bars. With stiffer and longer sentences passed, corrections costs have 
steadily climbed over the past 20 years, and now represent nearly 7% of state general 
fund discretionary dollars, or $50 billion. In terms of growth as a share of state 
expenditures, corrections was only topped by Medicaid.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 There is substantial variation from state to state. The personal income elasticity of tax revenue in 
Colorado over that period was actually inferior to one, whereas it is substantially larger than 1.17 in 
the case of Kansas.  
24
 Prisons indeed concentrate 88% of the increase in the correctional budget over the past 25 years. 
The rest of the increase went to probation and parole.  
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Figure 2.7. Total state prison population 
 
Source: Pew, 2010 
 
Figure 2.8. Growth in the principal budget items of state governments (FY 1988 – FY 
2008) 
 
Source: Pew, 2009 
 
FEDERALISM 
   
Through fiscal federalism and the aid it grants, Washington has a strong bearing on the 
budgets of state and local governments. In fiscal year 2010, grants and other payments 
from the federal government to state and local governments amounted to more than 
$630 billion , up from $253 billion in FY 1998 (Census Bureau, 2011). The largest 
area was the Medical Assistance Program, with $278 billion (44.1%).  
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Figure 2.9. Federal aid to state and local governments: annual amounts by major 
program areas ($ in billions) 
 
Source: Census Bureau, 2011 
 
By agency, Health and Human Services topped the ranking with $348.2 billion, 
followed by Education ($73.2 billion), Transportation ($63.9 billion) and Agriculture 
($32.8 billion). The number of federal aid programs to the states has also skyrocketed 
over the past 20 years: they numbered 463 in 1990, against 1,122 in 2010 (Edwards, 
2011).  
 
In the dire hours of the recession, federal fiscal relief proved particularly important for 
states to close their burgeoning budget gaps. Indeed, on the $787 billion made 
available by Congress under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 – 
commonly referred to as the ―stimulus package‖ – $140 billion directly went to the 
states. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities estimated that the package would 
help states close on average 40% of their budget shortfalls over the three fiscal years 
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starting in 2009
25
 (Oliff, Shure and Johnson, 2009). These dollars were primarily used 
to fund Medicaid ($87 billion) and education ($50 billion).  
 
There has been a relative consensus about economists that increased aid from the 
federal government was a relatively inexpensive way to stabilize the economy. For 
instance, Zandi (2009) found that among the measures contained in the ARRA, 
general aid to government had one of the highest multipliers.  
 
Table 2.2. Economic impact of the fiscal stimulus 
Spending increases Multiplier 
     Extending unemployment insurance benefits 1.61 
     Temporary federal financing of work-share 
programs 
1.69 
     Temporary increase in food stamps 1.74 
     General aid to state governments 1.41 
     Increased infrastructure spending 1.57 
 
Tax cuts  
     Non-refundable lump-sum tax rebate 1.01 
     Refundable lump-sum tax rebate 1.22 
Temporary tax cuts  
     Payroll tax holiday 1.29 
     Across-the-board tax cut 1.02 
     Accelerated depreciation 0.25 
     Loss carryback 0.21 
     Housing tax credit 0.9 
 
Permanent tax cuts  
     Extend unemployment insurance benefits 0.51 
     Make Bush income tax cuts permanent 0.32 
     Make dividend and capital gains tax cuts 
permanent 
0.37 
     Cut in corporate tax rate 0.32 
Source: Moody‘s Analytics (2010) 
                                                 
25
 New York State reported it would close 31% of its gap.  
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Since Gerald Ford refused in 1975 that the federal government comes to the rescue of 
the ailing finances of New York City – an adamant position translated by the tabloid 
press in a famous cover ―Ford to City: Drop Dead‖26 – Washington has been more 
inclined to support state and local governments in times of recession. If Ronald 
Reagan briefly inversed the trend in 1981, most of the reductions he proposed 
afterward were blocked by Congress. Given the explosive growth of Medicaid and the 
uncertain economic context during the presidency of George H. Bush, federal aid 
soared by $72 billion between 1989 and 1993. In the early 1990s, states were also 
eager to transfer costs to the federal government via legal loopholes, the most famous 
of which was the use of provider-specific taxes and donations as a source of state 
matching funds (GAO, 1994). In general, however, Washington has played a positive 
role in the state budget equation.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The sources of the current episode of fiscal stress among states are plural, and if we 
reviewed an important number of them, the list is far from being exhaustive. 
Moreover, the finances of each state are subject to their own cyclical and structural 
factors which make any generalization difficult. The violence of the recession 
certainly explains a good deal of the state fiscal crisis but we have seen that other 
causes – such as the structural growth of Medicaid or an increased reliance on a more 
volatile tax base – also played an important role. Several states experienced 
unsustainable rates of growth of their expenditures and probably would have 
                                                 
26
 The Daily News, October 30, 1975.  
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experienced substantial fiscal stress in the coming years even there had been no 
recession.  
 
2.2 Cutback Management in an Era of Scarcity  
 
The oil shock of 1973, the legacy of overspending of the 1960s as well as the long-
lasting stagflation of the 1970s led to the first post-war experiences of fiscal stress for 
state and local governments. These events caused a large number of states to deviate 
significantly from an efficient management of their finances, crippling the certitude of 
the era of ―grand expectations‖27 that public revenues and expenditures would 
continue to expand vigorously and continuously. Since the 1970s and the quasi-
bankruptcy of New York City, budgetary issues at the state and local levels have been 
cyclically dominated by resource scarcity, entering an ―era of limits‖ (McTighe, 
1979:86) characterized by cutback management. The idea that public agencies would 
continue to grow incrementally ad infinitum, a core concept of public finance, 
effectively collapsed.  
 
2.2.1 The evolution of cutback management strategies since the 
1970s 
 
Cutback management, defined by Levine (1979) as the management of ―organizational 
change towards lower levels of resource consumption and organizational activity‖, 
                                                 
27
 The expression, coined by historian James Patterson (1997), refers to the United States between 
1945 and 1974.  
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took root in public administration when states and local governments started to 
experience regular episodes of fiscal distress. The nature of cutback management, 
however, significantly evolved with policy priorities and political necessities. Up until 
the 2000s, state governments addressed their ailing public finances by both increasing 
revenues and cutting expenditures, trying to shield education and Medicaid from 
significant cuts. Borrowing and using up contingency reserves – such as rainy day 
funds
28
 – were also utilized to cushion the impact of the crises (Braun et al., 1993). 
Inefficient budget cuts targeting a percentage reduction of expenditures across-the-
board and destabilizing variations in tax rates resulted (Dougherty and Klase, 2009). 
The burst of the dot-com bubble and the post 9/11 recession marked a shift in policy. 
Governors and legislatures alike have been increasingly reluctant to increase revenues 
through taxation (see figure 2. ) and have overwhelmingly favored cuts to services to 
balance their budgets (Maag and Merriman, 2003; Scorsone and Plerhoples, 2010). 
This is especially true in states that enacted tax caps. Bowling and Burke (2006), 
paralleling some findings from Poterba (1996), indeed demonstrated that states having 
tax caps engage in deeper cuts than the states that do not.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
 Rainy day funds are an innovation of the early 1980s.  
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Figure 2.10. Tax increases during the 1991 and 2001 recessions (percent of the 
previous year‘s tax revenue) 
 
Source: Scorsone and Plerhoples (2010) 
 
The widespread use of spending cuts during the last two recessions might also have an 
additional cause beyond political and social preferences. Rubin and Willoughby 
(2009) found the steeper and the longer the recession is, the more likely are states to 
use a broad array of strategies. Because there are only so many tax increases that can 
be enacted, it is not surprising to find that during episodes of acute economic crises 
spending cuts are increasingly used as the recession unfolds. On the tax side of this 
broad array of strategies, policy alternatives usually deals with a change of the tax 
structure to accommodate losses of revenue caused by the recession or a simple mark 
up of the tax rate to increase tax collections. Along these states can also seek new 
nontax sources of revenues, prominent among which is federal aid. Cutting 
expenditures to match the new level of revenues is also an alternative, as well as 
borrowing additional funds.  
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2.2.2 Patterns of cutback management 
 
THE “PHASED-IN-RESPONSES” MODEL AND FISCAL GIMMICKS 
  
An aspect of cutback management broadly discussed in the literature is the pattern – if 
one exists – through which state and local governments engage in fiscal retrenchment. 
Klase and Dougherty, in an influential 2008 paper, support the model of ―phased-in 
responses‖ initially proposed by Levine et al. (1981). According to this model, states 
engage first in across-the-board cuts to tackle their deficits. When the strategy proves 
insufficient, they then turn to targeted budget cuts and program eliminations. 
Practically however, many of the actions taken by state governments are one-time-
only measures, which usually span four categories: 
- Across-the-board cuts, including laying off employees 
- Tapping rainy funds 
- Reorganizing programs 
- Other methods, such as offering early retirement, delaying expenditures or 
increasing sin taxes  
The use of these one-time-only measures, pejoratively referred to as ―fiscal 
gimmicks‖, is quite common, and is the object of fierce political and rhetorical battles 
between the several offices that share responsibility for the budget
29
. For instance, the 
Office of the New York State Comptroller systematically criticized an overuse of 
fiscal gimmicks by the Legislature and the Governor during recessions.  
 
                                                 
29
 Usually the state legislature, the office of the Governor and the state Comptroller.  
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Table 2.3. Assessment of the New York State budget by the State Comptroller 
Letter from the Comptroller 2003 
(p.7) 
“This year’s budget continued the State’s reliance on 
debt, non-recurring resources and other fiscal 
gimmicks” 
Letter from the Comptroller 2008 
(p.7) 
“The State’s repeated reliance on band-aid solutions, 
such as budgeting for risky revenues that often do 
not materialize, nonrecurring resources – know as 
“one-shots” – and the issuance of debt to parch over 
single-year budget gaps has created the illusion of a 
more solid and reliable revenue foundation than 
actually exists” 
Letter from the Comptroller 2009 
(p.7) 
“Instead of constraining spending to available 
revenues, the State again used temporary revenue as 
a short-term solution to the State’s budget crisis and 
did not address the State’s long-term structural 
budget imbalance” 
Letter from the Comptroller 2010 
(p.7) 
“The State continues to be overly reliant on non-
recurring, temporary and risky resources to balance 
its budgets” 
Letter from the Comptroller 2011 
(p.7) 
“The State Fiscal Year 2011-12 Enacted Budget made 
significant progress in addressing the State’s 
structural deficit primarily through spending 
reductions and without relying heavily on temporary 
revenue, one-shots or fiscal gimmicks” 
Source: Office of the New York State Comptroller, Comprehensive Annual Financial 
Report, various years 
 
A TAXONOMY OF STRATEGIES FOR FISCAL ADJUSTMENT  
 
Strategies to carry out short-run and long-run fiscal adjustments have been classified 
by the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO, 2002) in four 
categories: general, revenues, expenditures and other.  
 
Table 2.4. Strategies to balance the budget 
GENERAL REVENUES EXPENDITURES OTHER 
Across-the-board 
cuts 
Close corporate 
income and 
individual income 
tax loopholes 
Appropriation 
controls 
Medicaid cost 
containment 
measures 
Targeted cuts Corporate tax State employee Develop a baseline 
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surcharge retirement and 
benefits adjustments 
Budget stabilization 
fund / other reserve 
funds or borrowing 
against them  
Change state tax 
filings 
Delay program 
expansions 
 
Revenue forecasting 
Tobacco settlement 
funds 
Delay tax cuts Use of technology Error analysis 
Revenue transfers Debt finance 
Alter end of year 
spending practices 
 
Layoffs, furloughs, 
early retirement, and 
hiring and salary 
freezes 
Add income tax 
bracket 
Use of one-time 
revenues 
 
Travel freezes 
Create state lotteries 
and gaming 
Bond sells  
Program streamlining 
and reorganization 
Creative tax 
adjustments 
Defer or cut 
reimbursements 
 
Cut local government 
aid 
Amnesty programs 
Suspend tax credits 
and deductions 
 
Privatization and 
contracting -out 
Enhance penalties Close parks  
Tax and fee increases 
Enhance standards 
for exemptions 
Freeze COLA for 
programs and 
employees 
 
Freeze state 
spending 
Loosen legislation on 
local 
Government 
Delay payments  
Tax increase 
referenda 
Divert a portion of 
the sales tax 
Defer tax refunds  
Spending controls Sell or sale-leaseback 
Keep vacancies 
unfilled 
 
 Bond refinancing Review contracts  
 
Speedup tax 
collections 
Cut, reducing, or 
suspending K-12 and 
university programs 
 
 
Step up donation 
solicitations for 
colleges and 
universities 
Prolong in-state-
tuition 
qualifications 
 
 
Use multi-year 
forecasting 
Providing fiscal 
incentives to save 
 
  
Accelerate capital 
projects 
 
  Stimulate tourism  
  Reduce allotments  
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  Suspend training  
  
Eliminate state-
subsidies 
 
  Material cutbacks  
  
Change funding 
formulas 
 
 
 
ARE STATE FISCAL POLICIES PRO-CYCLICAL? 
  
The expansion and success of the Welfare state had profound consequences for state 
public finances. Indeed, Medicaid coverage and demand for welfare subsidies – in 
particular unemployment aid – boom during recessions, whereas forecasted growth in 
revenues trail significantly financing needs. Due to these automatic stabilizers
30
, a 
mechanical weakening of the states balance sheet ensues. The pattern is aggravated by 
the still dominant belief during periods of boom that state revenues will continuously 
improved. On that account, legislatures pursue aggressively policies of budget and 
services expansion when the economy experiences economic growth, even though a 
rising proportion of revenues must be channeled to fixed expenditures, first among 
which are health care programs. The consequence is a pro-cyclical fiscal policy: states 
slash spending when their economies‘ needs for government demand is the greatest 
while they increase tax rates on a shrinking and struggling tax base (McGranahan, 
2002).  
 
                                                 
30
 Automatic stabilizers are usually defined in the literature as the elements of fiscal policy resulting 
from non-discretionary government action which contribute to mitigate the fluctuations of aggregate 
output (Eaton and Rosen, 1980).   
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The pro-cyclicality of the fiscal policies of states governments is also an artifact of the 
strict balanced budget rules they came to enact. If the federal government is indeed 
authorized to run deficits to help stabilizing demand and output – a legal feature which 
enables it to play a counter-cyclical role during recessions – this is not the case of 
most states
31
. This is nowhere more apparent than in the comparison between the 
policy-mixes adopted by the federal government and by the state governments. While 
Washington entered the recession with a clear focus on counter-cyclical actions 
(ARRA, TARP, temporary cuts on payroll taxes, extension of the Bush tax cuts, 
extension of unemployment benefits), state legislatures slashed their payrolls, cut 
programs and raised taxes.   
 
Moreover, state governments tend to formulate unbalanced responses to changes in 
their economic and fiscal environment. Poterba (1994) finds that states have vigorous 
reactions to unexpected deficits but are unresponsive to unexpected surpluses. Public 
agencies as declining organizations must therefore answer tough questions when 
deciding whether or not they should resist or embrace cuts, the magnitude of the cuts, 
their repartition and the tradeoff that exists between efficiency and equity. These 
questions form the core of cutback management as an academic discipline (Levine, 
1979). Bartle (1996) offers an overview of its application to the case of cities in New 
York State that have faced important shortfalls in revenues.     
 
                                                 
31
 Vermont is the only exception. The strictness of the balanced budget rules vary by states.  
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In general, the pro-cyclicality of states‘ fiscal policies has had a negative impact on 
aggregate demand. The mechanism plays through two channels: (i) a direct channel 
when states slash their payrolls, reduce benefits and raise taxes and (ii) an indirect 
channel when they cut back on expenditures that themselves represent a demand for 
local businesses. Excluding the indirect effects, the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
found that the fiscal policies of state and local governments took 0.1 point off GDP 
growth in 2009, and 0.2 point in 2010 and the outlook remained negative for 2011 and 
2012.  
 
Figure 2.11. Contributions to GDP growth of the federal and non-federal governments 
 
Source: Lucas, 2011 
 
Even more interesting in the case of this recession, state and local governments 
continued to weight down on GDP growth even after the recovery started (Canally, 
2011). Over the deepest recessions that struck the U.S. economy since the first oil 
shock, this is the first time that state and local governments contributed negatively to 
the expansion of the GDP. 
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Table 2.5. Contribution to GDP growth over the first seven quarters of recovery (in 
percentage points of GDP growth) 
 Recovery 
from 2007 – 
2009 
recession 
Recovery 
from 2001 
recession 
Recovery 
from 1990 – 
1991 
recession 
Recovery 
from 1981 – 
1982 
recession 
Recovery 
from 1973 – 
1975 
recession 
Consumer 
spending 
11.0 13.3 15.4 24.7 18.9 
Housing -0.3 3.0 3.0 7.3 6.2 
State & Local 
government 
spending 
-1.5 0.8 1.4 2.2 0.2 
Source: Canally, 2011 
Note: longest episodes of recession according to the NBER 
 
2.3 The States in the Financial and Economic Crisis: Conditions 
and Policies  
 
2.3.1 General indicators of the deficit 
 
In fiscal 2010 alone, states had to resolve their largest budget gap ever, $192 billion. 
This is nearly as much as the budget shortfalls experienced by states in fiscal 2002, 
2003 and 2004 combined ($195 billion). Overall, NASBO (2010, 2011) estimated that 
states will face cumulated budget gaps of $296.6 billion between FY 2009 and FY 
2012, with nearly $230 billion realized up to FY 2011. Intervention by the federal 
government through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), 
which attributed $87 billion in Medicaid funds and $48 billion in education funds, 
certainly helped bridge the gap, but the program waned down in FY 2011. $59 billion 
were transferred to state under this program in FY 2011, an amount that will fall to $6 
billion in 2012. Without this additional help, it is clear that public finances at the state 
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level will take time to recover. Furthermore, the full effect of the economic crisis and 
of the dereliction of the real estate market on local finances – which rely heavily on 
property tax – remain to be seen, because the property tax assessment cycles usually 
take several years and the effect on sales tax is lagged (Hoene and Pagano, 2009).    
 
Figure 2.12. Total state budget shortfall ($ in billions) 
 
Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities  
Note: Data for FY 2012 are preliminary                                    
 
The deterioration of the states‘ fiscal position is clearly illustrated by the 
unprecedented two year decline in aggregated general fund
32
 spending for FY 2009 
and FY 2010, from $687.3 billion in FY 2008 to $657.9 billion in FY 2009 and $612.9 
billion in FY 2010. Revenues from sales, personal income and corporate income – 
which make up to 80% of the general fund revenues – also collapsed by nearly 12% in 
FY 2009 and remained significantly lower than in FY 2008 in both FY 2010 and 2011.  
                                                 
32
 General funds, which represented 42.5% of states funding sources in fiscal 2009, is the predominant 
fund for financing operations. Revenues are drawn from taxes.  
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To deal with the strain, legislatures increased taxes and fees by $23.9 billion in FY 
2010. Revenue efforts however faded markedly in FY 2011, with less than $3.1 billion 
in taxes and fees increases proposed by governors in their budgets. The weakness in 
revenues along with the expanding demand for state services, in particular social 
assistance and Medicaid, forced 43 states into implementing mid-year budget cuts in 
FY 2009, amounting to $31.3 billion. The trend continued over FY 2010, with 40 
states cutting approximately $22 billion from their budgets during the fiscal year. The 
cuts were far larger than those realized during the last economic downturn, in 2001-02, 
when they amounted to $14 billion and $12 billion respectively. Gubernatorial 
spending cuts were the privileged method to close mid-year budget gaps (Scorsone 
and Plerhoples, 2010). 
 
Manifestation of fiscal stress in the states general funds manifested as early as fiscal 
2007
33
, when the $18.2 billion surplus accumulated by states over the year melted into 
a $1.9 billion deficit. Fiscal balance in FY 2006 was actually even stronger, as 
stabilization funds totaled $22.4 billion, and the fiscal position of the states in early 
2008 remained solid. Once again accounting for contingency funds, the general fund 
remained positive in fiscal 2008. From late 2008 onward, the situation became more 
and more precarious. With rising unemployment, free-falling industrial activities, 
deleveraging across economic sectors and contracting consumption, revenues for the 
general fund collapsed significantly.   
 
                                                 
33
 The recession officially started in December 2007 according to the National Bureau of Economic 
Research.  
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Figure 2.13. General fund revenue ($ in billions) 
 
Source: NASBO 
Note: FY2010 is preliminary actual and FY2011 is enacted                
 
Figure 2.14. General fund balance ($ in billions) 
 
      
Source: NASBO 
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2.3.2 A better indicator of fiscal stress: the year-end total 
balance level 
 
Deficits themselves are however far from being a reliable indicator of fiscal stress as 
almost all states are constitutionally required to balance their budgets. The statistic 
preferred by the National Association of State Budget Officers is the states‘ year-end 
balances and how they fare with respect to the recommended threshold of 5% of 
general revenues
34
. Balance levels are indeed a more accurate measure of fiscal stress 
because they essentially capture the fiscal ability of a state to mitigate the impact of an 
economic downturn on its services and programs. As such, total balances include both 
ending balances and extraordinary funds that are available to the state to respond to 
unforeseen circumstances (the so-called rainy day funds)
35
. Total balance levels are 
most commonly expressed as a percentage of general fund expenditures, to capture the 
size of the fiscal cushion on which states can rely to meet their public service 
obligations.  
 
The quality of this measure is clear when taking the example of the 2001 recession
36
. 
NASBO relates that in fiscal 2000, states had accumulated balances reaching a 
considerable 10.4% of expenditures. By 2003, this bounty had shrunk to 3.2%. The 
states performed even better during the 2000s. In FY 2006, total balances represented 
                                                 
34
 The recommendation aims at insuring against inaccurate revenue forecasting and at guaranteeing 
the state’s ability to face emergency situations (for instance natural or human-caused catastrophes) or 
possible changes in federal legislation.  
35
 In 2011, 48 states had at least one such fund.  
36
A limit of this indicator is that a small number of states can have a disproportionate impact on the 
national average.Also, the methodology used by each state to report to NASBO is somewhat different.  
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11.6% of general fund expenditures. The subprime crisis and the following recession 
substantially altered the picture.  
 
Figure 2.12. Total year-end balances (percentage of expenditures) 
 
Source: NASBO 
 
The aggregated balance level for FY 2011, at 4.9% of expenditures, although 
seemingly reassuring, is somewhat of a trompe l’oeil as two states alone, Texas and 
Alaska, made up 48.3% of the total $31.9 billion
37
. When removed, the balance levels 
fall at 2.7%, very close to the dire situation of FY 1991 and far below the 
recommended 5%. At a more disaggregated level, 11 states had balances inferior to 
1% in fiscal 2011. 19 states had balances ranging between 1% and 5%. NASBO 
estimated that the balance levels would stabilize at a very similar level in FY 2012. It 
is expected that 12 states will have balances inferior to 1% in fiscal 2012, and 22 states 
forecasted balances between 1% and 5%. These statistics are particularly important in 
                                                 
37
 With $10.4 billion, Alaska represented a little bit less than a third of the total balance.   
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view of our dissertation, which deals with mid-year budget cuts. Indeed, the lower the 
balance the more difficult it becomes for states to tackle unanticipated budget gaps 
occurring during the fiscal year. With so many states under the 5% threshold, there is a 
clear risk of a multiplication of mid-year fiscal adjustments. Moreover, even though 
the balances remained positive at the height of the crisis, the fact that revenue revival 
usually trails the national economic recovery implies that legislatures and governors 
are reluctant to tap rainy day funds to absorb part of the recessionary shock, darkening 
the picture a little more.    
 
Figure 2.16. Number of states by total year-end balances (as a percentage of 
expenditures) 
 
Source: NASBO 
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Figure 2.17. Total State Balance Levels (FY 2010) 
 
Source: NASBO 
 
This does not necessarily reflect a lack of preparation, as contingency funds have 
significantly grown since their inception in the 1980s. State and local government 
savings started to increase rapidly with the first acute and generalized fiscal crisis in 
the 1970s. Since the 1990s, the magnitude of savings and deficits has been multiplied 
several times over, while swings have been increasingly correlated with booms and 
busts.  
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Figure 2.18. Net State and Local Government Saving ($ in billions, quarterly, 
seasonally adjusted annual rate) 
 
 Source: Economic Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
 
 
Curiously, increased level of savings in the form of contingency funds – funds that are 
parsimoniously used – may have contributed to disqualify tax hikes. Politically risky, 
tax increases indeed do not appear necessary as long as the states still have funds 
available in its rainy-day reserve.  What is certain is that since their inception, rainy 
day funds have come to represent a significant proportion of the year-end balances of 
most states, and as such constitute a strategic tool to manage the business cycle. 
However, a 5% end-year balance appears to be quite modest in comparison of the 
fiscal challenges posed by certain recessions. Several institutions argued that a 15% or 
higher benchmark should be recommended
38
 (Navin and Navin, 1997; Berube and 
Lav, 1999; GFOA, 2002), although it should be noted that the optimal size of budget 
stabilization funds is heavily dependent on the peculiarities of each state (Joyce, 
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2001). But even at 15%, the rainy day fund balance ($85 billion) would have been 
dwarfed by the size of the budget shortfalls faced by states ($425 billion).  
 
Figure 2.19. State rainy day funds and end-year balances (as a percent of 
expenditures) 
  
Source: NASBO, 2011 
Note: Excluding Alaska and Texas.  
 
 
2.3.3 Tax increases versus spending cuts  
 
It has been established in the introduction that this dissertation does not take part in the 
academic and political debate raging about the respective merits and weaknesses of 
budget cuts versus tax increases. The question, however, merits to be addressed 
briefly. The argument defended by Keynesian economists is that slashing spending has 
a depressive effect on the economy because it deprives agents – civil servants, 
contractors, local governments, non-profit organizations – from much needed revenue 
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and thus contributes to lower even more the level of aggregate consumption. On the 
contrary, increasing taxes on high-income brackets has a fairly limited effect on the 
economy, as the additional income taxed would have been saved nowadays. Except 
for rare exceptions, it seems that empirical evidences support this view
39
.  
 
The economic impacts of state tax increases are still however much debated among 
economists, no matter how important they may be to balance budgets. Brown (1956) 
argues that the state governments raised taxes so much during the Great Depression in 
a desperate attempt to jam the vicious circle of falling revenues that they undercut the 
fiscal stimulus created by the federal government and may have contributed to extend 
the economic slump of the Thirties.  
 
The question is of interest to us because by using a social accounting matrix 
framework we make the implicit assumption that the spending multiplier of state 
governments is positive, i.e. that slashing expenditures would lead to a contraction in 
the aggregate level of output. Thus, SAM clearly refutes the theory according to which 
contractions can be expansionary
40
. We will come back to this issue in Chapter IV.  
 
 
 
                                                 
39
 For a summary of the debate, see The Economist (2011).  
40
 It is all the more evident that SAM is a static framework, and therefore cannot take into account the 
anticipations agents formulate about the future state of the economy.  
61 
 
2.3.4 State policies in the crisis 
 
EXPENDITURE POLICIES 
 
Increased fiscal stress caused active spending management 
 
State expenditure levels have been negatively affected by the loss of Recovery Act 
funds and by lower than expected tax collections. Consequently, 42 states and Puerto 
Rico reported budget gaps amounting $73.1 billion in FY 2009. Gaps increased to 
$107.8 billion in FY 2010 and 32 states reported $62.3 billion in budget gaps for fiscal 
2011. Because 49 states are constitutionally required to balance their budgets, losses in 
revenues must be compensated by an equivalent reduction in spending. In fiscal 2010, 
36 states used targeted cuts and 28 states across-the-board cuts. Comparatively, only 
19 states tapped into their rainy day funds, illustrating the perception in capitals 
throughout the country that the crisis would extend well into FY 2011 and 2012. 
Figures were similar for FY 2011, with 35 state governors proposing targeted cuts and 
19 across-the-board cuts. 15 governors proposed to use rainy-day funds.  
 
Budget cuts and rainy-day funds are not the only ways for state governments to 
navigate the difficulties of the crisis. In FY 2010, 26 states employed layoffs and 22 
instituted furlough programs to tackle burgeoning deficits. These policies were 
pursued by 19 and 13 states respectively in FY 2011. The implementation of these 
pro-cyclical policies has been at the heart of numerous public debates in the United 
States, and came back at the forefront of the media with the poor performance of the 
U.S. job market in May and June 2011 (BLS, 2011). Indeed, if the private sector 
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added 57,000 jobs in May, public employment continued spiraling downward for the 
eighth consecutive month, especially in state and local governments.   
 
The active management of fiscal policies in the states is clearly illustrated by the 
change in the growth rate of spending from the general fund. At the peak of the boom 
in fiscal 2007, expenditures from the general fund grew by 8.5% and 4.2% in FY 
2008. Following the Lehman Shock, spending contracted by 3.3% in fiscal 2009. This 
is in line with the GDP percent change based on chained 2005 dollars for the entire 
country, at -3.5%, but significantly higher than the contraction recorded in fiscal 1991 
(-0.1%). On the other hand, the adjustment has been less brutal than in FY 1983, when 
real general fund budget decreased by 6.3%. The lag reaction in the case of the 2007 
recession seems however to have been magnified, as general fund spending contracted 
by 5.9% in fiscal 2010. The exceptional character of the early 1980s and 2007 
recessions is visible on figure . Moreover, all seven categories
41
 of the general fund 
were negatively affected except for transportation in 2010.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41
 Elementary & secondary education, higher education, public assistance, Medicaid, corrections, 
transportation and all other expenditures.  
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Figure 2.20. Annual percentage budget change, FY 1979-2012  
 
Source: NASBO 
 
State general fund spending trended upward after the drought of 2009 and 2010, with 
$651.5 billion spent over fiscal 2011 and $668.6 billon expected for FY 2012. This is 
however still far from the level reached in fiscal 2008 where states‘ general fund 
spending amounted to $685.7 billion. At a more disaggregated level, 40 states 
proposed an increase in general fund spending in FY 2012, even though 29 will still 
have spending levels below those of fiscal 2008. In fiscal 2011, 20 states recorded 
general fund spending increasing by more than 5%, while 18 grew by less than 5%. 12 
states were still fighting an uphill battle and had general fund spending below fiscal 
2010 levels. The picture has thus improved considerably compared with the intense 
fiscal stress of fiscal 2009 and 2010. Indeed, only 10 states estimated general fund 
spending growth for FY 2010. This was even worse than for fiscal 2009, were twice as 
many states increased their spending.  
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Figure 2.21. Repartition of states by change in general fund spending (FY 2007-2012) 
 
Source: NASBO 
* Estimated              
** Recommended 
 
Major spending areas affected 
 
Having established the sources of the fiscal crisis and having put some general 
statistics on the budgetary environment of the states since the recession of 2007, we 
can now turn our attention to a more disaggregated picture of the states‘ fiscal policies. 
As will be seen clearly in the following paragraphs, states have cut more deeply in 
their budgets than might have appeared at first hand. Indeed, the federal government 
helped state legislatures to withstand a considerable amount of pressure, and only by 
dividing budget contributions by origin can we obtain a better understanding of the 
delicate situation states are in since 2007. This is why we start this section with what 
we believe to best the best indicator of fiscal hardship available: the evolution of the 
states payroll, which clearly illustrates the impact of the economic crisis on state 
policies across the country.  
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The structure of state general funds is such that budget cuts must be implemented in a 
relatively limited number of programs. The bulk of total state spending in FY 2009 
was represented by elementary and secondary education, followed by Medicaid and 
higher education. A significant chunk of spending is also gathered in the ―all other 
expenditures‖ account42. Elementary and secondary education gathered 35.1% of all 
spending in fiscal 2009, Medicaid 16.2%, higher education 11.1%, corrections 7.2%, 
transportation 0.7%, public assistance 1.9% and all other expenditures 27.8%.  
 
Figure 2.19. States spending by program (FY 2009) 
 
Source: NASBO  
 
STATE EMPLOYMENT 
 
As illustrated by the grim numbers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics we previously 
quoted, states have reduced employment to tackle their deficits. It is however difficult 
                                                 
42
 All other expenditures in states includes the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), 
institutional and community care for the mentally ill and developmentally disabled, public health 
programs, employer contributions to pensions and health benefits (only partially taken into account in 
the case of New York State), economic development, environmental projects, state police, parks and 
recreation, housing, and general aid to local governments 
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to analyze the magnitude of the cuts announced by state and local governments 
because they usually concern authorized general fund positions, which can be vacant. 
States can also used accounting techniques to decrease artificially their payrolls by 
shifting employees from general fund positions to positions financed by fees and 
charges.  
 
The reduction in state employment, although severe, may thus have been exaggerated 
in the media. Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics suggest that state employment 
reached a peak in October 2008 before continuously falling up until today. States had 
5.316 million employees at this time, a number that fell 5.058 million in October 2011 
(-200,000 employees)
43
. In magnitude, losses were heavier in local governments, 
which employment fell from 14.648 million in October 2008 to 14.109 in October 
2011 (-539,000 employees). These numbers appear historically high: in the wake of 
the 1991 recession, states shed a total of 19,000 workers. Moreover, public 
employment at this level of government only contracted for a 3-month period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
43
 In comparison, a total of 190,000 jobs disappeared in France in 2009.   
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Figure 2.23. Change in employees on state and local governments payrolls (seasonally 
adjusted) 
 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation (various years) 
 
MEDICAID 
 
A particular source of strain on state budgets is the Medicaid program, which 
exponential growth has been difficult to contain even before the crisis. The program, 
offering comprehensive and long-term medical care for more than 60 million low-
income individuals in 2011, has been at the heart of states fiscal policy ever since the 
1980s and continued expanding at a rapid pace in the 2000s. As a share of state 
spending, Medicaid surpassed higher education as the second largest program in fiscal 
1990, before taking the top spot from elementary and secondary education in fiscal 
2003
44
. The expansion of Medicaid can be attributed to several factors, prominent 
among which are: 
- Booming health care costs; 
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 There have been changes since 2003: in fiscal 2009, elementary and secondary education became 
the largest component again, a place it lost in fiscal 2010.  
-6% 
-5% 
-4% 
-3% 
-2% 
-1% 
0% 
1% 
2% 
3% 
4% 
2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 Peak to 
trough 
State 
Local 
68 
 
- The growth in the number of Medicaid recipients, propelled by the economic 
downturn and successive health care reforms extending the benefits of the 
program to new categories (for instance, the Affordable Care Act of March 
2010); 
- Increased use of services by recipients and above inflation growth in provider 
payment; 
- Higher premium payments for Medicare.  
 
Figure 2.21. State Medicaid spending ($ in billions) 
 
Source: Congressional Budget Office 
Due to the recession and its effects on unemployment and income, enrollment for 
health care coverage boomed by 6% in fiscal 2009, by 8.5% in 2010 and by 6.1% in 
2011. Projections anticipate that Medicaid enrollment would increase by 21% over the 
period 2009-11. Consequently, spending grew by 7.8%, 6.6% and 10.5% in fiscal 
2008, 2009 and 2011 respectively. It is difficult to fathom how such an explosive 
growth could have been accommodated by states in this era of fiscal restriction if one 
does not factor in the federal government. In fiscal 2008, 42.6% of the federal funds 
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perceived by the states went to Medicaid. While state funds contracted by 3% and 1% 
in fiscal 2008 and 2009, federal funds boomed by 16.6% and 14.4% respectively. It is 
interesting to note that these declines in state spending were a first in the history of the 
Medicaid program.  
 
Figure 2.22. State expenditures for Medicaid by fund source 
 
Source: NASBO 
 
The boost in Medicaid spending was essentially attributable to the temporary increase 
in the Federal Medicaid Assistance Percentage under the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009. However, the expiration of the Recovery Act led to much 
speculation in policy circles
45
 about the ability of states to cope with the decline in 
federal support. In total, it has been estimated that the improved FMAP delivered 
approximately $103.1 billion to states over the period October 2008 – June 2011.  
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 In their proposed budgets for FY 2011, certain governors assumed an extension of the funding, 
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Support from the federal government did not prevent states from rolling in new cost 
containment measures, with reducing provider payments the most popular strategy (39 
states in 2010 compared with 33 states in 2009). Other measures include limiting 
prescription drugs (13 states), delaying expansions (10 states), expanding managed 
care (9 states) and limiting benefits (9 states). With the recovery of state public 
finances even slower than the already anemic overall economic growth, limiting 
benefits and even eliminating benefits altogether have become widespread (20 and 14 
states in FY 2010 and 2011 respectively), illustrating the difficulty for governments to 
find other areas of saving. As the leeway gets narrower and narrower, 17 states 
decided on raising provider taxes or fees in fiscal 2010, with 5 states completing the 
move by raising tobacco taxes. On the credit side of their balance sheets, states 
benefited from the phasing down of contribution to the Medicare Part D clawback 
payments, a program initiated in early 2006.  
 
To conclude, if the size of the Medicaid program and its growth have been a source of 
fiscal stress for states, it is without measure with what could be imagined just looking 
at the raw figures. The burden of Medicaid spending has indeed been essentially 
shouldered by the federal government, although the situation should deteriorate 
significantly at the expiration of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.  
 
WELFARE 
 
Unsurprisingly, public assistance expenditures – essentially the Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF) program – increased markedly during the economic 
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downturn, as the number of recipients grew and benefits level and eligibility were 
increased. The pattern of increase was very similar to the one of the Medicaid 
program. Spending from state governments decreased significantly between fiscal 
2008 and 2010 (+0% and -7.4%), while federal funds jumped by 10.6% from FY 2008 
to 2009 alone (+14.1% in fiscal 2010)
46
. This however fail to take into account the 
transformation of public assistance in the 2000s, which progressively shifted away 
from cash benefits to other type of services, in particular childcare, training and 
education, transportation, substance abuse and domestic violence.  
 
Federal funding was essentially provided by the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act through an emergency fund for TANF. As a result, the federal 
government accounted indirectly for 51% of total state expenditures on public 
assistance in fiscal 2009, a proportion that rose to 56.1% in 2010.  
 
National averages mask tremendous changes according to regions and states. New 
England and the Southeast region witnessed a rapid growth of their expenditures on 
public assistance (+9.7% and +8.9% respectively in FY 2009) while they decreased 
significantly in the Great Lakes and the Rocky Mountains (-9% and -2.7% 
respectively). The direct contribution of states collapsed in every region except for 
Mid-Atlantic and the Plains. This decrease was particularly important in the Great 
Lakes (-37.1%) and the Southwest (-31.5%). On the other hand, the federal 
                                                 
46
 These data are on a cash basis. The total cost of TANF for the states is actually higher when 
accounting for noncash services, as the case of Michigan clearly illustrates. It was indeed estimated 
that the state spent $389.2 million in fiscal 2008 on child development and care expenditures.  
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government increased its support to every region, with New England (+64.2%) 
leading the pack.   
 
Other cash assistance programs are less important in size – 0.7% of expenditures in 
fiscal 2009 – and more difficult to analyze, as they vary considerably from one state to 
the other. Moreover, California alone accounted for nearly half of the total spending 
on these programs.  
 
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION 
 
A quick review of the numbers available for states expenditures on elementary and 
secondary education display a relatively rosy picture. They increased by 3.2% over 
fiscal 2009, a faster pace than the enrollment growth. Much to the like of Medicaid 
and welfare programs however, the increase is due to a surge in federal funds 
(+20.8%). Expenditures coming from the general fund actually declined by 0.5% in 
FY 2009. The trend accelerated in fiscal 2010, where federal funds increased by a 
record 35.2%, while states contracted their expenditures by 5.4%. In proportion, the 
change is impressive: as a proportion of total expenditures, the general fund collapsed 
from 70.1% to 65.4% in a single fiscal year, a significant transfer of fiscal 
responsibilities to Washington
47
.  
 
                                                 
47
 Moreover, federal funds were traditionally channeled to poor districts and toward children with 
special needs while they became less targeted with ARRA.  
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On a spatial dimension, cuts in elementary and secondary education spending have 
spread relatively quickly. Only 3 regions (New England, Southeast and Far West) 
witnessed a decrease in state funds in FY 2009, while only a single region had higher 
expenditure levels in FY 2010 (Great Lakes). The contraction was particularly brutal 
in certain regions: state funds collapsed by 12% in the Far West in FY 2009, and by 
nearly 16% in the Southwest the following fiscal year. On the other hand, federal 
support skyrocketed by 60.2% in the Far West in fiscal 2009, and by 84.1% in the 
plains in FY 2010.  
 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
 
Higher education spending, which supports public university systems, community 
colleges and vocational education institutions is far more reliant on state funds than 
any other expenditure category. In fiscal 2009, general funds and other state funds 
contribute to finance 85.6% of expenditures, against 10% from the federal 
government. This contributes to explain the high sensitivity of higher education to 
economic downturns.  
 
Contrarily to primary and secondary education however, the state budgets for higher 
education have been spared in this recession. State funds increased by 1.4% in fiscal 
2009 and by 0.8% in fiscal 2010, and federal funds increased rapidly (+11.4% and 
+16.3%) through the ARRA. Cuts were realized in capital projects, which decreased 
by 2.5% in FY 2009 and by 11% in FY 2010. States also adopted a clear strategy of 
shifting an increasing share of the financing burden to the students attending their 
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higher education institutions. For instance, tuition and fees in four-year public colleges 
grew by 7.9% in 2010.  
 
Geographically speaking, state higher education expenditures stood relatively well in 
both fiscal 2009 and 2010. Only 5 regions (New England, the Great Lakes, the 
Southeast, the Rocky Mountain and the Far West) scaled back their spending in 2009 
and 2010.   
 
CORRECTIONS 
 
Corrections is another program in which funds from state government are 
predominant, with 90.2% of all expenditures financed by the general fund in fiscal 
2009. Spending has been characterized by an important degree of volatility irrelevant 
to the variations in the population of inmates. They expanded by 6.2% in fiscal 2008 
before stabilizing in fiscal 2009 and contracting by 2.8% in FY 2010, reflecting 
revenue shortfalls. Although the share of the federal government in state correction 
spending is low (2.6% in fiscal 2009) it has been growing vigorously in fiscal 2009 
and 2010, recording growth rates of 64% and 44.9% respectively. This implies that 
state funds actually declined over these two years.  
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TRANSPORTATION 
 
The state transportation programs are characterized by their source of financing, which 
mixes support from the federal government (30.6% of total expenditures) and 
earmarked revenues (56.8%). The largest of this revenue is the gasoline excise tax.  
 
Once again, expenditures for transportation have followed during this recession a 
pattern that has become familiar to us. While federal funding skyrocketed through the 
ARRA (+34.4% and +22.4% in fiscal 2009 and 2010 respectively), state spending 
from the general and other funds actually declined 2.4%.  
 
SUMMARY 
 
Spending policies adopted by states during the fiscal crisis have displayed the 
following pattern: 
- Spending increases in fiscal 2009 and 2010 was essentially due to a voluntary 
policy of the federal government through the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009; 
- States faced significant fiscal pressure over the period, a pressure to which they 
responded by scaling back every single one of their programs; 
- Medicaid remains the most difficult element to control for states and clearly 
constitute a major budgetary issue in an era of fiscal restraint; 
- Large cuts in state and local government payrolls illustrate the tremendous 
shock on public finances caused by the subprime crisis and the subsequent 
recession. 
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An area we have overlooked in this paragraph was the aid state governments provide 
to cities and other local public authorities. Relationship between state and local 
governments is as much complex – if not more – than those between Washington and 
state capitals. While states are often tempted to shift fiscal stress to local governments, 
in a move referred by experts as ―fend-for-yourself federalism‖, this can have a 
boomerang effect. For example, New York State had to seize the finances of one of its 
counties, Nassau, in January 2011 despite its position as one of the richest county in 
the nation and its strong tax base. One thing remains certain: states contribute 
massively to the fiscal health of lower echelons of government. In 2008, 30% of the 
revenues of local government came from the states.  
 
The incentive for states to transfer part of their budgetary issues to local governments 
is strong because the latter tend to perform better from a revenue perspective than the 
former during recessions. Local governments are indeed essentially funded by 
property tax collections which are far more stable than revenues from income or sales 
taxes. On the other hand, the situation appeared to have shifted in the third quarter of 
2010. Up until then, local governments revenues remained strong, but the lagged 
impact of falling housing prices is now hitting them hard (Luts, 2008)
48
.  
 
Data on changes in local aid during this recession are not yet available, but the 
example of the 2001 recession can offer a perspective. Total transfers from states to 
                                                 
48
 The Case-Shiller Home Price Indices reported that house prices fell by 27% nationally from the year 
ending in June 2006 to the year ending in June 2010.  
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cities declined by 9% between 2002 and 2004, depriving them of resources at the time 
they are most needed. NASBO (2010) suggested that 22 states would reduce their aid 
to local governments in FY 2010. 20 proposed to do so in FY 2011.  
 
An example of tensed fiscal relations between state and local governments can be 
found in New York, when New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg dismissed the 
state budget for fiscal 2012 as an ―outrage‖. The state of New York indeed scaled back 
its aid to the City by more than $400 million, forcing it to readjust its budget. The 
governor‘s office justified the transfer by the fact that ―the city revenue position has 
improved so they have much less pressure on their overall budget‖, while a spokesman 
for the mayor considered that ―Albany wants to have it both ways: take credit for a 
budget with real cuts and take no responsibility for the consequences of those cuts‖ 
(Hernandez, 2011).  
 
2.3.5 Taxes, fees and state revenue policies 
 
The economic downswing had a strong recessionary effect on the main components of 
fiscal revenues for states: sales, personal income and corporate income taxes. In fiscal 
2010, collections from these sources amounted to $592 billion, an 11.7% drop 
compared with the $670.5 billion collected in fiscal 2008. The decline in state 
revenues have been stronger than during previous recessions, as all the sources of 
revenues declined in 2008-10. The largest drop was experienced by corporate income 
taxes, which collapsed by 24.8% between 2008 and 2010. Personal income tax 
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collections fell by 14?9% over the same period, while sales tax declined by 6.5%. The 
situation improved in FY 2011, with corporate income tax (+12.8%) spearheading a 
6.4% increase in collection. Personal income tax revenues continued to lag behind 
(+4.9%). This is problematic as personal income tax constitutes the largest source of 
tax revenues in most states. The trend is unlikely to improve given the recent poor 
performance of the job market and the weakness of the recovery.  
 
In fiscal 2009, personal income taxes accounted for 40.3% of the total collection for 
the general fund, followed by sales and compensating use taxes (32.4%), other taxes 
and fees
49
 (19.7%) and corporate income taxes (6.8%). The general fund, as we have 
seen earlier, does not represent the entire source of revenues for the states. Some 
programs are indeed funded by particular taxes and fees which are earmarked for 
specific purposes, such as gasoline taxes, gaming taxes, lottery proceeds and motor 
vehicle fees 
 
Significant variations in the amount of tax collected brought pressure on states‘ 
forecasts, with 46 states overestimating their revenues in fiscal 2010, even more than 
the 41 states concerned in FY 2009. Only two states were on target (one in 2009) and 
two exceeded their estimations (four in 2009).  
 
States addressed the issue by enacting $23.9 billion of tax and fee changes in fiscal 
2010. The effort was not renewed in fiscal 2011, with only $3.1 billion in net tax and 
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 Most commonly: taxes on tobacco and alcohol, insurance premiums, severance taxes, licenses and 
fees for permits, inheritance taxes and charges for state-provided services.  
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fee increase recommended by governors. 18 states proposed net increases, and half of 
that number net decreases.   
 
Figure 2.26. Enacted State Revenue Changes ($ in billions) 
 
* Proposed state revenue actions for FY 2011 
Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and NASBO 
 
2.3.6 Mid-Year Budget Cuts  
 
For legislative and political reasons, budget cuts tend to be the favored strategy to 
generate short-term savings and maintain the budget in balance. In times of revenue 
volatility, states usually find it necessary to amend their enacted budget to address 
circumstances that were unforeseen. Because legislating revenue increases is very 
difficult during the fiscal year, governors and legislatures are biased toward 
expenditure-related measures in their quest for balancing the budget. In 2002, thirty-
seven states cut approximately $12.6 billion from their enacted FY 2002 budget to 
answer the economic downturn caused by the dot-com burst. And the budget shortfalls 
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during this previous recession were somewhat moderate when compared to those 
following the recession of 2007.  
 
As such, the most indicative element of fiscal stress at the state level following the 
recession has been the widespread implementation of mid-year budget cuts in both FY 
2009 and FY 2010, concerning more than 40 states. 23 states continued to implement 
the strategy in FY 2011, cutting approximately $7.8 billion. During the whole crisis, 
the program areas most likely to be affected by mid-year retrenchments were K-12 and 
higher education, with Medicaid and corrections following. Between fiscal 2009 and 
2011, states have already filled more than $230 billion in budget gaps. 12 states 
expected to face $12.1 billion in budget gaps before closing fiscal 2011, and the 
prospects for FY 2012 (33 states, $75.1 billion) and 2013 (21 states, $61.8 billion) 
remain depressed.   
 
Regression analysis proposed by Inman (2010) identifies the unemployment rate as the 
most important correlate to mid-year budget cuts. This confirms our intuition that state 
employee layoffs, along with mid-year budget cuts, are particularly good indicators of 
the degree of fiscal stress experienced by states. Another finding is that states with 
larger populations, such as New York, tend also to have larger per capita deficit gap. 
Finally, and interestingly enough in the case of New York State where manufacturing 
has been in constant decline, the importance of the manufacturing sector in a regional 
economy seems to dampen the size of anticipated deficits. This analysis thus offers a 
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strong critic of the structural deficit argument, attributing most of the downswing in 
general revenues to the surrounding economic conditions
50
.   
 
Table 2.6. Ten largest budget cuts after the enactment of FY 2009 and FY 2010 
Budgets 
FY 2009 FY 2010 
State 
Size of cuts  ($ in 
millions) 
State 
Size of cuts  ($ in 
millions) 
1. California 10,399.2 1. Florida 3,000 
2. Georgia 2,262.2 2. Massachusetts 2,394 
3. New Jersey 1,760 3. New Jersey 2,028 
4. New York 1,700 4. Georgia 1,253.4 
5. North Carolina 1,211 5. Kentucky 1,110.5 
6. Ohio 1,165.8 6. New York 1,083 
7. South Carolina 1,106.5 7. Virginia 1,044 
8. Massachusetts 946 8. California 1,000 
9. Florida 887.4 9. Indiana 726.5 
10. Indiana 767.4 10. Oklahoma  709.1 
Source: NASBO 
 
 
Despite the complex nature of raising revenues during the fiscal year, 7 states 
managed to do so in FY 2011, for a total of $3.6 billion. Modifications in personal 
income taxes accounted for nearly every dollar of additional revenue. But the 
preferred method for eliminating the gaps remained targeted cuts (34 states), across-
the-board cuts (20 states), layoffs (20 states) and furlough programs (19 states). In rare 
occasions (9 states) rainy-day funds were used to cushion the shock.  
 
 
                                                 
50
 Note that this does not necessarily apply to individual states. The example of California is here 
telling.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Despite the magnitude of the fiscal crisis of 2008-10, state budgets have remained on 
average remarkably stable in their structure. This stability is clearly the by-product of 
an extensive support from the federal government through the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009. The vast majority of policy implemented during the 
recession and its aftermath can be considered textbook cases when analyzed in the 
view of past experiences. Much like in the early 1990s, states have been eager to 
finance their higher education system by raising tuition, including rates for in-state 
students
51
, transferring Medicaid costs to the federal government, cutting down on 
welfare spending and aid to local governments. This however did not alter the great 
transformation that state finances have underwent since 1970, that is the increasing 
share occupied by health expenditures in their overall budget. On the revenue side, tax 
systems were not significantly reformed following the recession. As in the early 
2000s, governors and state legislatures have proven particularly reluctant to raise taxes 
to fund their booming deficits, leaving expenditures burden most of the fiscal stress.  
 
This does not imply however that state policies have remained static and that a new 
era of fundamental transformation in state public finances is not at hand. Despite the 
end of the revenue crisis in 2010, the fiscal crisis continues, fuelled by a slow 
economic recovery and the associated modest revenue growth. The end of massive 
federal aid programs and lagged tensions caused by Medicaid expenditures, unfunded 
                                                 
51
 For instance, undergraduate tuition is expected to rise at an annual rate of 5% over the next five 
years for in-state students attending the State University of New York (Kaplan, 2011). Tuition at the 
University of California is planned to rise up to 16% annually over four years.  
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pensions and the overuse of fiscal gimmicks to balance the budget will likely usher 
reform in the expenditure and revenue system. Even though there exists a strong 
opposition to tax increases in the United States, tax reform is perceived as a valid 
alternative.  
 
The ―reformist‖ perspective has been criticized by a certain number of practitioners, 
including the former New York State budget director Dall Forsythe who strongly 
believed that budget scarcity actually caused state and local governments to deviate 
from seeking efficiency when redeploying and re-imagining services (Forsythe, 1993).   
 
Beyond the question of efficiency and public management lies also the question of 
equity. As we repeated numerous times in this chapter, state expenditures in all areas – 
once corrected for federal funds – have declined since the start of the recession. This 
raises equity issues in that certain populations may be more affected by cutback 
management than others. Students attending higher education institutions may have to 
pay higher tuition fees, low-income household may face a decrease in their benefits 
and state employees can lose their jobs or see their pensions reduced. The interest of 
using a model such as the social accounting matrix, as we will propose in chapter IV, 
becomes clearer in this perspective as it is able to address both the equity and 
efficiency of fiscal policies in the same framework.  
 
One thing has been established in this chapter. During recessions, state legislators and 
governors operate in a highly unstable fiscal environment, where revenues – from 
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taxes and the federal government – and expenditures can vary abruptly and are 
complex to forecast and to organize efficiently (Ward, 2011). Given that most states 
are constitutionally obligated to balance their budgets, this implies that legislatures 
must take drastic actions to insure that revenues and expenditures remain in line for 
the current fiscal year and for upcoming ones. In the short term, it means that states 
can cut services and increase revenues only to realize a few months later that their 
deficit is still expanding. Managing these mid-year budget cuts prove tricky, especially 
when the deficit resulting from the business cycle is piled on a pre-existing structural 
deficit. 
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Chapter III 
OVERVIEW OF NEW YORK STATE’S 
PUBLIC FINANCES AND ECONOMY 
 
 
The economic downturn and the impact of the Lehman shock on the financial sector 
have crippled the short-term budget situation and the long-term economic prospects of 
New York State, a situation that aggravated the structural imbalances the state has 
faced for decades. Intense fiscal stress was quickly reflected by the appearance of mid-
year budget gaps which peaked in fiscal 2009, topping $3 billion. The analysis 
presented in this chapter points out to the role of the dependence of Albany‘s revenues 
on personal income taxes in the emergence of budget shortfalls, and to the increasing 
cyclicality of the state‘s resources (section 3.2). It further elaborates on the budget 
process and the actors that animate it (section 3.3) before offering a brief overview of 
how the state government decided to respond to increased fiscal stress and attempted 
to close burgeoning gaps (section 3.4). Finally, the structure of New York State‘s 
economy and its characteristics are described (section 3.5).  
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3.1 Some Definitions  
 
Before introducing this chapter with an overview of New York State‘s fiscal 
environment, we would like to provide the reader with a number of definitions 
provided by the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO) that will help 
with the material developed in the following pages.   
 
Definition 3.1. General Fund: The predominant fund for financing a state‘s 
operations. Revenues are received from broad-based state taxes. There are differences 
in how specific functions are financed from state to state, however. 
 
Definition 3.2. Federal Funds: Funds received directly from the federal government. 
 
Definition 3.3. Other State Funds: Expenditures from revenue sources that are 
restricted by law for particular governmental functions or activities. For example, a 
gasoline tax dedicated to a highway trust fund would appear in the ―Other State 
Funds‖ column. For Medicaid, other state funds include provider taxes, fees, 
donations, assessments, and local funds. 
 
Definition 3.4. Bonds: Expenditures from the sale of bonds, generally for capital 
projects. 
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Definition 3.5. State Funds: General funds plus other state fund spending, excluding 
state spending from bonds. 
 
Definition 3.6. Revenues:  Revenues comprise all money received by a government 
from external sources (that is, originating from "outside the government"). Statistics 
on state government finance include measurement of revenues by type (e.g., sales 
taxes, income taxes, intergovernmental revenues). For states that operate video lottery 
terminals, total income includes net revenue from the video lottery. Revenue does not 
include money a government has borrowed, although profits from the sale of cash and 
securities as well as proceeds from the sale of fixed assets are classified as revenues.  
 
Definition 3.7. Expenditures:  Expenditures comprise all amounts of money paid out 
by a government during its fiscal year, with some exceptions. Statistics on state 
government finance include measurement of expenditures by character (e.g., current 
operations, capital outlay, intergovernmental expenditures, and so on) and function 
(e.g., education, health, public welfare, natural resources, and so on). Expenditure does 
not include a government's payment of its debt, or purchases of investment securities, 
loans it has granted, agency or private trust transactions, nor correcting transactions.  
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3.2 Fiscal Environment and Budgetary Issues in New York State  
 
3.2.1. General Performance 
 
New York State offers a number of particularities that distinguishes it from other 
states, in particular what has been repeatedly characterized as a low level of 
transparency in budget decision-making (Bifulco and Duncombe, 2010), lax budget 
balance requirements and a relatively centralized budgeting power with the executive 
branch at its center. This centralization of the budget process is however counter-
balanced by the disproportionate size that New-York City occupies in the regional 
economic landscape. New York State, as such, represented only 36% of all local 
government expenditures in fiscal 2006, and only 46% of taxes. This is significantly 
inferior to the national averages, at 43% and 59% respectively.  
 
New York‘s reputation of a liberal state with a large and expansive government is 
therefore not as deserved as aggregated data might suggest: in 2006, state and local 
government expenditures per dollar of income were 12% higher than the national 
average, while taxes collected per dollar of income were 23% higher. When standing 
alone, New York State expenditures and taxes relative to income were 8% and 2% 
below the country as a whole respectively.  
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Figure 3.1. Annual growth rate of money spent by major service function 
 
 Source: Office of the State Comptroller 
 
It is however true that the state‘s spending have increased rapidly over the 2000s, 
throwing the public finances over the edge. The state repeatedly faced important 
budget gaps during the Great Recession, and gaps larger than the billion dollars are 
expected up until fiscal 2013 (Division of Budget, 2011).  
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Figure 3.2. Shortfall closed after adoption of the budget ($ in billions)  
 
* Estimates             Source: Division of Budget 
 
It is difficult to judge the degree of fiscal stress from the simple magnitude of the 
budget shortfalls because of the widely different size of the states‘ general fund. 
Shortfalls measured as a percentage of the general fund budget is thus a better 
indicator of the deterioration of public finances. At the onset of the fiscal crisis, in FY 
2009, New York State actually performed better than the national average, with a 
budget shortfall representing 13.2% of its general fund, against 15.2% for the whole 
country. But its situation considerably deteriorated in fiscal 2010, where its shortfall 
boomed to 38.8% of general funds, against a national average of 29%. In fiscal 2011, 
New York again fared better than the national average, its abysmal $17.9 billion gap 
reduced to an $8.5 billion shortfall, representing 15.9% of the state‘s general fund, 
lower than the national average of 19.9%. In fiscal 2012, New York is expected to 
face a budget shortfall in line with the whole country: 17.9% against 15.9%. In terms 
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proportion of the general fund in 2010 (#6), and barely in 2012 (#9). Focusing on the 
period 2009-11 only, it outperformed New-Jersey, California, Arizona, Illinois and 
Nevada in every year.  
 
Figure 3.3. General fund out year deficits in proposed executive budget (% of 
expenditures) 
 
Source: Bifulco and Duncombe, 2010 
 
3.2.2 Sources of the Budget Deficits 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE CYCLICAL AND STRUCTURAL FACTORS  
 
The growth of New York State spending has been driven by the new commitments 
taken by Albany without enacting corresponding revenue measures. For instance, the 
state took over took over counties‘ part of Medicaid costs and all their shares in 
Family Health Plus, expanded the STAR program and carried on significant 
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other hand and starting in the mid 1990s, the legislature enacted several rounds of 
multi-year back-loaded tax cuts which depressed annual revenues by an estimated $20 
billion (Fiscal Policy Institute, 2009).  
 
Figure 3.4. New York State Total Revenue and Total Expenditure Growth (in percent) 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
 
The level of public spending in New York State can nevertheless not be only 
attributed to cyclical factors. Demographically, the state is characterized by a high 
degree of urbanization, large immigrant communities and strong pockets of poverty. 
Empirical studies realized by Ladd and Yinger (1991) and Duncombe and Yinger 
(2008) suggest that ageing infrastructure, population and higher than average poverty 
rates translate into fiscal stress for local and state governments and higher costs of 
provision of public services, including education, housing and welfare. On the 
political side, Forsythe and Boyd (2006) remarked that neither the Democrats nor the 
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Republicans have articulated their fiscal rhetoric around budget conservatism, limiting 
the opposition to increased spending and borrowing. The size of the public sector has 
also made public unions particularly powerful, limiting the likelihood of significant 
spending reduction programs.  
 
Structural factors bequeathed a large long-term outstanding debt – the ninth largest 
among states – and rising costs to service it. In fiscal 2009, the state spent 6.4% of its 
general fund on debt service, or $5.2 billion. The debt burden is even heavier for local 
governments, making the policy of shifting costs to them more complex. 
Consequently, New York State has been plagued by recurring budget gaps for most of 
the past thirty years. The last ten executive budgets all forecasted that expenditures 
growth would outpace revenue increases, creating budget shortfalls ranging between 
5% and 9% of disbursements even when the economy was booming
52
.  
 
Perhaps the most striking explanation of the demise of New York State‘s public 
finances is the apparent contradiction that has been structuring its economy for most of 
the past two decades. Despite a highly-educated population, the presence of New York 
City and the state‘s leading position in many dynamic tertiary sectors – in particular 
finance, real estate and business services in general – New York has been trailing the 
nation in terms employment growth, which averaged a whopping yearly 0.2% or 40% 
of the national average. Even during the Clinton years, which saw dramatic economic 
and workforce expansion, New York underperformed the rest of the country in terms 
                                                 
52
 See the governor proposed budget for fiscal 2006.   
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of employment growth (0.5% against 1.9% nationally). This may be partly explained 
by the tremendous transformation its economy underwent since the post-war years 
(vom Hofe, 2002).  The manufacturing-oriented industrial base located in upstate New 
York – along the Erie Canal – has declined in favor of New York City, and 
manufacturing pursued its decay well into the 1990s and 2000s. The New York State 
Department of Labor estimates that manufacturing employment in the state eroded by 
nearly 50%, twice the national level. The emergence of the so-called ―new economy‖ 
has been a headache for policy makers in Albany and local governments, in particular 
when it comes to promoting the economic development of upstate New York and the 
vacuum left by the extinction of its manufacturing industries.  
 
THE REVENUE SIDE: INCOME AND TAX VOLATILITY  
 
To compensate for the loss of employment in manufacturing and associated labor 
income, New York State and New York City have been piggybacking on the region‘s 
top income earners and a relatively strong income growth (Bahl and Duncombe, 
1991). Between 1948 and 2008, the per capita disposable personal income
53
 as well as 
total average compensation per job in New York State has constantly been higher than 
the corresponding figures for the entire country. In 2010, the last year for which data 
were available, per capita disposable income was 15.4% higher in New York State 
than it was in the United States as a whole. Income appears however counterbalanced 
by a higher volatility in New York State.  
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 Total disposable personal income divided by total midyear population.  
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Figure 3.5. Disposable personal income in New York State and the U.S. (in current 
dollars) 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
Figure 3.6. Annual growth rate of disposable personal income in New York State and 
the U.S.  
 
Source: Author‘s calculations, from BEA 
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Figure 3.7. Annual growth rate of total average compensation per job 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations, from BEA 
 
This volatility of income stems directly from the state‘s over-reliance on the variable 
wages of the financial sector. The catastrophic effect this may have on public finances 
is clearly illustrated by the following statistics: total wages dropped by 7.2% in 2009, 
which, although the largest yearly contraction on record, pales in front of the collapse 
of variables wages. The latter decreased by almost 31%, or $21.6 billion, to $48.5 
billion
54
. With the economic ground gaining momentum in early 2010 and inflationary 
pressures kept at bay, the outlook for wages looked promising. However, much of the 
improvement can be attributed to variable compensation, while base wages struggle to 
reach their pre-recession growth pace. This is somewhat worrisome, as a one percent 
decline in personal income can cause a drop in income and sales tax revenues superior 
to one percent for the fiscal year (Bruce et al., 2006). The fall of revenues from the 
income tax, at 2.7%, explains most of the drop.    
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Although the share of variables compensation in total wages is still low – 
approximately 12% from 2004 to 2008 – it has progressed significantly since the start 
of the deregulation of the financial industry in the 1970s (5%). Consequently, the 
volatility of variable compensation is an increasing determinant of the evolution of 
wages in the state of New York. In 2010, the New York State Assembly Ways and 
Means Committee staff estimated that finance and industry alone accounted for more 
than half of variable wages, with bonus pools from the securities industry at the 
vanguard. This characteristic of the state economy is troubling, particularly given the 
new set of rules established by the Dodd-Franck bill and Basel III. As employment 
growth, profitability and variable compensation lose steam in the securities industries, 
wages progression in New York State is likely to slow down even further, 
compromising the revenues that Albany derives from its income tax.  
 
Figure 3.8. Wage growth in New York State by components 
 
Note: Data for 2010 are estimated. 2011 and 2012 are forecasts 
            Source: NYS Department of Labor, NYS Assembly Ways and Means Committee staff for estimates 
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This volatility and the transformation of New York State‘s economy had a nefarious 
effect on the stability of the revenues that Albany draws from its tax base. It is very 
clear that the growth in tax receipt has become more sensitive to both upswings and 
downswings during the 2000s. During the ―go-go‖ years of 2004-2008, tax revenues 
increased by a yearly average of 11% before contracting violently by 16.7% in FY 
2009. State revenues from taxes rely on a mix of four different instruments: individual 
income tax, corporate income tax, sales tax and a combination of other minor taxes. 
The economic crisis caused all these sources to dry up simultaneously, a phenomenon 
that had not occured since the 1980s recession (Deitz et al., 2010).  
 
Figure 3.9. Growth rate of personal current taxes in New York State by level of 
government 
 
Federal government: Income taxes net of refunds, including the federal fiduciary income tax 
State government: Income taxes, motor vehicle licenses and other taxes (consisting largely of hunting and fishing taxes and other 
license taxes) 
Local governments: Income taxes, motor vehicle licenses and other taxes; tax receipts growth for FY 1959 (+106.9%), FY 1965 
(+587%) and FY 1067 (+1777%) have been eliminated for readability 
State and local personal property taxes are excluded 
    Source: Author‘s calculations, from BEA 
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Figure 3.10. Growth rate of state tax revenues in New York State by sources 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations, from BEA 
 
Tax receipts volatility is a direct consequence of the tax structure adopted by New 
York State, which – very similarly to what happened in neighboring New Jersey – 
relies more on personal and corporate income than other states. As illustrated in figure 
3.12, New York State drew approximately 61% of its tax receipts from personal and 
corporate income, significantly higher than the national average. Increased 
dependence on these taxes has made New York revenues more sensitive to the 
business cycles. High volatility is also due to the central place taken by the financial 
and real estate industries in tax revenues. According to the fiscal 2009 Executive 
Budget Briefing Book (DoB, 2008), the financial services sector accounted for 
approximately 20% of state tax revenues in the 2000s. A significant portion largest 
economic crises since the Reagan era of deregulation has involved or affected an 
industry in the financial sector, from real estate to hedge funds and investment 
banking. This implies that the very structure of the tax base in New York State is ill-
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adapted to cushion the shocks that have become the most likeliest to occur, i.e. 
financial crises. The dependence of New York State tax revenues, tied to the 
performance of the financial sector, is therefore narrowing geographically to the 
economic health of New York City. Indeed, if New York City accounted for 43% of 
total nonfarm employment in the state, it concentrates more than half of the wages 
paid there. As the financial district shed an increasing number of highly paid and 
highly qualified jobs, the state finances crumbled. The sensitivity of New York State‘s 
revenues to the health of top income earners and to capital gains is illustrated by the 
fact that according to the Division of the Budget the upper half of the top income 
earners paid 30% of the state‘s personal income tax in fiscal 2009. As for capital 
gains, they accounted for approximately 25% of all income taxes.   
 
Figure 3.11. Structure of state governments tax collections (FY 2010) 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations, from U.S. Census Bureau 
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Figure 3.12. Annual growth rate of tax collections by type 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations, from U.S. Census Bureau 
 
Figure 3.13. Composition of the Business Tax in New York State 
 
Source: Office of the State Comptroller  
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Figure 3.14. Annual growth rate of the components of the business tax 
 
Source: Office of the State Comptroller  
 
 
THE EXPENDITURE SIDE: INCREASED SPENDING ON MEDICAID AND 
EDUCATION 
 
a. Medicaid 
 
Medicaid costs
55
 increased exponentially after the financial crisis, rising by more than 
$4 billion (+12.9%, +4.6% in FY 2008) in fiscal 2009 alone.  
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 Note that New York State asks its counties to make significant contributions to the financing of 
Medicaid. They cover approximately 16% of the total bill, but since FY 2006 growth of expenditures on 
the program has been capped to 3%.  
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Figure 3.15. New York‘s Medicaid Costs ($ in billions) 
 
Source: Office of the State Comptroller 
 
In fiscal 2010, Medicaid enrollment rose by 10.1%, more than the national average of 
8.1%. The impact of the economic downswing on unemployment led the number of 
eligible recipients to rise significantly (+7.6%, against +2.5% in FY 2008), explaining 
part of the additional strain on public health expenditures. The increase in eligible 
recipients was driven by adults (+4.2%, against +3.2% in FY 2008), but the largest 
single recipient group remains children (+2.3%), with over 1.7 million enrolled in 
Medicaid coverage. However large these groups, they represented a third of Medicaid 
costs, while the elderly, blind and disabled (+1%), making up a quarter of all eligible 
recipients, accounted for the remaining two-third of costs. Beside the effect of the 
crisis, the increase in the number of eligible adults can be explained by the change in 
allowable Medicaid resource levels that made a number of persons switching from the 
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56
 program (-20.2% and -6.6% in FY 2008) to Medicaid. Even as 
the recovery takes a hold and unemployment shrinks, the implementation of the 
Affordabe Care Act is anticipated to increase the number of people eligible to 
Medicaid after 2014.   
 
Figure 3.16. Medicaid eligibles in New York State (in millions) 
 
Source: Department of Health, based on each year‘s current claims 
 
As for spending in public health per se, it is relatively difficult to agree on a specific 
data set. Indeed, figures from all the main sources on New York State public finances, 
the U.S. Census Bureau, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the National Association 
of State Budget Officers, the New York Division of Budget and the Office of the State 
Comptroller, differ widely. Contrarily to Bifulco and Duncombe (2010), we prefer to 
use the data published by the Comptroller and NASBO because, as opposed to the 
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first-quarter and mid-year updates of the Division of Budget, they gather information a 
posteriori, instead of forecasts. One thing remains certain, state Medicaid expenditures 
are expected to boom over fiscal 2012 (+18.6%) to compensate the sharp decline in 
federal funding (-13%) due to the termination of the enhanced Medicaid match rate 
introduced by the Recovery Act
57
.  
 
To react to the additional burden created by the expansion of Medicaid, almost all 
state governments implemented cost containment measures.  
 
Figure 3.17. Annual percentage change in total state funds Medicaid expenditures 
 
Source: NASBO 
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Figure 3.18. Annual percentage change in total Medicaid expenditures 
 
Source: NASBO 
 
b. Education 
 
Another major area of expenditure for New York State – and states in general – is 
education, a category that gathers both K-12 and higher education. According to data 
from NASBO (2010), expenditures of states in elementary and secondary education 
actually declined in fiscal 2009
58
 (-0.5%), a trend only reversed by the intervention of 
the federal government through ARRA. This was expected to be all the more true in 
fiscal 2010, when state funds were estimated to have shrunk by 5.2%, while federal 
funds jumped by 35.2%. New York State followed a similar path by expanding its 
expenditure in K-12 education by 8% in fiscal 2008 before reducing it by 2% in fiscal 
2009. It however enjoyed important support from the federal government, which 
expanded its funding by 5.1% and 19.4% in FY 2008 and 2009 respectively.  
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The largest component of New York State‘s expenditures on K-12 education is in the 
form of aid provided to school districts. In fiscal 2006, New York had the second 
highest education spending per pupil in the U.S. As a percent of total expenditures, 
spending on K-12 education was 20.9% and 21.5% for fiscal 2009 and 2010 
respectively, in line with the U.S. average of 21.7% and 20.8%. The New York State 
Commission on Property Tax Relief (2008) explained the expensiveness of the state‘s 
elementary and secondary education system by teacher salaries, which are 17% higher 
than the national average and growing benefits. However, the main probable cause is 
the burden imposed by the School Tax Relief (STAR) program. Started in the early 
1990s, STAR is indeed entirely financed by states and amounted to $4.4 billion in 
fiscal 2008.  
 
Figure 3.19. K-12 and Medicaid expenditures as a percent of total state expenditures 
 
Source: NASBO 
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3.3 The Budget Process in New York State  
 
The rules defining the authority, roles and duties of the different branches of the state 
government are gathered in Article 7 of the New York State constitution. The State‘s 
fiscal year begins on April & and ends on March 31, and the entire budget process 
approximately spans 27 months. The model used in the budget process is executive in 
nature, as the responsibilities for initiating, preparing and balancing the budget rest 
with the Governor (Article 7, section 2). In order to do so, the Governor consult 
agencies of the State government and coordinates their requests. Coordination is 
realized through the emission of a ―call letter‖, through which the Budget Director – 
appointed by the Governor – outlines policy priorities, fiscal constraints and the 
schedule for the upcoming fiscal year. 
 
Figure 3.20. Budget Process in New York State 
 
Source: NYS Division of the Budget 
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The process is then handed over to the state‘s Division of the Budget (DoB), with 
legislative oversight. In particular, the DoB conducts hearings to assess and discuss 
the needs of the government‘s agencies. In parallel, the DoB, along with the two 
chambers of the state‘s Parliament and the Office of the Comptroller released their 
forecasts of revenues and expenditures. The final executive proposed budget is then 
formulated   
 
Beyond proposing a recommended budget and associated appropriations bills for 
every fiscal year, the executive can limit the changes that the legislature wishes to 
bring to the budget through the line item veto. Moreover, the legislature cannot 
actually raise the level of individual appropriations determined by the governor, 
meaning that the latter has indeed the power to lay down an upper cap on the budget. 
The legislative branch can however add new appropriations to the budget (Article 7, 
section 4), which the governor can in turn veto (Article 4, section 7). To override the 
veto, the legislature needs at lead a two-third vote
59
. The preeminence of the Executive 
over the budget has been confirmed by the New York State Court of Appeals in two 
landmark cases, in 1993 and 2004
60
. The Court ruled in favor of the Governor as of his 
power to include changes in permanent law in his proposed appropriations bills. The 
State Finance Law is another element strengthening the position of the Governor in the 
budget process: its office is indeed in charge of managing the budget through 
administrative actions as the fiscal year unfolds. This puts the Governor at the center 
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 Which it has done repeatedly.  
60
 ‘New York State Bankers Association v. Wetzler’ and ‘Silver v. Pataki and Pataki v. The Legislature’ 
respectively.  
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of the policy stage when mid-year budget gaps emerge, a critical feature for the 
realism of the model proposed in Chapter 4. By guaranteeing the prominence of a 
single decision maker for managing mid-year budget gaps, we may safely put aside 
group decision making as an additional layer of complexity in our mathematical 
programming framework.  
 
Among the legislative branch considerable powers are vested in the leaders of each 
House over budget decisions. Effectively, the budget process is a negotiation between 
the governor, the Speaker of the Assembly and the Senate majority leader (Creelan 
and Molton, 2004). The legislature is thus not entirely powerless when facing the 
governor. At the height of the financial crisis in November 2008, when Governor 
Paterson called a special session to close a deficit of $3.2 billion, the legislature 
remained inert and $2.3 billion had to be carried away to the following fiscal year. 
Centralization is certainly reinforced by the lack of public debate, as amendments to 
the governor‘s budget are usually negotiated behind closed doors. It is not uncommon 
for the final budget proposition to reach members of the house just hours before the 
vote, and no independent body supervises a budget analysis.  
 
The emergence of budget deficits have been made easier by the weakness of 
constitutional and regulatory constraints on budgeting decisions (Hou and Smith, 
2006). The constitutional requirement that the governor submit a budget balancing 
general fund expenditures and receipts on a cash basis is relatively lax by national 
standards, and the budget passed by the legislature need not be balanced on either a 
117 
 
cash or an accrual basis
61
. Nor is there a requirement for the budget to be balanced at 
the end of the fiscal year, a technical provision that is be found in the literature to limit 
spending and budget deficits (Poterba, 1994; Alt and Lowry, 1994). So much that the 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1987) attributed a score of 3 – 
one being the most lenient and ten the most stringent – to New York for the stringency 
of its balanced-budget requirements
62
.  
 
3.4 Managing Structural and Cyclical Deficits  
 
Perhaps the most striking feature of Albany‘s management of budget deficits is its 
heavy reliance on one shot measures over long term policies (Ravitch, 2010). As a 
result, New York State made extensive use of debt to finance some of its past 
deficits
63
. Successive governors and legislatures have also been prone to enact non-
recurring spending cuts. Such gimmicks include the transfer of funds from one agency 
– the New York Dormitory Authority or the New York Power Authority being two of 
the traditional contendants – to the state‘s general fund.  
 
Despite the state‘s long history of fiscal gimmicks, one-shot reductions of 
expenditures and mounting debt, numerous governors have taken the mantle of fiscal 
conservatism during their terms, from Republicans to Democrats. This is not 
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 Actually, the Legislature is not constitutionally required to pass a budget.  
62
 New Jersey scored a perfect ten, which did not prevent its finances to suffer badly from the 
recession.  
63
 The State Comptroller estimates that approximately 21% of the state’s debt outstanding can be 
directly attributed to fiscal relief.  
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particularly surprising from the perspective of political science, because voters tend to 
focus on the budgetary ―bottom line‖, i.e. whether a surplus or a deficit, as a proxy for 
the quality of an administration‘s fiscal management (Savage, 1988). As such, the 
larger the move away from a balanced budget – in particular when talking about a 
deficit – the more likely the candidates are to focus on the budget issue. Moreover, 
research found that American voters are attached to the idea of a balance budget (Page 
and Shapiro, 1992). Voters‘ view of the management of fiscal imbalances is however 
conditioned by the nature of the initial budget situation (Hansen, 1998). In the case of 
deficit, voters favor cutting discretionary spending over increasing income tax rates, 
while they favor increasing discretionary spending over reduced tax rates in the case 
of a surplus. This corresponds to the perspective of Nobel Prize winner Franco 
Modigliani, who also identified the electorate‘s ―antagonism to raising taxes as a way 
of reducing deficits‖ (Hansen, Modigliani and Modigliani, 1987:473).  
 
Therefore, as Burden and Sanberg (2003:99) remarked, ―the nature of [the voters‘] 
preferences […] is fairly predictable‖ and is ―context dependent‖. Fiscal retrenchment 
strategies are clearly favored when budget deficits becomes large enough. Given the 
structure of the Democratic Party constituency, the strategy adopted by Governor 
Paterson is somewhat surprising: beneficiaries from the Welfare State (middle-classes 
and low-income households) tend to affiliate with the Democratic Party while 
wealthier constituencies associate with the Republicans. In terms of policy, Democrats 
are usually perceived to focus on social spending and unemployment. The GOP, on 
the other hand, is associated with fiscal conservatism, austerity and inflation control 
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(Tufte, 1978; Kiewiet, 1983). Then, candidates and incumbents tend to emphasize the 
aspects of the budget that are the most favorable to their own party, respecting a 
certain consistency over time (Hinich and Munger, 1994). This is unfavorable to 
Democrat candidate when there is a budget deficit, as public opinion leans toward 
austerity. In the case of the presidential election, Burden and Sanberg (2003) found 
that the volume of budget rhetoric emanating from the GOP is significantly increased 
when it is a challenger and when the budget is in deficit.  
 
In this regard, the fiscally conservative postures adopted by Governors Paterson and 
Cuomo, two democrats with a relatively liberal background, may seem antithetic given 
their party affiliation but politically cunning. The two Governors championed budgets 
relying heavily on spending reductions to address fiscal imbalances and opposed 
major changes in the tax legislation. In fiscal 2009, the legislation intervened and 
significantly modified Governor Paterson‘s proposed budget and increased taxes and 
spending. This caused the Cato Institute (2010), a conservative think-tank, to attribute 
to Governor Paterson the worst grade possible, F, in its ―Fiscal Policy Report Card on 
America‘s Governors‖64.  
 
Despite these criticisms, the new budget emphasis brought by governors since the start 
of the Great Recession has been fiscal retrenchment. In Governor Paterson‘s own 
words (DoB, 2010:2): 
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 New York scored 25, half the average of the 45 states surveyed. Governor Paterson was ranked 
second to last, only topped by Ted Kulongosky from Oregon. Mark Sanford from South Carolina came 
first, with a score of 74.  
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―Since the day I became governor, I have warned that New York is facing an 
inevitable fiscal reckoning. The mistakes of the past – squandering surpluses, 
papering over deficits, relying on irresponsible fiscal gimmicks to finance 
unsustainable spending increases – have led us to a financial breaking point. 
There are no more easy answers. Avoidance behavior is simply not acceptable. 
Federal stimulus funding is running dry. We have already increased taxes on 
high-income New Yorkers. And those who have doubted the severity of our 
financial difficulties were proven wrong time and time again. 
Further spending reductions are both necessary and inescapable. 
The Executive Budget I am proposing today continues the difficult process of 
confronting New York‘s new fiscal reality. It attacks our substantial structural 
budget deficit through recurring spending reductions across every single area 
of State government. Given the gravity of the current situation, there is simply 
no other option if we want to end New York‘s irresponsible pattern of boom 
and bust cycle budgeting‖65 
 
In fiscal 2009, spending reductions proposed by Governor Paterson were concentrated 
in three program areas: education, the STAR program and Medicaid. We will come 
back in detail to this policy in chapter 5, as it provides the backbone of our social 
accounting matrix multiobjective linear programming model. Moreover, Albany has 
been wary about using the state‘s rainy-day funds66 to cushion the impact of the crisis. 
                                                 
65
 Our emphasis.  
66
 New York State has two rainy day funds: the Tax Stabilization Reserve Fund, capped at 5% of the 
budget, and the Rainy Day Reserve Fund, capped at 3%.  
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Even though reserves constantly declined as a percentage of total expenditures 
between FY 2009 and FY 2012 (from 2.2% to 2.1%), the amount held, approximately 
$1.2 billion did not vary. This can be explained by the length of the crisis and the 
uneasiness of the state legislature with using emergency ammo while the storm may 
still be coming. In the case of New York, it may also be argued that the replenishment 
rule it shares with five other states
67
 and the District of Columbia makes it more 
difficult for Albany to tap in the funds when needed. The state is indeed required to 
replenish the funds in three years, even if economic conditions have not improved.  
 
When a $16 billion deficit appeared in the fiscal 2010 budget, balance was brought 
through ARRA funds amounting $8 billion. The State did (temporarily) increase the 
tax rate on high-income individuals and raise tuition fees in public universities, but it 
also extensively used spending retrenchments, in particular by delaying payments to 
local governments. This reflects the experience of the state during the previous 
recession, in the early 2000s, when it enacted temporary increases in the income and 
sales taxes.   
 
3.5 The Economy of New York State  
 
With its diverse and broad industrial base, its qualified workforce and attractive 
business climate, New York State and New York City have developed resilient and 
adaptable economies. The state economy managed a relatively successful transition 
                                                 
67
 Alabama, Florida, Missouri, Rhode Island and South Carolina.  
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from a manufacturing- to a service-based economy, and recovered relatively quickly 
from the post 9/11 crisis (Bram, 2003). The economic success of New York State has 
much to do with the constant expansion of its human capital and the rapid 
development of a handful of extremely competitive industries, in particular finance 
and biotechnology. This is not to say that New York does not face many challenges, 
prominent among which is the economic crisis it entered in October 2008. 
 
The structure of New York‘s economy and its socio-institutional characteristics, which 
we detailed in the following sections, responded differently to the economic crisis than 
the country as a whole. A certain number of sectors and indicators – for instance total 
nonfarm payroll employment – fared better, while others fared worse – for example 
the housing market.  
 
Historically, the fact that the economy of the ―Empire State‖ performed better than the 
national average since 2000s is an exception. If New York dominated the economic 
landscape of the United States in the 19
th
 century and in the first half of the 20
th
 
century, it did not share the post-World War II boom as much as other states did. From 
the onset of the Korean War to the burst of the internet bubble, New York State added 
jobs at a quarter of the national pace. The crisis was especially acute during the 1970s, 
a decade during which job creation in the state literally stopped. The picture 
brightened during the years of the Reagan administration, even if New York continued 
to lag behind the national averages for most statistics. The recession that started in 
early 1991 dealt a considerable blow to the already weakened state: with only 7% of 
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the population, it concentrated an astonishing 31% of all job losses from January 1991 
to the election of Bill Clinton to the presidency. The Empire State barely did better in 
2001, as its peak-to-trough period lasted 32 months.    
 
3.5.1 Population and Employment 
 
Contrarily to New York City, which population stagnated for most of the past 50 years 
at around 8 million, New York State displayed strong growth in the past decades.  
 
Figure 3.21. New York State population (in millions) 
  
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
 
In 2007, New York State employed an average of 9,114,411 persons (BLS, 2011), 
implying that data from IMPLAN are overestimated
68
. Even though its nonfarm 
payroll expanded at a slower pace than the national average for most of the past two 
                                                 
68
 Total employment is 10,690,700 in IMPLAN.  
17,99 
18,98 
19,54 
17 
17,5 
18 
18,5 
19 
19,5 
20 
1990 2000 2009 
124 
 
decades, New York State is still the third largest states in term of employment after 
Texas and California, at 6.5% of the total. The unemployment rate averaged 4.5% over 
the year, before the crisis took its toll on the payrolls.  
 
Figure 3.22. Unemployment rate in the United States and New York State 
 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
As we demonstrated, employment growth in New York State has been anemic in the 
2000s and trailed national averages. New York‘s nonfarm employment growth lagged 
the national average for nineteen out of the past twenty years. Only in 2007, after the 
beginning of the recession and a significant downswing on the national job market did 
New York outperformed the country, a trend that was maintained up until the fall of 
2010. Data suggests that New York had actually 343,000 jobs more than it would have 
if it trailed national averages (Ward, 2011).  
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Figure 3.23. Employment and wages in New York State 
 
  
           Source: NYS Assembly Ways and Means Committee 
 
Employment losses have been heavily concentrated in the construction and 
manufacturing sectors. On the 250,000 jobs shed in the State between 2008:Q2 and 
2010:Q1, 81,100 were in the manufacturing sector and 53,800 in the construction 
sector. The downswing in construction employment mirrored jobs destruction in other 
states, as construction of new houses took a hit with the subprime crisis. Losses were 
however smaller in New York State, as its housing market resisted better to the 
recession.  
 
As for the manufacturing sector, it pursues its structural decline. Manufacturing jobs 
were destroyed at a faster rate in New York than in the nation as a whole and 
contracting by approximately 100,000 between 2007 and 2010.  
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Figure 3.24. New York State Manufacturing Employment by Region (2008:Q2 to 
2010:Q1) 
 
Note: United States average: -14.6%         Source: U.S. Department of Labor and NYS Department of Labor 
 
Losses in the financial sector were localized in New York City: the sole securities 
industry lost 9.7% of total employment in 2009 and 3.7% in 2010. In comparison, 
securities employment contracted by 7.9% nationally. All in all, the professional and 
business services sectors hemorrhage the most, along with trade, transportation and 
utilities. Together, they concentrated more than half of all jobs destruction in the state.  
 
Employment figures for the public sector were mixed. The growth in public schools 
was important, with 9,000 jobs added between 2006 and 2010, but the state 
government virtually froze its payroll over the period (against +1.3% nationally).  
 
On the positive side, the state continued to add jobs in the education and health care 
sectors, expanding by an average of 2% a year between 2008 and 2010. This must be 
contrasted however, inasmuch as job creation in health care and social assistance 
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lagged the national average. It is likely that limited demographic growth and increased 
fiscal pressure – hospitals and nursing homes are typically dependent on some forms 
of public funding – explain much of this slow pace. Leisure and hospitality also 
showed signs of dynamism as the weakening U.S. dollar attracted a growing number 
of tourists to New York City. Moreover, upstate New York, traditionally the poorest 
area in the state, suffered less from the downturn than New York City and directly 
adjacent areas did
69
.  
 
Figure 3.25. Job growth by sector in New York State  
 
Source: Office of the State Comptroller 
 
Total nonfarm payroll employment in New York State lost fewer jobs than the nation 
during the recession, which implies that recovery may trail the average for all states. 
For instance, the manufacturing sector shed 16.6% of its workers throughout the 
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 However, New York City added far more jobs than upstate New York did during the boom years of 
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country between 2007 and 2010, against 15.5% in New York. Overall, it is estimated 
that New York State lost a yearly average of about 261,700 jobs from 2008 to 2009, or 
3.1% of total nonfarm payroll. New York ranked eighth in terms of nonfarm payroll 
employment growth in 2009, after ranking thirteenth and twentieth in 2008 and 2007 
respectively. The staff of the New York State Assembly Ways and Means Committee 
forecasts overall employment to grow by 0.9% in fiscal 2011 and 1.2% in fiscal 2012 
after contracting by 3.1% and 0.1% in fiscal 2009 and 2010. The recovery should also 
boost total nonfarm wages, which declined by 7.2% in fiscal 2009, before picking up 
at the rate of 4.4% in 2010
70
.  
 
From a geographical perspective, the burden of employment decline appears to have 
been shared relatively evenly across the state.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
70
 The variable wages, which are essentially driven by Wall Street’s bonus took an unprecendented 
dive of nearly 31% in 2009, or $21.6 billion.  
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Figure 3.26. Dynamic of New York State employment by region (2008:Q2 to 
2010:Q1) 
 
Source: NYS Department of Labor 
 
 
Job attrition was the fastest in the Mid-Hudson and Central regions because of the 
hardship faced by the manufacturing sector, whereas New York City, with its large 
diversified economic base and its booming tourism sector remained the best 
performing area. An interesting fact is the second position of the Mohawk Valley, 
which enjoyed the 2008-09 government-led expansion in the education and health care 
sectors
71
. In terms of proportion, the dominance of New York City is illustrated by its 
43.3% share of total nonfarm employment in the state. It also accounted for 
approximately 33% of job destruction. In comparison, Mid-Hudson concentrates a 
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little bit more than 10% of total nonfarm employment, and shouldered 15.2% of the 
state‘s employment losses.  
 
Figure 3.27. New York State Nonfarm Employment by Region (2008:Q2 to 2010:Q1) 
 
Note: Downstate New York concentrates 64.1% of nonfarm jobs, against 35.9% for 
Upstate 
Source: NYS Department of Labor 
 
 
3.5.2 The New York State Economy in the Great Recession 
 
Although there is strong evidence suggesting that national and regional business 
cycles are not synchronized (Orr et al. 1999; Crone and Clayton-Matthews, 2005), 
there is little doubt that the intensity of the national financial and economic crisis that 
started in December 2007 caused severe damages to New York. Economic activity in 
the state, as captured by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York‘s coincident 
economic indicators (CEIs), peaked in February 2008. The deterioration of the 
economy accelerated significantly after October 2008. A particularity of the Great 
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Recession, when compared to previous economic crises in the late 1980s, early 1990s 
and 2000s is that New York State actually lagged the national peak of economic 
activity. In the late 1980s, Bram et al. (2009) remarked that the state experienced its 
downturn as soon as eighteen months earlier than the nation as a whole did. As we 
repeatedly noticed previously, the economic recovery in the New York metropolitan 
area also occur much later than for the U.S., lengthening the poor prospects for state 
government‘s revenues and spending.   
 
Figure 3.28. Economic activity in New York State (base 100 = July 1992) 
Note: The interval between the black vertical lines represent the peak-to-through 
periods of national business cycles. The shaded areas indicate the peak-to-through 
periods for New York State 
            Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
 
Unsurprisingly, economic data suggests that the economic downswing in New York 
State has been fuelled by unemployment, an element to which we dedicated a section 
previously.  
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3.5.3 Economic Structure and the Role of the Financial Sector 
 
The data source of the model we develop in this dissertation is the Social Accounting 
Matrix for 2006 proposed by the Minnesota IMPLAN Group
72
. Given that only three 
years separate this data set from the policy under scrutiny, it can be argued that the 
economy of the state did not underwent tremendous structural transformations in such 
a brief period of time. In 2007, New York State‘s Gross Regional Product (GRP) 
amounted to $1.022 trillion, or 7.6% of the United States GDP ($13.2 trillion), the 
third largest in the country after that of California and Texas. The principal component 
of the state‘s economy was household consumption, which made up approximately 
67% of its GRP. State and local governments represented the second largest 
component of final demand, with 15%. Federal government accounted for 2.6%, while 
demand for investment made up 9.1% of the GRP. Net exports amounted to 9%. The 
positive trade balance of $92.3 billion illustrates the strength of New York in export-
oriented activities, although the balance is lower than what it was during the Clinton 
years (vom Hofe, 2002).   
 
The economic structure of New York State, as illustrated by the composition of its 
GRP, is heavily geared toward the tertiary sector and in particular the finance and 
insurance industries. In 2010, the state‘s economy expanded by a staggering 5.1%, 
                                                 
72
 It is difficult to trace the sources used by MIG to develop its social accounting matrices. Although the 
data set we have refers to 2006, aggregate figures seem to correspond to 2007. For instance, the BEA 
estimates that the state’s GRP for 2006 was $1.001 trillion (in which case IMPLAN would grossly 
overestimate the economic size of New York State), but $1.022 trillion in 2007, very close to IMPLAN’s 
own results ($117 million difference).   
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outperforming the Mideast region (3.8%) and the United States in general (2.6%)
73
. 
According to preliminary data released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2011), 
the financial services industry alone contributed by nearly 35% (1.76 percentage 
point) to the state‘s real GRP growth, while the second largest contributor, the real 
estate, rental and leasing sector, only contributed 12.7% (0.65 percentage point)
74
. By 
comparison, the United States‘ economic expansion relied primarily on durable-goods 
manufacturing and retail trade.  
 
The central role of financial services in the economy of New York State is confirmed 
by the negative role it played in both 2008 and 2009. The adverse contribution of 
finance and insurance to the percentage change in real GRP during 2008 (-0.36 
percentage point) was largest than the combined contribution of the second and third 
worst performing sectors, nondurable goods manufacturing (-0.18) and wholesale 
trade (-0.15) respectively. The trend is even more palpable at the height of the crisis, 
in 2009, when the economy of New York contracted by 4.3%
75
.  Finance and 
insurance contributed for 2.78 percentage point to this poor performance, far more 
than all the other sectors combined (-1.89 percentage point).  
 
 
 
                                                 
73
 New York indeed ranked in the highest quintile.  
74
 The finance and insurance sector was the largest contributor to growth in the Mideast region in 
2009, and topped every other industry in Delaware and New York, coming close second in the District 
of Columbia and fourth in New Jersey.  
75
 Against 2.1% for the country as a whole. New York was ranked in the lowest quintile.  
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Figure 3.29. Contributions to percent change in real GRP (in percentage points) 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
On a static basis and using a 35-industries aggregation scheme for the social 
accounting matrix close to the NAICS classification, the importance of the financial 
services sector is confirmed. ‗Finance and Insurance‘ had by far the largest output, 
with $229.6 billion (22.5% of commodity production), outstripping ‗Wholesale and 
Retail Trade‘ ($160.9 billion) and ‗Real Estate, Rental and Leasing‘ ($111.9 billion). 
The value of production is also particularly high in finance and insurance, reaching 
$323,523 per worker against $213,157 as a national average. If the sector accounted 
for 6% of total nonfarm payroll employment in 2009, it concentrated approximately 
20% of total nonfarm payroll wages.  
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The concentration of the industry in New York City makes the downstate area 
especially sensitive to the health of the finance and insurance sector. Finance and 
insurance variable compensation collapsed by 42.5% in fiscal 2008, or $24.7 billion.  
 
3.5.4 The State and Local Government Sector 
 
Of particular interest to this dissertation is the state and local government sector. In 
terms of output, the size of the sector is relatively limited, at $81.2 billion (7.9% of 
total output). The breakdown of this sector is as follow: 
- $58.5 billion for State and Local Non-education  
- $40.4 billion for State and Local education 
Its role in aggregated consumption is more consequential. According to IMPLAN‘s 
data, local commodity demand for state and local non-education ($63.2 billion against 
$19 billion for the Federal government), state and local education ($45.4 billion) and 
capital expenditure ($19.4 billion) amounted to $127.98 billion.   
 
The importance of state and local government in the economy of New York State is 
however better reflected by employment statistics. The top employer in the state was 
‗Wholesale and Retail Trade‘, with a headcount of 1,419,750 employees (13.3%). 
State and local governments followed with 1,307,330 people (12.2%), nearly twice as 
many persons employed than in the finance and insurance sector. Total employee 
compensation however significantly lagged the ‗Finance and Insurance‘ sector ($114.6 
billion) and the ‗Professional, Scientific and Technical Services‘ sector ($58.3 billion). 
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It amounted to $44.2 billion in state and local non-education and $37 billion in 
education, respectively ranked #3 and #4. If combined, the two sectors would overtake 
‗Professional, Scientific and Technical Services‘ as the second largest sector for 
employee compensation.  
 
In terms of Type SAM multipliers, state and local government do not seem to perform 
as well. On 36 sectors, ‗State and Local Education‘ ranks 34th with an employee 
compensation multiplier of 1.26. State and Local Non-education fares marginally 
better, ranking 33th with a multiplier of 1.32 (the average is 1.92). Turning our 
attention to employment multipliers, perhaps more important, we can observe that the 
state and local government sectors do not perform better (education ranks 34
th
, with a 
multiplier of 1.3 while non-education ranks 25
th
, with a multiplier of 1.51). This is far 
from top performing sectors, such as ‗Pharmaceuticals‘ (5.92), ‗Computer‘ (5.1) or 
‗Finance and Insurance‘ (2.78). As for the federal government, it ranks 21st. Finally, as 
far as labor income multipliers are concerned, state and local governments again 
perform relatively disappointingly (rank 33 and 34 for non-education and education 
respectively). This is however not necessarily bad news in our research context. 
Indeed, budget cuts translating into a negative shock on the final demand vector of the 
SAM framework, small multipliers will actually translate into bottlenecks limiting the 
destructive impact of fiscal retrenchment on the economy.    
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CONCLUSION 
 
The economy of New York State has suffered a great deal since 2007. It however 
fared better than other states in these tumultuous times, and even outperformed 
national averages for the first time since World War II. The reason why it is so is still 
unclear. The absence of a real estate bubble in New York may partly explain why 
employment suffered less in the Empire State although foreclosure on mortgage loans 
was pervasive, at least in 2009. The strong support of Washington to the financial 
sector in general and to Wall Street in particular is also a factor to consider, as it 
probably saved many high-paying jobs in New-York City‘s Financial District and the 
indirect employment they create. 
 
It is difficult to find structural causes to this comparatively good performance. State 
taxes, a permanent source of parliamentary feuds in Albany, remain high by national 
standards, and were even hiked during the crisis. The environmental standards tend 
also to be stricter than in other states, while energy costs are higher.  
 
No matter the reasons behind this performance, the short episode of economic 
‗exceptionalism‘ New York State enjoyed is expected to come to a halt in 2011, with 
employment in the private sector reverting back to its long-term trend. This is 
especially worrisome in light of the past. It is indeed estimated that the consistent 
under-performance of the state since the 1950s has cost it nearly 10 million jobs, or an 
annual average of 200,000 (Ward, 2009). This leads us to believe that the budget of 
New York State may not stabilize before a strong recovery takes place in the United 
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States. Given the current economic climate in the U.S. and strong incertitudes in 
Europe, Albany is still in a position where it would need additional rounds of fiscal 
retrenchments to manage budget shortfalls.       
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Chapter IV 
GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR A 
SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRIX 
MULTIOBJECTIVE LINEAR 
PROGRAMMING MODEL 
 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the two analytical research tools on which this 
dissertation is based: social accounting matrix (SAM) and multiobjective optimization 
(MOO). These two methods are then combined into a single model illustrating how it 
can be used to help decision makers solving the problems they are facing in an 
optimal, given various policy instruments and conflicting objectives.  
 
4.1 The Social Accounting Matrix Framework  
 
4.1.1 The Input-Output Model 
 
The mathematical structure of a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) is directly derived 
from the Input-Ouput system it expands: a set of n linear equations with n unknowns 
that describes the distribution of industries‘ output throughout the economy. In this 
respect, a social accounting matrix can be likened to a double entry bookkeeping 
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framework offering a static image of an economy. It is structured around a set of 
accounts that record income and expenditure
76
 and that must balance. This balancing 
condition implies that each sector/institution‘s income is another sector/institution‘s 
expenditure, thus forming a circular flow capturing all transactions and transfers in an 
economy. At the microeconomic level, SAM describes the economic activity of each 
agent in the economy while after aggregation it forms a macroeconomic model. The 
level of aggregation varies with the topic at hand. Agents included in a typical SAM
77
 
are divided between endogenous and exogenous accounts, the latter incorporating 
industries, factors of production (land, labor and capital), households and corporations 
while the former usually gathers government, capital and the rest of the world. The 
division between exogenous and endogenous accounts derives from the use of SAM as 
an impact analysis tool.  
 
From a computational standpoint, the system can be expressed using square matrices, 
which makes it easier to manipulate and relatively straight-forward to solve. By 
convention, each cell in the SAM matrix represents a spending flow
78
 from the column 
account to the row account. Row accounts record agents‘ sources of income. SAM 
thus appears to constitute a generalization of the System of National Account (SNA), 
the international standard to compile measures of economic activities developed by the 
United Nations. SAM enriches the SNA framework by offering a detailed view of the 
                                                 
76
 In general, accounts present incomings and outgoings.  
77
 Various forms of SAM exist, in particular the Commodity-by-Industry approach (for a description, 
see Eurostat, 2008).  
78
 Originally, Leontief developed an input-output model based on physical quantities (Leontief, 1951). 
Nowadays, price and mixed-units models are more common 
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transactions and transfers between institutions involved in the (re)distribution of 
income in the economy. This feature is what distinguishes a social accounting matrix 
from an input-output model (Round, 2003). Originally, the framework was indeed 
created to investigate developmental issues and in particular the impact of policy on 
living standards. While growth in output certainly contributes to the improvement of 
living standards, economists quickly acknowledged that the distribution of income 
among groups also constituted a critical area of study for development economics. 
Unsurprisingly then, the first SAMs were created for two developing economies: Iran 
and Sri Lanka in 1970, and Swaziland a year later (Pyatt and Round, 1985).    
 
Table 4.1. A Social Accounting Matrix Transactions Table 
 
Expenditures 
Endogenous Accounts Exogenous Accounts Total 
Production Factors Households Government 
Savings 
and 
investment 
Rest of the 
world 
Total output 
1 2 3 4 5 6  
In
co
m
e 
Endogenous 
Accounts 
Production 1 
Intermediate 
input 
 
Consumption 
spending 
Recurrent 
spending 
Investment 
demand 
Export 
earnings 
Total 
demand 
Factors 2 
Factors 
requirements 
     
Total factor 
income 
Households 3  
Factors 
payment to 
households 
Income 
transfers 
Social 
transfers 
 
Foreign 
remittances 
Total 
household 
income 
Exogenous 
Accounts 
Government 4 
Sales taxes 
and import 
tariffs 
 Direct taxes   
Foreign 
grants and 
loans 
Government 
income 
Savings and 
investment 
5   
Private 
savings 
Fiscal 
surplus 
 
Current 
account 
balance 
Total savings 
Rest of the 
world 
6 
Import 
payments 
     
Foreign 
exchange 
outflow 
Total Total outlays 7 Gross output 
Total factor 
spending 
Total 
household 
spending 
Government 
expenditure 
Total 
investment 
spending 
Foreign 
exchange 
inflow 
 
         Source: Adapted from Breisinger et al. (2010) 
 
145 
 
In itself, the social accounting matrix does not constitute an economic model but 
simply a database support for models of national income and expenditure. The initial 
application of the SAM framework to policy analysis was in the form of multiplier 
models, a straightforward extension of the input-output logic.  
 
4.1.2 The Social Accounting Matrix Multipliers 
 
The benefits of the SAM framework have much to do with the multipliers that can be 
derived from it. Multipliers are particularly useful for economic planning purposes 
because they allow computing the direct and indirect effects of a given economic 
shock on macroeconomic variables, reflecting the linkages and interdependences 
existing between institutions in an economy. As Burfisher (2011:68) puts it, 
―multiplier models essentially trace the effects of an exogenous shock in one or more 
parts of the SAM throughout the rest of the SAM as an accounting procedure. 
Producers adjust the quantity of their output to meet any changes in demand and 
consumers adjust their demand in response to any changes in income‖.   
 
At the center of the multipliers model is the Input-Output analytical framework 
originally developed by Wassily Leontief in the late 1930s. Using data recording inter-
industry flows in monetary terms in a particular economy over a defined period of 
time – usually a year – it is possible to create a table of transactions between pairs of 
industries. The input-output model thus concentrates on inter-industry production 
linkages. Cells in the transaction table are algebraically represented by the notation zij, 
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where j designates the demand for inputs from other sectors while i denotes the sector 
from which inputs originate. The inter-industry table is completed by a set of 
additional columns, final demand, which records the sales by each industry to final 
markets, usually consumers, investment, the government and exports. Because 
demand emanating from these markets is assumed to be determined by factors other 
than amounts being produced by each industry, they may theoretically be considered 
exogenous. The determination of exogenous sectors is a critical step for the 
computation of multipliers. Indeed, without exogenous sectors, the Walras Law 
teaches us that the matrix of input-output coefficients cannot be inverted. Finally, 
additional rows are used to determine value added, i.e. non-industrial inputs used by 
industries for production. This includes accounts such as employee compensation, 
depreciation of capital, indirect business taxes and imports.  
 
In an Input-Output model, total production for each industry composing the economy 
of interest may be expressed as a function of the sale of its production across all other 
sectors and final demand. If xi is the total output produced by industry i over a year, 
and fi denotes the aggregated final demand for this industry‘s output, then in a n 
sectors economy we will have: 
          
 
   
 
As noted earlier, this can be expressed in a more compact form thanks to matrix 
notation: 
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where x is the n×1 column vector of total output, Zi is the matrix of inter-industry 
sales and value added and f is the n×1 column vector of final demand. 
 
Because this study aims at analyzing the impact of budget cuts on the economy of 
New York State, the column vector of final demand f should be disaggregated further 
to accommodate the variety of components that together form final demand, such that: 
                 
where c represents consumer demand, i purchases for private investment purposes, fg 
the federal government demand, sg the state government demand, lg the local 
governments demand and e the demand from abroad (exports).  
 
The same applies to the payment sector, which gathers imports and value added. 
Indeed, besides employee compensation industries must also use a variety of 
government services along with other inputs (land rent, interest payment to capital…) 
and imports to produce outputs. It is therefore possible to disaggregate further this 
sector into several rows: 
                    
where l represents employee compensation, fgs, sgs and lgs government services for 
the federal, state and local government services respectively, n other value added 
elements (rents, payment to capital) and m imports. Certain cells located at the 
intersection of the value added rows and final demand columns are of particular 
importance for this study, as they include tax payments (row n/column c) and 
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employee compensation for civil servants and government workers (row l/column 
fg;sg;lg).  
 
In the simplified model just presented, total gross output X for the entire economy may 
be expressed as: 
     
 
   
     
 
The sum of outputs produced by each industry, value added and imports. By 
construction, the total sum of rows and columns must be equal in an Input-Output 
model: total gross output equals total gross outlays, the latter being expressed such 
that: 
     
 
   
         
 
In other words, gross national income is set to equal gross national product.  
 
The next step in the creation of a full-fledged Social Accounting Matrix model is to 
compute the matrix of technical coefficients based on the inter-industry transactions 
table. Each coefficient for sector j, denoted by aij, is computed as the monetary value 
of inputs from industry i it uses in its production process divided by the total monetary 
value of its production, or: 
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The way technical coefficients are computed in the SAM thus implies that every sector 
in the economy is subject to constant returns to scale. Factors of productions, 
including industrial inputs, value added components (land, capital, labor and 
government services) and imports are used in technologically pre-determined fixed 
proportions, and factors are not substitutable. Industries behave according to a 
production function known as the Leontief production function, a special case of the 
constant elasticity of substitution production function: 
 
       
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
   
  
 
This assumption of constant returns to scale is all the more important in regard of our 
ulterior use of a linear programming model and guarantees that the proportionality 
assumption about both the objective function and the functional constraints is not 
violated. Having established the fixed character of technical coefficient, equation (1) 
can be re-written as:  
            
 
   
 
 
In matrix form, this would translate as: 
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Because final demand fi is exogenously determined and the technical coefficients are 
derived from data
79
, it is possible to determine the amount of output from each sector 
necessary to accommodate a shock in final demand: this is the very purpose of input-
output analysis. Formulating a new set of equations such that the parameters and the 
endogenous variable are placed on the left-hand side and the exogenous variable on 
the right-hand side, we have: 
            
 
   
 
 
The Input-Output system of n linear equations can be formulated in matrix notation as: 
         
where I is a n×n identity matrix and A the technical coefficients matrix. The unique 
solution to the system, if it exists, is found by using the total requirements matrix, 
which is simply the inverse of (I-A). This implies that: 
           
 
Assuming that technology does not change
80
, and this is the case with a Leontief 
production function, the total requirements matrix (I-A)
-1
 can be considered a 
parameter. In terms of change, it is therefore possible to find the general equilibrium 
impact of an exogenous shock on the economic system with the following equation: 
 
             
                                                 
79
 They are thus considered parameters in the model.  
80
 Technology is represented by the A matrix.  
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This final equation, perhaps the most important in input-output analysis, enables the 
computation of a sum of consecutive rounds of adjustment to an exogenous demand-
side shock until the economy settles down again in a state of general equilibrium. 
Demand-side shock usually refers to changes in government spending, the demand of 
foreign countries for domestic products (exports) or investment demand.  
 
4.1.3 Modeling Exogenous Shocks: Final Demand and Total 
Output Vectors 
 
Exogenous shocks in the social accounting matrix are modeled through a final demand 
column vector that reflects the research question investigated. The general equilibrium 
impact computations indeed do not uniquely depend on the figure associated to each 
element of the final demand vector, but also on the closure of the model, i.e. which 
sectors the researcher chooses to endognize. Most commonly, sectors such as the 
government, the capital account and the rest of the world are rendered exogenous
81
.   
 
Thanks to the multipliers underlying it, social accounting matrices are able to model 
effectively the linkages existing between an economy‘s structure (the inter-industry 
sub-matrix) and the distribution of income across economic agents, and primordially 
households. The introduction of the exogenous shock vector, along with a column 
                                                 
81
 In the case of an input-output model, it is also usual to see the households account as an exogenous 
sector.  
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vector of total output change ∆x, offers the possibility of carrying out comparative 
static analysis, a useful feature for policy and economic planning.   
 
The column vector ∆x, which captures the economic impact of the demand shock, 
summarizes three different types of effects: 
- The direct effects pertain to the sector directly affected by the exogenous shock 
- The indirect effects pertain to the repercussion of a change in a sector‘s 
demand for intermediate goods and services 
- The induced effects pertain to the change in demand from households resulting 
from the income they derive from economic activity 
Mathematically, to each effect is attached a particular multiplier that can be found 
through decomposition. M1, the matrix of direct effect
82
 multipliers is: 
    
      
  
 
  
 
 
The matrix M2 of indirect multipliers
83
 is: 
    
         
  
  
where H is the matrix of coefficients allocating household income to value-added 
categories and C is the matrix of endogenous final consumption coefficients.  
 
Finally, the induced (or feedback) effects are captured by M3, the matrix of ―closed 
loop‖ multipliers: 
                                                 
82
 Also referred to as “intragroup” or “own” multipliers. 
83
 Or “extragroup” or “open loop” multipliers. 
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The magnitude of the multipliers is determined by the strength of backward and 
forward linkages in the economy. Backward linkages refer to the change in demand 
for intermediate input of sectors affected by the exogenous shock while forward 
linkages refer to the adjustment of the production of sectors downstream of where 
production was initially stimulated. Moreover, because SAM multipliers incorporate 
both consumption linkages and production linkages, they tend to be larger than input-
output multipliers. Indeed, input-output multipliers focus uniquely on production 
linkages, ignoring the impact caused by additional incomes to households
84
 generated 
by the change in production.  
 
SAM thus reveals itself as a more complete approach to mapping the circular flow of 
spending and revenue in the economy, and offers an interesting tool to translate 
exogenous demand shocks into changes in endogenous macroeconomic variables, 
including gross output, labor income and employment.  
 
 
 
                                                 
84
 Income also accrues to factors of production, but in the SAM framework, it is assumed that 
households are the ultimate owners of the factors of production, be it land, capital or labor.  
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4.1.4 Assumptions, Limits and Appropriateness of the SAM 
Framework  
 
If SAM enjoys certain advantages over input-output models, it suffers from the same 
limitations. Indeed, using SAM to model an economy implies defending strong 
assumptions:  
- the behavior of firms can be represented by a linear production function with 
constant returns to scale (the so-called Leontief production function); 
- the model is demand-driven, and there are no supply constraints on the goods 
and services market and on the market for factors of production; 
- prices are exogenous, and thus fixed.  
 
SAM is also a static model in nature. Furthermore, by using a SAM framework we 
make the assumption that the fiscal multiplier of state spending is at least equal or 
superior to one. This implies that by construction, the model cannot converge toward 
so-called ―expansionary contraction‖, i.e. an above-trend output growth accompanying 
a fall in the cyclically adjusted budget deficit. We believe that at least in the short-run 
– the timeframe that is of interest to us here – there is few empirical evidences 
suggesting that slashing spending lead to higher aggregate output: the examples of 
Greece, Ireland and the United Kingdom appear edifying in the case of the 2008 
financial crisis (The Economist, 2011). More concerning perhaps is the magnitude by 
which the fiscal multiplier deviates from one. If the multiplier is indeed very close to 
one in the case of New York, then the exercise lose somewhat of its interest: slashing 
expenditures would certainly have a depressive effect on the local economy, but it 
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would not ripple throughout the production sector and magnify losses in employment 
and output. We would thus be relatively indifferent among cutback management 
strategies. The question of the size of fiscal multipliers has been central in 
macroeconomics, but research on the topic at the local level is scarce. At the national 
level, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) find a fiscal multiplier of 1.1 for government 
spending in the U.S. while Dalsgaard et al. (2001) find 2.1. Perotti (2005) estimates it 
to be 2.2. Because the economy of the state of New York is more open than the one of 
the United States, we would expect its fiscal multiplier to be somewhat smaller
85
. 
Serrato and Wingender (2010) find that federal spending has a local income multiplier 
of 1.88 and a certain number of papers recently demonstrated that the income 
multiplier may actually get larger during episodes of recession (Christiano et al., 2009; 
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2010; Woodford, 2010). Thus, our assumption of a 
significantly larger than one fiscal multiplier appears comforted by recent empirical 
works. Besides, because SAM is a static general equilibrium model, the resulting 
change in output from an exogenous demand shock will likely be far larger than the 
one that can be observed through econometrics model.  
 
Using SAM for fiscal policy analysis is not without appeal, in particular for this 
dissertation. Capturing the impact of budget retrenchment on the economy of New 
York State requires a comprehensive and consistent disaggregated general equilibrium 
data system offering both a model of the State‘s socioeconomic system and a set of 
                                                 
85
 This may however well depend on the nature of the spending of both levels of government. If state 
expenditures result in higher aggregate demand – perhaps because their spending is more targeted 
and efficient – then we could imagine the local fiscal multiplier to be larger than the federal.  
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initial values for exogenous and endogenous variables. SAM answers precisely these 
two requirements (Thorbecke, 1988). As for SAM in our proposed social accounting 
matrix multiobjective linear programming model, it provides: 
- a consistent structural framework allowing to compute the general equilibrium 
of the economy and the associated values taken by target variables (i.e. 
objective functions) corresponding to various settings of policy instruments; 
- A database to assign specific values to the C matrix of parameters in the linear 
program.  
 
Another advantage of the SAM framework is that it is sufficiently flexible to allow 
―fine-tuning‖ for particular issues. How disaggregated and large the matrix must be 
depends on the amount of data available to the researcher and the motivation behind 
the research project. The closure of the matrix is another sphere of flexibility: 
depending on the research objectives, one can choose to render exogenous (or 
endogenous) given sectors or sub-components of them. In this regard, the strength of 
the social accounting matrix framework resides in its endogenization of households, 
making possible the study of the distributional effect of policies. SAM thus constitutes 
a convenient type of general equilibrium model, simpler to manipulate and solve than 
the more cumbersome CGE models. This feature is attractive for our study, because 
the general equilibrium model must actually be combined with an optimization 
program.  
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The focus of the research being on mid-year budget cuts, it appears relatively realistic 
top postulate that in the short term agents in the production sector can be represented 
by a Leontief production function. In the same fashion, sticky prices are not a major 
violation of either economic theory or empiric studies in the short run. The logic of 
using a demand-driven model appears solid in the case of the United States and New 
York State, two economies were consumption is the main driver of economic growth 
and employment. Furthermore, the demand-driven characteristic of the model is, we 
believe, especially appealing to approximate an economy in crisis. The absence of 
supply constraints does not appear problematic in the case of the United States, where 
significant production capacity remained unused during fiscal year 2010.  
 
Figure 4.1. Capacity utilization in the United States 
 
                        Source: Federal Reserve 
 
Having justified our preference for social accounting matrices in the framework of this 
dissertation, we must however point out to certain weaknesses of our treatment of the 
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methods in the subsequent pages. Social accounting matrices require a vast amount of 
data to be constructed and the building process is both time-consuming and tricky. We 
thus rely on the Minnesota IMPLAN Group for our New York State SAM, which 
poses some difficulties. The most prominent is the impossibility to fine-tune the SAM 
to our needs. In particular, the level of aggregation of the sector of interest to us, state 
and local governments, is too high, clearly reflecting the necessity for economists to 
actually build their own SAM to study questions that span beyond the impact analysis 
of small projects.  
 
4.2 Aspects of Multiobjective Linear Programming  
 
Now that we have established a model to evaluate the impact of a policy on the 
economy, we may turn our attention to the method through which said policy can be 
optimized. In the introduction, we observed that policy makers must usually respond 
to multiple conflicting objectives, in which case the classical linear programming 
approach proved flawed and simplistic. On the contrary, multiobjective linear 
programming enables a systematic and simultaneous optimization of a collection of 
objective functions, circumventing the difficulty of modeling preferences through a 
single criterion or utility function.   
 
Definition 4.1. An objective function is a mathematical function of some decision 
variables providing the decision maker with an appropriate measure of performance 
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Definition 4.2. The decision variables, gathered in a vector   , are modified to perform 
a search for an optimum of the objective function  
 
Besides engineering, the most important field of application for multiobjective linear 
programming (MOLP) has been operations research and finance, with extensive works 
realized in capital budgeting decisions, project evaluation and portfolio optimization to 
quote but a few (Steuer et al., 1996). The technique however originated in 
microeconomics and matured along the development of the welfare and utility theory 
(Stigler, 1950).  
 
In this section, we present the basic elements and concepts of multiobjective linear 
programming (MOLP) and an application of the technique to a policy problem with 
economic and equity objectives. Sub-section 4.2.1. presents multiobjective 
programming in comparison of the classical single objective linear programming 
model, while sub-section 4.2.2. elaborates on the most critical concepts necessary to 
the understanding of MOLP.   
 
4.2.1 From Monobjective to Multiobjective Programming  
 
The most common type of application for linear programming involves the allocation 
of limited resources among competing activities in an optimal way (Hillier and 
Lieberman, 1995). The objective of the problem, denoted Z, is mathematically 
160 
 
captured by an overall measure of performance, or criterion, through the introduction 
of an objective function        where R1 denotes a one-dimensional Euclidean 
space. The value of f(x)=Z indicates how much impact is given on objective Z by 
performing an alternative x (Sawaragi et al., 1985). A standard form of a minimization 
monobjective linear problem can thus be formulated as follow: 
 
                      
                         (m inequality constraints) 
                                (e equality constraints) 
with      ,           and            
 
where       represents the objective function to optimize, while        and         
correspond to vectors of inequality and equality constraints respectively. The decision 
variables, exogenous to the model, are gathered in the vector   . The search for an 
optimal solution is done by modifying this vector. Note that a vector    in Rn is written 
as a row vector but when using matrix calculations it will take the form of a column 
vector of dimension n×1.  
 
The multiobjective counterpart to this model takes the form: 
                       
                                              
                                                       
with      ,          ,            and            
 
where we have k ≥ 2 objective functions are gathered in the    vector.  
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In order to spare ourselves cumbersome notations, we will henceforth eliminate the 
vector superscript. The purpose of a multiobjective optimization is to minimize or 
maximize ―at best‖ the various objective functions. We know from our initial set of 
equations that        is the vector of decision variables, where there are n 
(independent) decision variables   .         
  is the vector of objective functions 
         
    . The gradient of         with respect to   is            
 . The 
significance of the gradient is that the infinitesimal change in   that maximizes the 
rate at which      decreases is the change that is proportional to       (Hillier and 
Lieberman, 1995).   
 
The general multiobjective optimization problem can be re-written as
86
: 
 
                                      
  
                      
 
where the decision variable vector   belongs to the nonempty feasible region S, itself a 
subset of the decision variable space R
n
. S is defined as a set such that : 
                                            
 
As for the feasible criterion (or objective) space, denoted Z, it is the set: 
           
 
                                                 
86
 Certain authors replace the “Min” or “Max” element by “Eff”, implying that the multoptimization 
program actually searches for a set of Pareto efficient solutions to an optimizing problem.  
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From this formulation derives an interesting particularity of multiobjective linear 
programming over monobjective programming: if the latter focuses on the decision 
variable space, the attention of the analyst often shifts to the objective space – usually 
of lower dimension – in the case of the former. Using a two-dimension graphical 
representation, this implies that the axes in a single objective linear programming 
problem will be        , the decision variables, while they will be        ,, the 
objective functions, for MOLP.  
 
4.2.2. Concepts 
 
Throughout the rest of the dissertation, a certain number of critical concepts will be 
mobilized repeatedly. This sub-section is dedicated to clarify their meanings. As a tool 
helping decision makers to ameliorate their choices, multiobjective linear 
programming is constantly addressing the issue of defining the preferences of the 
decision maker. The exercise is particularly difficult because contrarily to 
monobjective programming, the objective space in MOLP problems is only partially 
ordered. In other words, it is extremely difficult to compare vectors in real space 
(Chankong and Haimes, 1983), and this challenge is considered the trickiest part in 
implementing MOLP (Steuer, 1986).  
 
Definition 4.3. Preferences pertain to the decision maker‘s opinion vis-à-vis points in 
the objective space, and are represented in a preference function ideally under the 
form of a mathematical utility (or preference-preserving) function. 
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If single-objective optimization reaches clearly defined solutions, it is not the case of 
multi-objective linear programming. The method indeed aims at finding a solution – 
most commonly a set of solutions – that is actually a ―best compromise‖ between 
conflicting objectives. This notion of ―best compromise‖ rests on the preferences of 
the decision maker. Based on the interpretation of these preferences, it is however 
possible to identify a set of points in the criterion space that satisfied the definition of 
an optimum using Pareto optimality. Lacking a perfect knowledge of the decision 
maker‘s utility function, Pareto optimality enables the researcher to investigate the 
―space of tradeoffs‖ between objective functions.  
 
Definition 4.4. Pareto Optimality
87
: A vector      is globally88 Pareto optimal if 
and only if (iff) there does not exist any other vector      such that            , 
and     
       
   for at least one objective function. A vector    is weakly Pareto 
optimal iff there exists no    such that            . 
 
Moreover, Pareto optimal solutions can be classified as being either proper or 
improper (Geoffrion, 1968). Notice that in the definition given hereunder the quotient 
actually represents the trade-off between objective function i and objective function j.  
 
                                                 
87
 Pareto optimality has been defined by several authors, the most famous being the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker condition (Karush, 1939; Kuhn and Tucker, 1951) and the efficient point type (Koopmans).  
88
 A vector can indeed be also locally optimal. Locality is traditionally defined by a circle of radius δ 
which centers is the vector x.   
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Definition 4.5. Proper Pareto optimality: a solution    is said to be properly efficient 
iff it is Pareto optimal and there exists a strictly non-negative scalar M such that, for 
each i, we have 
          
  
             
   
 
For some j such that           
   whenever     and           
   
 
Pareto optimal solutions are thus found when no objective function can be improved 
without worsening at least another objective function. Weakly Pareto optimal 
solutions imply that there does not exist any other vector that can improve all of the 
objective functions simultaneously. These definitions correspond to the idea of 
domination relation. 
 
Definition 4.6. Domination Relation: A vector      is said to dominate a vector 
     iff (i)    is at least as good as    for all objectives and (ii)    is strictly better 
than    with respect to at least one objective.  
 
For all intent and purposes, it can be seen that the definition of domination is identical 
to the definition of Pareto optimality (and by extension, to efficiency
89
). In the 
literature however, efficiency tends to refer to a vector of decision variables in the 
                                                 
89
 To be more precise, Pareto optimality is a specific case of efficiency.  
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decision space while domination typically refers to a vector of objective function in 
the criterion space.  
 
The contact theorem tells us that all Pareto optimal points for a given multiobjective 
programming problem lie on the boundary of the feasible objectives sub-space Z. 
 
Theorem 4.1. Contact Theorem: A vector      is Pareto optimal iff 
               
where C
-
 is a negative cone defined in R
k
 such that 
                              
 
Nothing prevents the Pareto optimal set, which gathers the Pareto optimal solutions to 
a given problem, from being infinite. The Pareto optimal set is also geometrically 
known as the trade-off surface, Pareto front or Pareto frontier, an idea to which we 
will come back in the following sub-section. Ideally, the Pareto optimal set is a sub-set 
of a convex feasible region Z.  
 
Definition 4.7. Convexity: A set      is convex iff for any         the points 
                for all        .  
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4.2.3 Determining Optimal Solutions: Payoff Matrix and Pareto 
Front  
 
In more than 30 years of development, various methods to solve multiobjective linear 
programming problems have been proposed. Colette and Siarry (2009) classified them 
in five categories: 
- Scalar methods 
- Interactive methods 
- Fuzzy methods 
- Metaheuristic methods 
- Decision aid methods 
Van Veldhuizen (1998) employs another type of categorization according to the way 
decision maker and analyst interact: 
- A priori techniques: the decision maker has defined preferences even before 
the optimization framework is put in place. Monobjective linear programs falls 
in this family; 
- Progressive techniques: the decision maker cooperates with the analyst during 
the optimization process to identify satisfying solutions; 
- A posteriori techniques: the analyst provides the decision maker with a set of 
optimal solutions from which she will choose. For this family, the computation 
of the tradeoff surface is especially important. 
 
Finding a solution to a multiobjective linear programming problem usually involves 
both the decision maker and the analyst. The solution process can be divided in two 
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parts. In a first step, the analyst tries to define the set of Pareto optimal solutions, an 
application of vector optimization. In a second step, the analyst will try to determine a 
limited number – or a unique – of optimal solutions among which the decision maker 
will be invited to choose. The vector satisfying the preferences of the decision maker 
is called the final solution.  
 
As definitions of Pareto optimality and domination relation forcefully illustrated, there 
exist trade-offs between any two criteria in MOLP. Trade-offs are simply measures of 
how much of one objective should be sacrificed to gain an improvement in another 
objective, a concept that echoes the economic idea of opportunity cost. Multiobjective 
optimization can thus be solved by identifying the exhaustive set of trade-offs for 
given problem, which graphically take the form of a trade-off surface (or Pareto front). 
The Pareto front can more precisely be defined as the set of solutions of rank 1 
determined through the definition of a domination relation and the resulting sorting 
process. It is noteworthy that the shapes of the Pareto fronts are not arbitrary for 
problems having a convex solution set (we will come back to this idea hereunder). 
They depend on the formulation of the MOLP and the type of optimization which is 
individually asked of each objective function (e.g. if    , min-min, min-max, max-
min, max-max are the four possible combinations). A good representation of a trade-
off surface is given by an algorithm that provides solutions located at a regular interval 
on the front, in order to avoid missing potential concavities.   
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An important tool to assess the nature of trade-offs between criteria is the payoff 
matrix. The cell elements of this square matrix – whose dimensions equal the number 
of objective functions – are the value taken by objective functions when they are 
optimized individually, i.e. without taking into account the existence of the other 
objectives. The payoff matrix can also serve as a starting point for compromise 
programming algorithm, a technique we detail hereunder. Indeed, the elements in the 
diagonal of the matrix can be consider to form the coordinates of an ideal vector which 
optimizes simultaneously all the objectives
90
, notwithstanding the trade-offs that must 
be realized between the various criteria. By the same token, the lowest value taken by 
the objective function in each column is the ―Nadir‖ point (or ―anti-ideal‖ point), a 
useful reference to restrict the search space.    
 
4.3 Application Using a Small Algebraic Model  
 
4.3.1. Introduction 
 
The preceding sections and chapters established the context and necessary concepts 
necessary to the practical purpose of this dissertation. For the moment however, we 
have yet to combine the two instruments we presented into a coherent framework for 
the optimization of policy designs when policy makers are concerned by more than a 
single objective. It is the purpose of the rest of this chapter and of the next one. 
 
                                                 
90
 The ideal point thus does not belong to the set of feasible solution Z.  
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A social accounting matrix multiobjective linear programming model has, up to the 
extent of our knowledge, never been proposed in the literature. We thus feel that 
before jumping into a full-fledged model for concrete policy evaluation, it may be 
beneficial to elaborate and solve analytically a smaller model, which, for all intents 
and purposes, will have the same properties. The goal of the exercise remains the 
same: identifying a set of Pareto optimal solutions from which the decision maker will 
select a final solution she deemed reflective of her preferences.  
 
The policy design problem is articulated around a set of variables that are introduced 
over the next few pages. Central among these variables are the policy criteria the 
decision-maker is trying to optimize. In the macro SAM framework, they will be 
captured by some macroeconomic aggregates
91
. So as to steer these indicators toward 
desired levels, the decision maker will mobilize a body of policy instruments, for 
which only plausible variations must be admitted.   
 
For illustrative purposes, the SAM-multiobjective linear program is presented under 
the form a bi-criteria problem, so that we can illustrate some of our findings 
graphically. 
 
 
 
                                                 
91
 Notice here that SAM cannot be used to evaluate any policy. For instance, because prices are 
exogenous, it is impossible to consider minimizing inflation as a policy objective.  
170 
 
4.3.2. The Model 
 
CRITERIA AND POLICY INSTRUMENTS  
 
Even in the case of the implementation of a generalized model, the policy design 
process should be started by defining both policy objectives, represented by objective 
functions, and policy levers, captured by the decision variables. The policy criteria and 
their associated objective functions are measured through macroeconomic variables.   
 
Concerned with the depressive impact of stagnating wages on consumption and 
economic growth, the government‘s first policy objective in our model is to boost the 
revenues of all households as measured by the growth in real gross labor income. For 
simplicity purposes, it will be assumed that labor income is a positive linear function 
of total of value-added payments to households W, the sum of row elements for the 
aggregated household sector (Miller and Blair, 2009): 
          
where F refers to the final consumption of goods and services by households, T to the 
direct taxed paid to the government, S the allocation of a certain proportion of 
revenues to savings and O to overseas transfers of income.  
 
The second objective for the government is to maximize the revenues of low-income 
households in particular to improve equity in the society. This objective is also 
measured through total of value-added payments to households, but this time the SAM 
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matrix is sufficiently disaggregated to incorporate a row dedicated to low-income 
households specifically.  
In other words, we thus have: 
 
 Z1 = maximizing the revenues of all households 
 Z2 = maximizing the revenues of low-income households 
 
For convenience purposes, revenues of all households will be denoted      while 
revenues of low-income households will be denoted     . Notice that according to 
the definitions of Pareto optimality and domination relations we gave earlier, a policy 
    92with feasible space coordinates    
  
   
  
  can be said to be Pareto efficient 
iff there is no other policy      with coordinates    
  
   
  
  such that   
  
   
  
 and 
  
  
   
  
 or   
  
   
  
 and   
  
   
  
 in the case where the two objective functions 
must be maximized.  
 
Initially, we will assume that the policy maker‘s preferences are perfectly represented 
by the following utility function: 
                
where α is a parameter. 
 
                                                 
92
 The greek letter khi.  
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It can be easily seen from the equation that α acts as a weight measuring the relative 
importance of Z2 compared to Z1. When α is set to equal 1, the policy maker is 
indifferent between the two objectives. When α=0, the decision maker has no interest 
in maximizing the revenues perceived by low-income households. We will come back 
to this feature later on when solving the linear programming implementation of the 
problem. 
 
A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF THE ECONOMY  
 
Let us now turn our attention to the hypothetical economy. It is assumed to be 
represented by the following Leontief inverse matrix: 
 
           
            
            
            
            
        
 
where value-added components and final demands (including of course the 
government) have been rendered exogenous. In this matrix, sectors 1 and 2 represent 
two industries while sectors 3 and 4 represent aggregated households and low-income 
households respectively. The presentation of the multipliers, low-income households 
being a sub-component of aggregated households, is unorthodox but of no 
consequence to the SAM-MOLP framework we will establish later by virtue of linear 
algebra. This reflects our use of the social accounting matrix as a database for 
estimating the parameters for the multiobjective linear program. The results from the 
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computations will not be affected by the presentation of the SAM as long as we do not 
take interest in an aggregate measure, for instance GDP.   
 
To fulfill its objectives, it is assumed that the government has at its disposal a budget 
of size B that has been earmarked for industrial development. The government, a 
single and coherent agent, is the decision-maker. It decides the volume of public 
spending and the sectors that will be the recipient of the expenditures. Because the 
funds available have been earmarked for an industrial policy, the government can 
inject the money either in sector 1 or in sector 2, or in both. It is however impossible 
to channel funds directly to households (sectors 3 and 4).  
 
It is useful here to re-write the entire model so as to get a sense of the way it will be 
optimized and solved. Moreover, it provides the opportunity to address a notation 
issue that could lead to certain confusion. In linear programming, it is traditional to 
denote the decision variables by   , whereas the exogenous shock in SAM models is 
denoted by  . The variable   on the other hand represents the level of output. This 
constitutes a problem, insofar as the column vector  .actually constitutes the policy 
instruments – and thus the decision variables – in our model. Except for the following 
section, it will be understood that   , the vector decision variables in the 
multiobjective linear program, will be equal to the vector of change in final demand 
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  . The vector of output93 will be denoted  . Having been clarified notations, let us 
jump to the model: 
           
 
 
            
            
            
            
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
 
where we have established that    and    must equal zero. Generalizing, we find that: 
               
 
We will henceforth assume that  
        
         
         
          
 
THE SAM MODEL: IMPACT FORM OR PLANNING FORM?  
 
As established in the methodological part of this chapter, the economic impact of the 
government‘s budget choices is estimated through a social accounting matrix. In order 
to do so, we may choose to implement the model either in its impact analysis form or 
in its planning form. The impact form, as its name indicates, is used to analyze the 
response of industry outputs and factors associated with inter-industry activities to a 
                                                 
93
 In linear algebra, it is traditional to reserve capital letters to matrices. This will be an exception.  
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particular final demand schedule presented to the economy. The planning form on the 
other hand is advantageous when seeking to optimize an objective – or a set of 
objectives – other than the objective implicit in traditional input-output modeling 
(Thoss, 1976; Blair, 1979). Indeed, the basic Leontief takes the following form, which 
is nothing but a special case of linear programming: 
 
       
or                        
 
In a two sector economy, a solution to this problem can be represented graphically. 
The feasible region would represent every possible combination of xi that satisfies 
final demand. The two binding technological constraints forming the production 
possibilities of this economy intersect at the input-output solution, i.e. the vector of 
output satisfying a given schedule of final demand. More precisely, the intersection is 
the point where the values taken by xi minimize total value-added while still satisfying 
final demand. If q denotes total value added, then we can re-write the original two-
sector Leontief model under its linear programming form: 
 
                                                  
                                      
                                             
 
From there, it becomes possible to formulate a generalized input-output model under 
its impact analysis form: 
      
where                          
  
 
        and            and     
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Note that D* is a matrix of direct impact coefficient (dedicated to relate factors of 
interest such as employment, energy use or pollution to industry output) and L is the 
Leontief inverse matrix. H, which is created by concatenating D* and L is a matrix of 
total-impact coefficients.    is a vector representing the levels of total impacts of the 
factors of interest while   is the traditional vector of output in the Leontief model. The 
trained eye will immediately remark that this impact form is nothing but an expansion 
of the classical input-output model developed by Leontief, the difference between the 
two consisting in the addition of two vectors of total impact to investigate other issues 
than the level of output (D* and   ).  
 
The planning form of the generalized input-output model offers a different 
perspective. This form is indeed articulated around a matrix G, which is an expanded 
direct-impact coefficients matrix. 
   
 
     
  
 
The planning approach is generalized as follow: 
     
 
where                                                            
  
 
  
 
The corresponding linear programming problem has the following form: 
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This form is particularly interesting because we have provided the original Leontief 
model with additional constraints reflecting the existence of factors the policy-maker 
deems of interest (see the right-hand side of the constraint). It implies however that the 
new input-output model can be over-constrained, in which case the set of feasible 
solutions is actually empty. The linear programming is initialized by computing the 
values of the right-hand side constraints from the impact analysis form. These values 
are then modified to simulate economic growth (increase in the vector  ) or the targets 
of some policy (change in the vector   ). The limit of the planning form is precisely 
that it is extremely difficult to operate a change in the right-hand side of the constraint 
equation that does not eliminate altogether the feasible region. It is therefore necessary 
to obtain an exhaustive knowledge of the feasible set of solutions prior to changing the 
constraints of the linear program. If it is feasible for small problems, identifying the 
feasible region quickly becomes intractable as the number of policy objectives 
increases beyond three.  
 
Despite its usefulness and appeal for optimization, we will employ a generalized social 
accounting matrix under its impact analysis form in the rest of the chapter and the 
following one.  
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NECESSARY CONDITION FOR NON-TRIVIAL MULTIOBJECTIVE 
OPTIMIZATION  
 
In this chapter, we already emphasized that a necessary condition for a non-trivial use 
of multiobjective linear programming is the existence of a conflict between at least 
two objective functions. Therefore, we must have that: 
         or           
                                     
 
Indeed, if          and            holds simultaneously, then injecting all the 
funds in sector k would result in optimizing both Z1 and Z2. Consequently, the problem 
would be of a trivial nature. An interesting feature of social accounting matrix is that 
thanks to its convenient presentation in matrix form, it is easy to extract the set of 
linear equations summarizing the impact of the exogenous shock(s) on the economy. 
Therefore, conflicts between objective functions can be revealed straightforwardly.  
 
The relations between the Leontief coefficients in the same column are left undefined 
because inter-households equity is not a policy objective of the decision maker here. 
To reduce inequalities in society, the policy maker might actually been interested in 
injecting money where                   
 . This would imply that the income 
earned by low-income households would actually catch up with the income earned by 
all households. One can argue that this measure is even more interesting than the one 
we selected because equity issues are comparative in nature, rather than absolute. Our 
model can indeed reach an optimal solution resulting in the best absolute improvement 
for labor income of both types of households, but in a rise in inequalities since 
aggregate households‘ income may be progressing at a faster rate than the revenues of 
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low-income households. For simplicity purposes however, we will keep our original 
policy design.  
 
NON-NEGATIVITY AND STRICT POSITIVITY OF PARAMETERS  
 
Another interesting feature of SAM should also be noted. Each of the terms A used in 
the series approximation         contains only non-negative elements. Indeed, the 
Hawkins-Simon conditions (Hawkins and Simon, 1949) stipulate that as long as 
       , then all elements in the Leontief inverse matrix will be non-negative94. 
Because             objectives will be strictly increasing in   as long as the vector 
of final demands shock      for at least one             . We can bypass the 
need to investigate the principal minors of the Leontief matrix using the condition 
developed by Dietzenbacher (2005): if the original data are      and      (with 
at least one   
    , then               and           for any     . 
Requirements for    and    are easily checked in a social accounting matrix. In our 
example, we will assume that      and we know from the policy design problem 
under scrutiny that at least one   
  will be strictly positive, i.e. that the government 
must spend its earmarked budget B. 
 
                                                 
94
 The proof can be found in Hawkins and Simon (1949). The intuition is that as         
 
       
     
   
     
   
     
       
     
  and knowing from basic input-output that       and      ,       is non-
negative. Hereby,         has non-negative elements (Miller and Blair, 2009).  
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It is also important to note that as it has been demonstrated that      , every 
additional dollar injected in any sector of the economy will result in the improvement 
(except when      ) of the utility function                . 
 
4.3.3. Implementation of the Model  
 
PRELIMINARIES  
 
The multiobjective linear programming implementation of the problem is as follow: 
 
Objective functions: 
                     
                       
 
Constraints: 
                          
                                           
  
                                        
 
The constraints are such that it is actually possible for the government to inject the 
integrality of its budget in a single sector. This could be changed by transforming the 
third constraints to a strictly positive condition for the column vectors   and   .  
 
Inasmuch as we determined a utility function mapping the preferences of the decision 
maker, we can re-write the objective function under a familiar form, that of a single 
objective linear program. 
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Objective function: 
                    
or when developed  
                                               
 
THE PROBLEM IN DECISION AND CRITERION SPACES  
 
Having only two decision variables,    and    , it is possible to solve the linear 
programming problem graphically. Representing the problem in the decision space, 
we note that there exist three corner point feasible (CPF) solutions, two of which can 
be considered optimal depending on the objective function to maximize.  
 
Figure 4.2. Solutions in the decision space   
 
 
Our knowledge of the policy maker‘s utility function offers a simple way to solve the 
problem by mapping said function in the two-dimensional Euclidean decision 
variables space. 
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Figure 4.3. Solving with the decision maker‘s utility function 
 
Only two optimal solutions emerge from the decision maker‘s preferences, as captured 
by                , except when   is set to equal one. In this case, an infinite 
number of optimal solutions exist. The utility function indeed corresponds to the 
binding constraint         .   measuring the relative importance of the two 
objectives, setting     means that the policy maker is indifferent between 
maximizing the income of all households and that of low-income households. Ergo, 
any amount of fund can be channeled in either of the two sectors without violating the 
stated preferences of the decision maker. On the contrary, if    , then the policy 
maker does not care about the labor-income perceived by low-income households in 
which case the original multiobjective framework is transformed into a monobjective 
one, where Z1 is the only measure of performance under consideration. When     
 , the decision maker displays her preference for low-income households‘ revenues 
over the revenues earned by all households. Accordingly, when      , the 
decision maker favors all households.   
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Despite its simplicity, this problem illustrates a central feature of multiobjective linear 
programming: the importance of the decision maker in the establishment of an optimal 
solution. Perhaps more importantly, this example enables us to introduce graphically 
the concept of feasible region in the criterion space. Consider the original MOLP 
where the feasible region in decision space we just illustrated is denoted S, whereas Z 
will denotes the feasible region in criterion space. In set theoretic notation,  
                     
 
which means that Z is the set of images of all points included in S. A point worth 
mentioning is that Z is not necessarily confined to the nonnegative orthant of   , even 
if S is.  
 
With respect to the original MOLP, it is possible to transfer the linear problem‘s 
graphical representation from the decision space to the criterion space by identifying 
the set of criterion vectors associated with the corner point feasible solutions of S. 
They are as follow: 
 
        →                         
        →            Nadir point 
        →                      
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Figure 4.4. Solving the MOLP in the decision space 
 
Note that both the feasible sets S in decision space and Z in criterion space are convex 
and closed. It is possible to determine graphically the location of both the Nadir point 
and the ideal point    .  
 
Defintion 4.8. Nadir point: its coordinates correspond to the worst values obtained on 
each objective function while restricting the solutions set to the trade-off surface. The 
Nadir point is used to restrict the search space and ameliorate the computing time of 
the algorithm.  
 
Definition 4.9. The ideal point
95
: its coordinates are obtained by maximizing 
separately the different objective functions. It may be used as a reference point for 
optimization. Vincent and Grantham (1981) offer the mathematical definition of the 
ideal point: 
                                                 
95
 Also called “Utopia point”.  
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 A point        is an ideal point iff for each          ,   
   
                 
 
IDENTIFYING THE PARETO FRONT  
 
Up until now, only a graphical representation of the MOLP has been offered. In order 
to solve the problem, domination relation among the solutions must be established. 
Similarly to single objective linear programming, we are interested in optimal 
solutions to the Pareto, a small subset of the feasible criterion space Z. In particular, it 
is crucial to identify the set of nondominated criterion vector. 
 
Definition 4.10. Nondominated vector: Let     . Then   is a nondominated criterion 
vector if and only if there is no other vector     such that     and     . If this is 
the case,   is a dominated criterion vector. The inverse image of   in S, called    is by 
definition efficient (or Pareto optimal)
96
.  
 
To compare various solutions, we must first recall that the policy maker wishes to see 
Z1 and Z2 maximized. Therefore, a point P in the criterion space dominates a point Q 
in the same space considering objective Z1 if Z1(P) has a larger value than Z1(Q); a 
point P is better than a point Q with respect to objective Z2 if Z2(P) has a larger value 
than Z2(Q). It is then possible to classify the set of solutions to the problem in the 
following way: 
 
                                                 
96
 It is said that efficient points are contenders for optimality.  
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Table 4.2. The Payoff Matrix: a table of the values of the criteria for a selection of 
feasible points 
Point Objective Z1 Objective Z2 
                      
   0 0 
                 
                                                
where       
D’ is an intermediate point on the Pareto tradeoff surface (see preceding graph) 
 
 
Table 4.3. Corresponding classification of solutions 
             
    (+ , +) (- , +) (- , +) 
   (- , -)  (- , -) (- , -) 
   (+ , -) (+ , +)  (+ , -) 
   (+ , -) (+ , +) (- , +)  
● Graphically, it can be seen that A’ is worse than C’ considering objective Z1. 
Therefore, the first element in the cell [A’,C’] is a minus. Reciprocally, the second 
element in the cell [C’,A’] is a minus as well. 
● Similarly, we observe that A’ is better than C’ with respect to objective Z2. 
Consequently, the second element in the cell [A’,C’] is a plus. 
● B’ being worse than the other points selected with respect to both objectives, it is 
attributed a double minus for its row.  
 
Then, it is possible to say that point B‘, the Nadir point, will not belong to the set of  
nondominated solutions of rank 1 because it is possible to find at least one point (A’, 
C’ or D’) which is better than B’ on all objective functions. As for A’, C’ and D’, they 
all belong to the set of nondominated points N according to the following theorem: 
 
Theorem 4.2. 
Let        be a coordinatewise increasing utility function. Then, if    , is 
optimal,   is nondominated. 
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 Proof. (Steuer, 1985:148) Suppose   is dominated. Then, there exists a      
such that     ,     . Since U is coordinatewise increasing, this means      
    , which contradicts the optimality of  . Thus,   is nondominated.                  
 
Thanks to the classification of solution, we have already established that A’, C’ and D’ 
do not dominate themselves, so that they can be called Pareto optimal solutions of 
rank 1. This sorting rule, based upon the concept of domination relation, creates the 
tradeoff surface or Pareto front, which gathers the set N of Pareto optimal solutions of 
rank 1.  The tradeoff surface we represented in our solution graph is consistent with 
the shape of a max-max problem (maximizing both objective functions) with a convex 
solution set.  
 
Figure 4.5. Theoretical shape of a tradeoff surface for a max-max problem with a 
convex solution set. 
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4.3.4. Algorithm and Solution  
 
INTRODUCING COMPROMISE PROGRAMMING  
 
To solve our program we will use a type of compromise solution, a technique that 
yields a single optimal solution
97
. The key point of compromise solutions, also known 
as ―distance-to-a-reference-objective method‖, is to minimize the topological distance 
between the vector under consideration, member of the set of nondominated solutions 
N, and the ideal vector     (Yu, 1973; Zeleny, 1973). The Pareto optimal solution 
which is the closest to the ideal vector is the compromise solution. Of course, the 
meaning of close is dependent on the metric selected. In this case, the absolute 
Euclidean distance      is the measure of choice, as the two objective functions are 
expressed in the same unit (US dollars): 
                          
    
 
 
 
 
  
 
With       
 
Keeping this in mind, we may now propose a specific method to solve the MOLP. The 
augmented weighted Tchebycheff (also written Chebyshev by certain authors) 
procedure, a type of weighting vector space reduction method, has been selected 
(Steuer and Choo, 1983). Using this procedure has several advantages, including the 
fact that the objective vectors    need not be linear, nor the set of feasible solution in 
                                                 
97
 The approach is thus very close to single objective LP. Once the model has been run, a unique 
solution is proposed for the decision maker’s approval.  
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the decision space S need be convex. Moreover, the algorithm can converge to non-
extreme solutions and can compute unsupported and improperly nondenominated 
criterion vectors. To obtain a final solution, the algorithm follows a progressively 
more concentrated sampling strategy respecting the preferences of the decision maker. 
It is therefore classified as an interactive technique, where the analyst requires the 
input of the decision maker to enable the model to converge to a satisfying conclusion. 
The algorithm operates in a pre-determined number of iterations and computes a fixed 
number of solutions per iteration.  
 
The general formulation for the weighted Tchebycheff method is as follow: 
 
     
 
            
     
where   is called an achievement function,   is a vector of weights set by the decision 
maker such that       
 
    and    . The weighted Tchebycheff procedure is the 
limit
98
 of equation      as    .  
 
                 
 
   
    
 
Steuer and Choo (1983) however recommend to use another set of weighting vectors 
    , where    is the set of all nonnegative weighting vectors, to give birth to the 
augmented weighted Tchebycheff method: 
                                                 
98
 Setting      allows a complete identification of the Pareto optimal set (Messac et al, 2000).  
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This set is used to define different weighted Tchebycheff metrics in such a way that 
the probability of obtaining a weakly Pareto optimal solution – a risk of the classical 
weighted Tchebycheff procedure – is reduced to zero (Miettinen, 1999). The weighted 
Tchebycheff metric will be the yardstick used to measure the distance between a 
Pareto optimal vector      and the ideal point    : 
 
        
     
      
      
       
Let us define 
          
          
       
      
 
   
 
 
as a member of the family of augmented weighted Tchebycheff metrics. We have 
families of         
  and           
  metrics because     . We use the word 
augmented with reference to the           
  metric because of the      
      
 
    
term, in which   is a sufficiently small positive number. We can write the general 
formulation for the augmented weighted Tchebycheff method as follow: 
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The method is appealing for polyhedral problems
99
, such as the one we are facing, 
since optimizing the achievement function will necessarily result in Pareto optimality 
as long as the scalar   is not too large (Steuer, 1986). One can immediately remark 
that if    , then the metric for the augmented weighted Tchebycheff and the 
weighted Tchebycheff will be identical.  
 
This lengthy mathematical presentation of the augmented Tchebycheff method can be 
summarized in the following graph. It can be seen that the purpose of the procedure is 
to establish two contours centered on the ideal criterion vector and tangentially 
scanning the set of nondenominated solutions (the tradeoff surface). The contours 
consist of the loci
100
 of points equidistant from     according to their respective 
metrics, i.e. either the weighted Tchebycheff or the augmented weighted Tchebycheff. 
The contour for the weighted Tchebycheff metric has a rectangular shape, whereas the 
contour for the augmented weighted Tchebycheff metric is an octagon.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
99
 Polyhedral problems are a class of problem with only linear constraints.  
100
 A loci is a set of all points satisfying a given set of conditions.  
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Figure 4.6. Contours of the         
  and           
  metrics and optimal solution 
for the MOLP 
 
 
In this case,   is at the same time the definition point and the vertex of each of the 
contours. The line segment connecting     with   is the diagonal of the contours, and 
the arrow linking the two points specifies the diagonal direction of each contour. 
Notice here that we make reference to the diagonal direction of the contours because 
we solve the problem in a two-dimensional Euclidean space. If k, the number of 
objective functions, was superior to two, then the direction specified by          
would be a diagonal direction of the contours.  
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Definition 4.11. Definition point: Let        and     . Then   is a definition point 
of the           
  contour if and only if  
    
 
  
      
  
 
  
      
 
    
  
                       
                                                                 
                                                                 
  
 
In our model, it is possible to graphically observed that     , defined as all the points on 
the segment        , is different from   
   for all i‘s. Consequently, the first condition 
applies.  
 
Definition 4.12. Vertex: Let       . Then   is a vertex of a given           
  
contour if and only if   is an extreme point of the closed convex set in    whose 
boundary is the contour. 
 
From definition 4.12, we conclude that if D’ is a vertex of the augmented weighted 
Tchebycheff contour presented in the previous graph, this is not the case for A’ and C’, 
because          .  
 
THE AUGMENTED WEIGHTED TCHEBYCHEFF ALGORITHM  
 
Suppose that in figure 4.6. we wish to determine the point      that is the closest to 
the     ideal criterion vector according to the augmented weighted Tchebycheff 
metric. What we need is a program to discover     , much like the Simplex method 
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is used to solve monobjective linear programming problems. The augmented weighted 
Tchebycheff program is: 
                              
      
 
   
  
                        
                    
                                                            
                                
where   is a minimax variable since its purpose is to minimize the maximum weighted 
   deviation from   
  . The original multiobjective linear programming has been 
transformed into a single objective linear programming problem.  
 
The solution to this program will take the form of a vector                where   
is the closest criterion vector to the ideal criterion vector and   is its inverse image in 
the decision space. Of course, running the algorithm is not possible for an algebraic 
model, and thus a specific solution cannot be pinpointed without the recourse to 
graphs.  
 
The way the algorithm is implemented is relatively straightforward: it samples a 
shrinking proportion of the Pareto front with each iteration. The procedure is 
initialized after an ideal point has been identified. The first iteration starts by creating 
a dispersed group of  -weighting vectors. As we have demonstrated previously, this 
group of weighting vectors will create various augmented weighted Tchebycheff 
metrics. The vertices of these contours span the integrality of the Pareto front and offer 
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the decision maker with a sample of the set of nondominated solutions to her problem. 
The size of this sample set is pre-determined and fixed across iterations. Among this 
sample, the decision maker is asked to select a solution she deems tailored to her 
preferences.  
 
The second iteration is a repetition of the first step, but with another group of  -
weighting vectors which vertices span this time a more concentrated sub-space around 
the first vector solution identified by the decision maker. A new set of nondominated 
solutions emerge, and the decision maker selects her preferred one. The process 
repeats itself up until the decision maker finds a solution she is satisfied with. 
 
Calibration of the augmented weighted Tchebycheff algorithm thus requires a certain 
number of information from the analyst (Steuer, 1986): 
- An ideal point     to initialize the procedure; 
- A specification of the sample size P, with    ; 
- A pre-determined number of iterations t, with    ; 
- A   -reduction factor r (which rules the changes brought by each iteration to 
the  -weighting vectors), with  
 
 
   
 
  
   
. 
 
The bounds around the solution i selected by the policy maker at iteration h are 
denoted    
    
  , and w is the interval width for the final iteration (Steuer and Wood, 
1986): 
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AN ANALYTIC SOLUTION TO THE MODEL  
 
The fact that we cannot run the algorithm with an algebraic problem offers us two 
solutions through which to close this chapter. Returning to the graph presented in 
figure 2.2. (section 4.3.3.), in which case we will immediately see that an infinity of 
solutions may be drawn from the inverse image of Pareto front in the decision space. 
Each of this point, unsurprisingly, represents a different allocation of the budget mix 
where both sectors    and     received some funding. The allocation is entirely 
specified by the preferences of the decision maker. The nature of the model, small and 
linear, does not actually require using an algorithm to be solved. 
 
However, it is possible to ascertain the existence of a set of analytical solutions 
regulated by the vertex of the augmented weighted Tchebycheff contour. In our 
model, we can graphically determined that    
     
     , which implies that: 
      
 
  
      
  
 
  
      
 
    
  
      (4.1) 
 
Yet, we know that: 
  
      
    
    
     
    
                
                    
   
where       
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Thus, we obtain:   
   
      
     
                     
                          
  
 
We must now reorganize this cumbersome expression into a more elegant factorized 
form: 
 
   
      
     
                
              
  
 
Notice that because         ,            and      , we have demonstrated 
without the help of the graph that    
     
     . The topographical distance between 
the two vectors is indeed strictly positive vis-à-vis both criteria. Moreover, it appears 
clearly that the vector    
   is dominated by   
  .  
 
Let us now introduce the following notations: 
             
               
     
 
Reintroducing part the   -weighting vector from equation (4.1), we see that
101
: 
 
                                                 
101
 Let us not forget that this expression represents the sum of the topological distance between   
   
and    
   relative to Z1 and the topological distance between   
   and    
   relative to Z2. These distances 
are the elements of the matrix    
      
    we already computed.   
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which is a scalar. Therefore, the inverse of this matrix is simply the reciprocal of its 
value, or: 
 
         
          
 
  
  
          
         
  
 
Thus, re-writing equation (1) this time in its integrality: 
 
    
 
      
  
          
         
   
  
         
  
 
    
 
  
  
          
         
   
      
         
  
 
The graph presented in figure 4.6. portrays the generalized 
   
  
         
 
        
         
            
  contour that has   as its vertex and 
definition point. Computing the diagonal direction of the contour, we have
102
: 
  
 
  
 
 
  
    
         
  
 
         
      
  
         
                                                
                                                 
102
 Notice the negative sign preceding the vector, typical for a max-max optimization problem.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The diagonal direction of the contour presented in the last equation is the same for the 
augmented weighted Tchebycheff contour           
  and the weighted Tchebycheff 
contour         
 . Because the Lp-metric, set to infinity, does not change, the 
variation in the contour can only come from two elements: 
- The definition of the ideal point    , that we know fixed in our case103; 
- The  -weighting vector. 
From our computations, it is clear that the only variable in the diagonal direction of 
the contour is     , or the share of the budget attributed to    and    . Other 
elements are all derived from parameters extracted from the social accounting matrix 
(  and  ) or exogenously determined (B, the size of the budget). 
 
This may seem as if we have been turning in circles for most of the chapter. The 
analytical solution we deliver indeed reveals the overarching importance of   on the 
outcome of the algorithm. Once again, the preferences of the decision maker come to 
haunt us. Then, what has changed?   
 
It must actually be understood that the usefulness of our framework directly derived 
from the fact that the augmented weighted Tchebycheff contours are computed 
through an algorithm. This is a major difference with trying to solve the problem in 
the decision space, as we did earlier in the chapter. In the decision space, we get 
                                                 
103
 That is, we have no reason of proposing another ideal vector given the knowledge of the feasible 
region we possess.  
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rapidly stuck if we do not obtain a mathematical expression – a utility function for 
instance – from the policy maker. The main problematic faced by the analyst is then 
less to propose an alternative set of solutions to the decision maker than to desperately 
attempt at formulating the preferences of the decision maker. By using multiobjective 
optimization, we steer away from this difficulty: the algorithm, through numerous 
iterations, provides Pareto optimal solutions for different budget mixes. The analyst 
(and even the decision maker) is agnostic vis-à-vis preferences
104
. Through the model, 
they gain a better understanding of the trade-offs at stake, and progress toward the 
definition of preferences that will be embodied in the final solution.  
 
As the model grows more complex, incorporates more decision variables and 
objective functions, and as the ability to graph solutions vanishes, this feature proves 
especially attractive. One however should not expect too much from multiobjective 
optimization. Contrarily to its close cousin, traditional linear programming, MOO does 
not offer a unique solution. Additionally, the technique requires in general more 
computational effort than monobjective programming (Marler and Arora, 2004). This 
is especially true for methods – such as the one proposed here – that use an a posteriori 
articulation of preferences
105
. Despite these downsides, we believe that multiobjective 
linear programming can be fruitfully used for policy analysis in correlation with social 
accounting matrices, as we hope to have demonstrated in this chapter.  
 
 
                                                 
104
 This is not entirely true inasmuch as the analyst determines the ideal point as well as the calibration 
of the model, influencing the results derived from the implementation of the algorithm.  
105
 Computational time can be drastically reduced by using genetic algorithms.  
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Chapter V 
PARETO OPTIMAL POLICIES IN A 
SOCIAL ACCOUNTING MATRIX: A 
MULTIOBJECTIVE APPROACH TO 
FISCAL RETRENCHMENT IN NEW 
YORK STATE EMPLOYING A 
GENETIC ALGORITHM AND 
CONSTRAINT PROGRAMMING 
 
5.1 Preliminaries 
 
The purpose of this thesis up to this chapter has been to provide public decision 
makers with a new theoretical framework capable of combining macroeconomic 
impact analysis – under the form of a Walrasian equilibrium model – and a tool to 
optimize policies with respect to given objectives. Chapter IV introduced such a model 
based on a social accounting matrix and a multi-objective linear program (MOLP). We 
demonstrated, at least mathematically, how the model would work and how it could 
result in the selection of the best set of alternatives available to policy-makers through 
the identification of a Pareto front. The perspective adopted has been that of a unitary 
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decision maker evolving in an environment without uncertainties
106
. It will remain so 
in the following paragraphs.  
 
In this chapter we present an application of this model to an area where policy making 
is particularly intricate, and where the effects of tradeoffs on the economy are all the 
more complex to assess that they span categories that are by no mean fungible: public 
finance, and in particular the management of fiscal deficits during or following a 
recession. The interest of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, to identify a set of fiscal 
policies such that there is, in equilibrium, no possibility to make an improvement in 
one attribute without accepting a sacrifice in another. Secondly, and perhaps more 
importantly, to reveal the existence or inexistence of inefficiencies in the policy 
adopted by the State of New York with respect to pre-defined objectives.  
 
We have illustrated in chapter III how New York State‘s public finances have been 
hard hit by the financial crisis, and that both Governor Paterson and Cuomo 
emphasized the importance of budget cuts to ensure the sustainability of the state‘s 
finances. Under such trying circumstances, policy makers in Albany are typically 
under the pressure of accomplishing several competing objectives simultaneously 
through the budget. Prominent among these objectives are employment, balancing the 
budget, ensuring a sustainable level of equity in society and limiting the contraction in 
local private capital expenditures. It is therefore clear, as we established in the 
introductory chapter, that budgetary decisions can be interpreted as multi-faceted 
                                                 
106
 Multi-objective linear programming can be adapted to fit collective decision making. For instance, 
see Kilgour, Chen and Hipel (2010).  
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problems where a wide range of policy instruments can be mobilized to achieve 
specific outcomes. The problematic of competing policy objectives is especially acute 
for mid-year budget cuts. Contrarily to tax increases, their impact on the economy tend 
to be immediate (Benson and Johnson, 1986), and their formulation must strike a 
delicate balance between the necessary act of reducing the deficit and the negative 
consequences this might have on aggregate consumption – and thus growth, 
employment and human capital. 
 
Figure 5.1. Additional mid-year gap ($ in billions)  
    
      Source: New York State Division of Budget 
 
 
Closing multi-billion dollars mid-year budget gaps in an efficient fashion is critical 
from an economic standpoint, but it is also vital from a purely political perspective. A 
tough budget decision is easier to pass if it does not entail a lower well-being than it 
strictly has to.  
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In our case, we argue for a fiscal policy design articulated around economic objectives 
only. This is of course simplistic, and it is worth noting that the social accounting 
matrix framework can be customized to incorporate other concerns of the policy 
maker. For instance, the Governor might very well wish to evaluate the potential 
ecological impact of cutting the budget of the Department of Environmental 
Conservation or lengthening the lifespan of coal-fired power plants. Environmental 
input-output analysis can be helpful in this context.  
 
In section 2, we present the policy that will be scrutinized through the lens of the 
social accounting matrix multiobjective linear programming model. Section 3 
introduces the architecture of the model and its main components, while the 
mathematical formulation of the problem at hand is reviewed in section 4.   
 
5.2 The Policy Under Consideration: Governor Paterson’s Deficit 
Reduction Plan  
 
The focus of this thesis has been on fiscal policy and more precisely how state 
governments ought to manage the mid-year budget cuts that can arise in situations of 
increased fiscal stress. In this model, the policy instrument is thus conceived as the 
amount of budget that should be retrenched from each spending program in order to 
satisfy the state‘s balanced budget requirements in the most efficient fashion (see 
section 5.4.1 hereunder). By extension, the model provides useful guidance to policy-
makers insofar as it becomes possible to compare on a unified scale the respective 
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performances of a ―benchmark‖ distribution of the budget cuts as defined by the 
model and the policy alternatives defined by the state administration.  
 
It was illustrated in chapter IV that the methodology proposed relied heavily on the 
multiobjective linear programming part of the model. Indeed, if the use of a social 
accounting matrix represents a choice in the theoretical framework which undergirds 
the economic impact analysis, the policy part of the model is essentially derived from 
the formulation of a linear program. Once the social accounting matrix has been 
selected, substantial improvement can still be made so that it fits more precisely the 
conditions prevalent to the region of interest. Nonetheless, much of the flexibility in 
the methodology we propose comes from the linear programming part, as it is possible 
to manipulate simultaneously several aspects of the overall policy design: policy 
instruments, policy objectives, constraint and even uncertainty in the variables. This is 
why so much attention will be devoted to the MOLP.   
 
The first step in creating the linear programming model is to establish an overall target 
level for budget cuts. In other words, by how much should the state of New York 
reduce its expenditures to achieve fiscal sustainability? Even though theoretical works 
on fiscal sustainability exist (see for instance Greiner and Fincke, 2009), it is clear that 
the desirable size of the budget gap is primarily a political matter. This is the case in 
New York State because if the executive budget submitted by the governor for every 
fiscal year must be, by constitutional provision, balanced
107
, no such obligation applies 
                                                 
107
 43 other states have the same provision.  
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to the state legislature
108
 (NASBO, 2008). Moreover, the state is authorized to carry 
over the deficit
109
 to the next fiscal year. This prompted the U.S. Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations to rank New York as one of the four 
states with the least stringent balanced budget requirements
110
 in the country, along 
with Massachusetts, Vermont and New Hampshire
111
 (Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations, 1987).  
 
When it comes to mid-year budget gaps the governor has the initiative and 
concentrates most of the decision-making power. This is of special interest to us 
because spending cuts are the principal – when not the only – tool pushed by 
governors to close gaps between revenues and expenditures emerging during the fiscal 
year. We will thus devote our attention to the management of mid-year budget gaps, 
and use the FY 2010 gap of $3.2 billion to run the model.  
 
In order to eliminate the entire FY2009-10 current-year budget gap, Governor Cuomo 
proposed on October 15, 2009 a Deficit Reduction Plan totaling approximately $3.16 
billion. The plan called for a set of actions that can be implemented administratively 
by the Executive branch and requiring for other actions the approval of the Legislature 
or other parties. They are summarized in the following table. 
                                                 
108
 New York shares this characteristic with 9 other states: Hawaii, Indiana, Missouri, New Hampshire, 
Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin.  
109
 12 other states can legally carry over their deficit: Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin.  
110
 The constitutional and statutory citations for the balance budget requirements can be found in the 
Article 7, §2 of the New York State Constitution and in the Legislative Law, §54. 
111
 California and New Jersey were classified in the “most stringent” category.  
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Table 5.1. Deficit Reduction Plan for 2009-2010 (in million dollars) 
 
Administrative Actions 833 
State Operations Across-the-Board Reductions 484 
Medicaid Fraud Targets 150 
Debt Management 100 
18-A Utility Assessments112 45 
Workers’ Compensations Surplus Recapture 49 
Dormant Funds 5 
  
Actions Requiring Legislative/Other Approval 2,326 
Local Assistance Across-the-Board Reductions 1,300 
   School Aid ($686 million school year reduction) 480 
   Health Care (including insurance) 343 
   Transportation 125 
   All Other 352 
Battery Park City Resource (Need NYC Approval) 300 
Statewide Audit/Recovery Targets/Amnesty (Tax) 250 
VLT Franchise Payment (Assumes Current Year 
Settlement) 
200 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Fund/EPF Fund 
Sweep 
100 
DASNY Fund Sweep 26 
Other Actions 150 
  
Total Deficit Reduction Plan Actions 3,159 
 Source: New York State Division of Budget 
http://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/archive/fy0910archive/enacted0910/midYear_update/091
0midyear_DRP.html 
 
Among these, only a handful can be strictly considered budget cuts:  
- State operations across-the-board reductions ($484 million): an 11% 
reduction to agency operating budgets 
- Local assistance across-the-board reductions ($1.3 billion): a 10% reduction 
to all remaining, undisbursed local assistance spending in FY 2010.  
 School aid:     $480.3 million 
 Health care (including insurance):  $343 million 
                                                 
112
 Refers to the public utility companies, corporations and persons subject to the public service 
commission’s regulation (Article 1 §18-A of the Public Service Consolidated Laws of New York).  
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 Transportation:   $125.4 million 
 All other113:    $352 million 
- Other actions ($150 million): potential actions that could be implemented to 
realize additional savings. It includes the in-sourcing of IT activities pursuant 
to legislation to modernize civil service rules, further controls on specific 
agency activities, the use of funds currently earmarked for debt management 
purposes, and other initiatives. The nature of these actions is ill-defined, and 
we will allocate 70% of them to local assistance reductions and the remaining 
to state operations reductions.  
 
We will eliminate from the model actions pertaining to Medicaid fraud. Even if we 
could divide the $150 million recovered by New York State between provider fraud, 
waste and abuse and recipient fraud, the language of the plan is not sufficiently clear 
to provide a solid foundation for modeling. Moreover, Medicaid fraud is not 
systematically measured and as part of the non-observed economy is absent from our 
data set. We discard additional revenues from tax audit for similar reasons.  
 
We deem ‗Debt management‘114, ‘18-A utility assessment‘115, ‗Workers‘ 
compensation surplus recapture‘116 and ‗Aqueduct VLT franchise payment‘117 to 
                                                 
113
 All other expenditures in states includes the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), 
institutional and community care for the mentally ill and developmentally disabled, public health 
programs, employer contributions to pensions and health benefits (only partially taken into account in 
the case of New York State), economic development, environmental projects, state police, parks and 
recreation, housing, and general aid to local governments 
114
 Realization of savings compared to debt service estimates from refunding, the use of Build America 
Bonds and relatively low interest rates on variable rate bonds.  
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constitute revenue measures rather than budget cuts. They may thus be safely ignored 
in our model. As for ‗Dormant funds‘118, ‗Battery Park city resource‘119, ‗Regional 
greenhouse gas initiative‘120 and ‗DASNY fund sweep‘121, they are not included 
because they represent accounting transfers.  
 
The Deficit Reduction Plan is an interesting illustration of the principle that the size of 
the state‘s deficit is managed politically rather than being the pure product of 
economic management. Indeed, we observed that a substantial proportion of the 
initiatives taken to close the budget gap may not materialize. Because the topic of 
interest in this dissertation is fiscal retrenchment, it is possible to go even further: the 
final amount of budget cuts deemed appropriate by the Governor‘s office is of a purely 
political nature (e.g. it is conceivable that the Executive can adopt a fiscal policy 
relying solely on budget cuts, or inversely on revenue measures). 
 
This statement has important practical implications for our methodology: it cannot 
formulate recommendations about a potential efficient policy mix of budget cuts and 
revenue measures, just an arbitrage among several categories of budget cuts. In other 
words, the overall target level for fiscal retrenchment in this model is a parameter. It 
has to be defined exogenously by the decision maker. In order to provide the decision 
                                                                                                                                            
115
 Re-estimation of the amount of revenue generated from an increased assessment on utilities 
enacted in 2009-2010.  
116
 Certain insurers indicated their intention to remit excess funds.  
117
 Assume that the winning Aqueduct VLT bidder will make a franchise payment.  
118
 Part of the money held in dormant accounts will be made available to the General Fund.  
119
 State would receive excess revenues from the Authority.  
120
 Transfer of RGGI proceeds and EPF funds to the General Fund.  
121
 Receive funds from the Dormitory Authority of the State of New York (DASNY).  
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maker with an analysis of budget cuts versus revenue increases in terms of efficiency a 
computable general equilibrium model would be better suited than a social accounting 
matrix. The latter is indeed poorly adapted to model accurately revenue measures, and 
in particular changes in tax policy
122
. The former, in which prices are endogenously 
determined, appears as a pertinent alternative to tackle such an issue.     
 
It is therefore logical to take the Deficit Reduction Plan as a basis to define the overall 
target level for budget cuts, ignoring the fact that the resulting policy mix might itself 
not be efficient in the Pareto sense. This is as a source of theoretical discomfort from 
the perspective of economics. Indeed, nothing guarantees that the optimal distribution 
of budget cuts yielded by our SAM-MOLP model would correspond to a Pareto 
efficient outcome in the case of a policy mobilizing both spending and revenue tools. 
Under a particular fiscal policy, the results from the model can actually lead to a sub-
efficient allocation of resources. Two sets of restrictive assumptions can assist in 
overcoming this difficulty: 
(i) To consider that the mid-year budget gaps are overwhelmingly closed 
through fiscal retrenchments, and that revenue policies do not affect 
significantly the economic system. The empirical work of Romer and 
Romer (2007) suggests that there is a strong negative correlation between 
tax increases and output growth, but that this relation is weaker when the 
legislated tax change aims at reducing a budget deficit; 
                                                 
122
 Evaluation of tax policy is a core application of CGE modeling. Because prices are absent from the 
social accounting matrix, it is unable to capture effectively changes in tax policy.   
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(ii) To establish hypotheses about the nature of budget cuts and revenue 
measures in the SAM-MOLP framework. Indeed, it can been seen easily 
from the short model we developed in chapter IV that if both policies are 
perfectly fungible, if each policy‘s impact is modeled in a consistent 
manner (e.g. a negative shock on final demand) and if the sectors affected 
are the same, then the SAM multipliers guarantee that in equilibrium 
optimizing one of the two aspects of fiscal policy will yield a Pareto 
optimal result.  
 
Using set notation, this hypothesis translates as: 
 
                                             
                                                 
 
Then,      . 
 
Having established this relationship, it is possible to relax slightly the hypothesis. 
In order to do so, we must first take a little detour by the nuts and bolts of the 
SAM-MOLP model. Because the goal of the multiobjective linear program the 
SAM-MOLP model is to determine which negative shocks on final demand will 
have the smallest impact on a collection of policy objectives, its drivers will be (i) 
the multipliers of the matrices used to evaluate these objectives (e.g. if the criteria 
of interest is employment, then the coefficients of the employment row vector) and 
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(ii) the amounts of the cut / revenue measures. To see this more clearly, we can use 
generalized input-output analysis, which tells us that it is possible to concatenate 
several direct-impact coefficient matrices into a single matrix. This leads to 
formulate the input-output problem in a manner that is particularly well suited to 
our purpose. In chapter IV, we demonstrated how the planning form of the 
generalized input-output model could be derived, and we established that: 
 
 
  
 
   
 
     
     
Which is the same as 
     
 
The G matrix corresponds to the multipliers we referred to earlier, i.e. parameters 
of the model, while the   matrix represents policy alternatives under the form of 
an exogenous shock. Individual elements in the G matrix are denoted      . Note 
that theoretically the G matrix concatenated all the factors associated with 
interindustry activities that we deem relevant to our policy analysis. It may be 
employment, or pollution, or even energy intensity. It does not matter as long as 
they vary linearly with output. The performance of the policy alternatives with 
regard to objectives are captured in the   column vector. The MOLP algorithm we 
will use to solve the model will look at the set of policies that yield the most 
efficient results in terms of  .  
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With respect to the original question of relaxing the assumption, this 
circumlocution tells us that Sr need not be a subset of Sc (       for the 
optimization process to yield a globally Pareto efficient set of solutions. Assuming 
the notation used previously and that        , optimizing the budget cuts will 
result in a globally Pareto efficient fiscal policy mix if and only if it can be proven 
that the smallest
123
       is larger than the largest of      , as long as budget cuts 
and revenue measures are allowed to vary freely on the interval        where BG 
is the mid-year budget gap. Notice that because we used the concatenated matrix 
G, this holds true for any   .  
 
Recalling the graph used in chapter IV to present a geometrical solution in the 
criteria space to a SAM-MOLP model, the condition just expressed implies that: 
 
          which contributes to form a vector of non-dominated solutions in  
 . 
 
Consequently, vectors created from       simply belong to the set of feasible 
solutions, but not to the Pareto front.  
 
One additional assumption must be made for the hypothesis to hold: each 
dollar saved or obtained by the state through its fiscal policy is affected to 
the deficit, which consists in debt detained by non-resident bondholders. 
                                                 
123
 The expression is somewhat counter-intuitive because in the case of a negative shock on final 
demand we are interested in the behavior of the objective functions in the third quadrant. As -1,000 < 
-500, the larger the impact the better for the economy.  
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Indeed, if it were not the case and say some of the additional receipts (in 
the form of increased revenues or new resources freed by budget cuts) were 
re-injected under one form or another in the regional economy, then 
optimizing the SAM-MOLP model would not necessarily yield a set of 
optimal alternatives. The framework would indeed fail to take into account 
the effects of this indirect shock.       
 
From the perspective of political science however, the absence of revenue measures 
from our model is somewhat less distressing. As empirical evidences suggest a weak 
negative electoral effect of taxation for governors
124
 (Kone and Winters, 1993), state 
and local governments appear to clearly favor spending cuts over revenue measures 
during episodes of recession, as detailed in chapter II. As long as this preference 
endures, a model focusing on fiscal retrenchments seems politically appealing.     
    
For all these reasons, we thus opted for a ―one stage‖ optimization rather than for a 
more cumbersome ―two stages‖ optimization in which we would first offer an 
arbitrage between budget cuts and revenue measures and then detail which cuts / 
revenues should be targeted for improvement. As such, the Deficit Reduction Plan 
proposed by Governor Cuomo provides a good starting point for the model. 
Furthermore, it has the advantage of already reflecting some of the arbitrages that 
overshadowed the budget negotiations. This is a crucial point, inasmuch as in the 
context of this dissertation, optimization is useful only when it is politically feasible.  
                                                 
124
 Interestingly enough, there does not seem to be a statistically significant correlation between 
electoral support and a decrease in taxation.  
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5.3 A Social Accounting Matrix Multiobjective Linear 
Programming Model for Fiscal Retrenchment Policies in New 
York State  
 
 
5.3.1 A General Equilibrium Model of New York State 
 
The core of the model presented in this chapter is a social accounting matrix (SAM) 
with trade flows estimated through econometric relative power contribution (RPC) for 
New York State in 2006. The data set used to create the SAM was provided by the 
Minnesota IMPLAN Group (MIG). This social accounting matrix enabled us to 
observe and describe the prevailing characteristics and the structure of the state‘s 
economy in chapter III. It may now be introduced to trace the equilibrium impacts of a 
selection of fiscal retrenchment policies on macroeconomic variables, thus fulfilling 
its role as a type of Walrasian general equilibrium model. The equilibrium state of the 
economy is given by a vector of activity level, i.e. output, for all endogenous sectors 
satisfying the condition that total outlays equal total output in all markets.  
 
Given that the last dataset available for the economy of New York State was 2006, we 
make the key assumption that the matrices derived from IMPLAN fully capture the 
structural and behavioral characteristics of the state‘s economy in 2009-10. Moreover, 
it is assumed that some features of the model remain fixed. As we have seen 
previously, this is the case of the technological coefficients of the Leontief inverse 
matrix. But this is also the case of inter-institutional transfers, of the ownership of 
factors and of the saving and consumption patterns of households. This last category 
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implies that the income elasticities of demand, albeit different for each of the nine 
household types, is constant.    
 
As we briefly mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, using the social 
accounting matrices provided by MIG comes at a price: the inability to conform the 
design of the underlying data system to the specific needs of the study. For instance, as 
will appear clearly in the following pages, the level of disaggregation of the sub-
national public sector – combining state and local governments – is somewhat unfit to 
our purpose. Indeed, the sector is divided between a ‗State and Local Governments 
Education‘ (sector 503 in IMPLAN) and a ‗State and Local Governments Non-
education‘ (sector 504 in IMPLAN) account, hardly disaggregated enough for a 
methodical analysis of fiscal retrenchment policies at the state level. A positive point 
is that the structure of public spending is appropriately detailed, as current and capital 
expenditures are separated into two different accounts (capital expenditures are 
captured in the ‗State and Local Governments Investment‘ account).    
 
Furthermore, a social accounting matrix offers a good basis toward more complex 
models, such as computable general equilibrium, and can even be transformed into a 
dynamic model (see for instance Alarcón et al., 2011). This chapter will be confined to 
the social accounting matrix as a fixed-price multiplier model and will provide a 
comprehensive picture of the circular flow of all payments in the regional economy of 
New York State at a given point in time. Contrarily to the framework developed by 
Alarcón et al., this chapter sticks to a conventional static model and thus ignores the 
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adjustment process underwent by each endogenous variable before reaching a state of 
equilibrium. 
 
By selecting a social accounting matrix over alternative models such as financial 
social accounting matrices (Emini and Fofack, 2004) or financial computable general 
equilibriums (F-CGE) the focus of the study is brought over the real side of the 
economy. The absence of a clear snapshot of the financial markets and of the 
transactions of assets and liabilities between agents, lumped into a single highly 
aggregated ‗capital account‘, is a second area of theoretical discomfort after the one 
detailed in section 5.2. Closing mid-year budget gaps can be considered an exercise in 
fiscal sustainability, a policy objective that is impossible to incorporate using a real 
social accounting matrix. That is, the SAM-MOLP model is agnostic when it comes to 
the management of the public debt For instance, our algorithm could point out that 
transportation should be specifically targeted for budget cuts because its current 
contribution as specified in the Deficit Reduction Plan results in a sub-optimal policy 
mix. The increased pressure on transportation could however lead to a report and a 
raise in the cost of necessary public works, a distinct breach of fiscal sustainability. 
This explains partly why fiscal sustainability has been eliminated from the model as a 
policy objective. On the other hand, the limited size of mid-year budget gaps 
compared to overall deficits, the narrow scope to make the decisions that will close 
these gaps and the speed at which arbitrages must be rendered means that long term 
fiscal sustainability may not be of the utmost importance for policy-makers. This issue 
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is indeed better addressed during the elaboration of the budget for the entire fiscal 
year.   
 
Consequently, it would be advantageous to sift the Pareto optimal alternatives yielded 
by the SAM-MOLP model through frameworks commonly used in the literature to 
assess the impact of particular policies on fiscal sustainability. These are endogenous 
growth models (Moraga and Vidal, 2004; Annicchiarico and Giammarioli, 2004) and 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (Leeper, Plante and Traum, 2010; 
Sakuragawa and Hosono, 2010).   
 
5.3.2 The State and Local Governments Sector in New York State  
 
As detailed in chapter III, data from IMPLAN clearly illustrates the importance of the 
state and local governments in the economy of New York. Education, the single 
largest area of expenditures for Albany, is by far the largest employer in the state, 
although it lags behind other sectors in terms of income per worker and output. We 
also find in the ranking other sectors that are closely linked to state government 
expenditures, including ―state and local non-education‖, ―hospitals‖, ―social 
assistance‖ and ―nursing and residential care facilities‖.  
 
Table 5.2. New York State‘s largest sectors in 2006 
Sector Employment Labor Income Output Output/Worker Income/Worker 
State & Local Education 
 
701,767 $37,042,630,000 $40,393,820,000 $57,560 $52,785 
State & Local Non-
Education 
547,540 $40,422,460,000 $44,079,430,000 $80,504 $73,826 
Food services and 502,347 $10,806,920,000 $29,199,580,000 $58,126 $21,513 
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drinking places 
Real estate 
 
387,230 $15,633,890,000 $93,288,550,000 $240,913 $40,374 
Wholesale trade 
 
385,720 $30,064,140,000 $79,386,980,000 $205,815 $77,943 
Hospitals 
 
329,971 $20,342,400,000 $40,082,260,000 $121,472 $61,649 
Social assistance- except 
child day care services 
320,514 $7,689,525,000 $12,251,390,000 $38,224 $23,991 
Securities- commodity 
contracts- investments 
315,348 $83,208,420,000 $98,256,970,000 $311,583 $263,862 
Offices of physicians- 
dentists 
280,396 $20,148,930,000 $33,110,190,000 $118,084 $71,859 
Nursing and residential 
care facilities 
229,396 $8,645,075,000 $13,101,430,000 $57,113 $37,686 
Source: IMPLAN 
 
A complete image of the activities of the state and local governments is provided in 
the following table: 
 
Table 5.3. A snapshot of the State and Local Governments sector 
Sector Employment Output Value Added Intermediate Expenditures 
State & Local Education 
 
701,767 $40,393,820,000 $40,393,820,000 ($3,906) 
State & Local Non-Education 547,540 $44,079,430,000 $44,079,430,000 ($7,813) 
State & Local Passenger transit 2,190 $130,348,600 $45,207,030 $85,141,540 
State & Local Electric Utilities 
 
657 $204,566,800 $97,784,760 $106,782,000 
Other State & Local government 
enterprises 
55,176 $14,133,820,000 $6,373,547,000 $7,760,273,000 
Source: IMPLAN 
 
Figures from the New York State Department of Labor (Gardner and Paterson, 2010), 
although somewhat different from those provided by IMPLAN, confirm the prominent 
place of education in the state‘s economy. The education sector concentrated 867,900 
jobs in September 2009, a 3.7% growth over 2006, while the total number of jobs in 
the economy receded by 0.6%. The average weekly wage in the sector was $930 
however, one of the lowest in New York. 
 
 
224 
 
Table 5.4. Comparison of significant industries in New York State  
 Job Count    
Sector 2006 2009 Change Projected Change 
(2006-2016) 
Average Weekly 
Wage 
All Industries 8,368,500 8,315,600 -0.6% 6.2% $1,080 
Hospitals 411,900 429,800 4.3% 1.6% $1,110 
Nursing… 263,900 272,900 3.4% 20.7% $600 
Ambulatory… 357,900 393,400 9.9% 25.8% $900 
Construction 84,000 82,800 -1.3% 22;9% $1,060 
Securities… 196,700 187,800 -4.6% 24% $5,590 
Education… 836,700 867,900 3.7% 8.3% $930 
Source: NYS Department of Labor 
 
 
5.3.3 Detailing the Social Accounting Matrix  
 
The SAM-MOLP model used in this dissertation is calibrated from the 2006 New 
York State SAM published by MIG, which counts a total of 509 sectors broken down 
as follow: 
- The inter-industry transaction matrix, gathering 483 industries along the 
lines defined by the U.S. Census Bureau in its 2002 North American Industry 
Classification  System (NAICS); 
- Value-added, divided into 4 accounts: employee compensation (labor), 
proprietary income and other property income (capital) and indirect business 
tax; 
- The institutions: 9 household groups categorized according to their annual 
income, the federal government, state and local governments and enterprises 
(corporations); 
- Investment and savings (capital) 
- Adjustments (inventory additions and deletions) 
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- Foreign and domestic trade: the organization of this account is specific to 
regional SAMs. Trade flows are indeed divided into domestic trade, i.e. trade 
activities taking place between New York State and the rest of the U.S., and 
foreign trade, which accounts for exchange realized with partners beyond the 
national borders.  
 
Given modern computers‘ computational power, the 526 526 could be kept entirely 
disaggregated for the purpose of this study. To investigate the results would however 
be tremendously complicated. It appears therefore preferable to use a modified 
aggregated SAM to reduce the matrix to more tractable dimensions. In order to do so, 
we chose to select the NAICS-2 aggregation scheme available directly from IMPLAN 
built-in library of aggregation. However, we customized it to our needs, conserving 
the original level of disaggregation for certain institutional accounts and certain 
industries.   
 
The proposed model is a 49 49 SAM. In this new SAM, a distinction must be brought 
between endogenous and exogenous accounts if we want to carry out controlled 
experiments of the impact of given fiscal policy on a pre-determined
125
 set of 
endogenous variables. The nature of our study is such that the origin of the exogenous 
shocks modifying the equilibrium of New York‘s socio-economic system has been 
determined to be the budget retrenchment policy that the state government must 
                                                 
125
 The relevant endogenous variables depend on the policy objectives identified by the decision 
maker.  
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implement in order to close mid-year budget gaps. Therefore, the following accounts 
shall be considered exogenous (all definitions are from Olson, 2011): 
- State/Local Governments Education: ―the operational spending pattern of all 
levels of public education, from pre-K to higher education‖; 
- State/Local Government Non-education: ―the operational spending pattern of 
all other divisions of administrative state and local governments including 
legislature, police, fire, hospitals, prisons, etc. but excluding market driven 
(enterprise) activities such as sewer, water, power and public transportation‖; 
- State/Local Government Investment: ―the new construction and capital goods 
expenditures by all levels of state and local governments‖.  
Only part of the state and local governments sector is actually made exogenous, since 
as an institution it also has attached ―holding‖ sectors to account for its payroll and 
employment. These two holding sectors (one for non-education, the other for 
education) will remain endogenous, and will form elements in the final policy 
instrument vector.  
 
It is also common to render exogenous other accounts that are not endogenously 
determined in a regional economy. Ergo, the ‗domestic and foreign trade‘, ‗capital‘, 
‗federal government‘, ‗inventory‘ and ‗rest of the world‘ accounts shall all be treated 
as exogenous variables.   
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To better understand the flow of funds from and to the two most important 
governmental accounts identified previously, it is interesting to take a closer look at 
the row elements of the SAM.  
 
‗State and Local Government Non-Education‘ gather the payments made by state and 
local governments to five different institutions: following the organization of the 
SAM, these are commodities
126
, households, state and local government education and 
foreign and domestic trade. The first category, commodities, directly relates to the 
payment of domestic goods and services. It essentially amounts to the non-education 
domestic final demand of state and local governments. Payments to households are 
made under the form of transfers – in particular unemployment and welfare – and 
more rarely interest to bondholders. The non-education accounts also transfer some 
funds to the education account, representing the allocation of money from the state 
and local administrations (non-education) to accommodate education expenditures. 
Finally, both state and local governments import foreign goods, a flow that is 
represented at the intersection of the ‗State and Local Government Non-Education‘ 
row and the ‗Foreign Trade‘ column.  
 
‗The State and Local Government Education‘ account is more succinct. As with ‗State 
and Local Government Non-Education‘, payments are made to acquire domestic 
commodities, representing a form of final demand. There are however no transfers to 
                                                 
126
 The underlying data sets from which the IMPLAN regional social accounting matrices are built use a 
commodity-by-industry format.   
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households or to other governmental accounts, but there is a flow to foreign imported 
goods and services.  
5.4 Implementing Multiobjective Optimization: Policy 
Instruments, Policy Objectives and Pareto Optimality  
 
5.4.1 The Policy Instrument: Retrenchment across Spending 
Domains 
 
The focus of this dissertation is on the optimal distribution of budget cuts across 
spending domains to close mid-year budget gaps. Mid-year budget cuts logically 
constitute the policy instrument available to the decision maker to close the state‘s 
budget gap. Budget cuts, which will be denoted  , are modeled by negative public 
expenditures in a number of targeted sectors. The targeted sectors, referred to by a 
subscript t in subsequent equations, have been presented in section 5.2 so that we 
have: 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
    
   
   
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
where subscripts SLG corresponds to administrative expenditures for State and Local 
Governments; K12 to elementary and secondary education; HE to higher education; 
PA to public assistance; HC to health care; and finally T to transportation.  
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Varying the pattern of these government expenditure accounts through a 
multiobjective linear programming model will allow us to investigate the impact of 
counterfactual policy scenarios on the entire socio-economic system of New York 
State and more precisely on the set of policy objectives selected. Mathematically, it is 
simply tantamount to create alternative exogenous column-vectors      and measuring 
their respective effects on the endogenous Z vector of objectives. The MOLP enables 
to systematically inspect a very large number of experiments, instead of formulating a 
definite number of alternatives and examine them one at a time.  
 
Modeling the policy instruments through negative public expenditures implies that 
     for all t. This technique was first introduced by Leontief et al. (1965) in their 
study of the impact of a reduced defense budget in the United States. It was 
reproduced by Keuning and Thorbecke (1989) in a paper dealing with the impact of 
fiscal policy on income distribution in Indonesia. In both works the budget 
retrenchments are first expressed as a percentage change from before being expressed 
in monetary units. Because our study is based on figures in dollar, we will directly 
jump to expressions written in monetary units.  
 
Interestingly enough, the use of negative injection to simulate fiscal retrenchment 
policies agrees well with social accounting matrices. Ceteris paribus, shrinking public 
expenditures lower the rate of utilization of productive capacities by economic agents, 
which satisfies the assumption that there is excess capacity in the economy. Therefore, 
the fact that prices are not allowed to vary in social accounting matrices should not 
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handicap the SAM-MOLP model. On the contrary, it might be argued that other types 
of Walrasian general equilibrium frameworks which allow for prices to adjust, such as 
CGE models, may well not be as appropriate to simulate the economic impact of 
budget cuts as far as this point is concerned.   
 
Technically, the nature of mid-year budget cuts is more complex than the    column-
vector would let appear. They are indeed deducted from the remaining funds made 
available to each program by the original legislated budget for the entire fiscal year, 
i.e. they constitute a retrenchment from a decrease (or increase) in public spending. In 
the case of a decrease and if we denote by      , in dollar, the legislated change in 
expenditures for the entire fiscal year
127
, then we may express mathematically the total 
budgetary impact of a retrenchment policy as follow: 
 
      
        
       
 
        (1) 
where M is a large number. It seems highly unlikely that a budget cut could actually 
become larger than the original amount retrenched, but it is nonetheless possible. For 
clarity purposes, we changed all the signs to positive.  
 
Because      
 
 is a part of the enacted budget, it might be tempting to discard it as an 
irrelevant variable from the optimization model. If reintegrated into a simple social 
accounting matrix, it is possible to see that the expression      
        
 
 is actually 
                                                 
127
 For New York State, this would be the so-called “enacted budget”, which covers the fiscal year 
(April 1 – March 31).  
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a column-vector which would be pre-multiplied by the Leontief inverse matrix to 
obtain a final demand vector. As a consequence and in virtue of matrix algebra, both 
     
 
 and       
 
 share the same multiplier    . Ceteris paribus, optimizing one is 
therefore tantamount to optimizing the other. The ceteris paribus condition is of 
course a reference to the policy objectives and constraints that rule the optimization 
program. It is unclear whether or not the decision maker shares a unique set of 
objectives for the fiscal year budget and subsequent adjustments alike. For instance, 
we have seen that fiscal sustainability may not be an overarching policy objective 
when it comes down to closing a mounting mid-year budget gap whereas it is a central 
preoccupation during the crafting of the fiscal year budget. In that case, the 
optimization problem should be solved in the      criterion space instead of the    
space. In itself, this does not constitute a violation of the idea that optimizing       
 
 
and optimizing      
 
 yield the same mathematical result. But it does if the new policy 
objective is independent of the criteria already existing.  
 
The fact that mid-year budget cuts constitute a retrenchment from a legislated change 
in public spending has also practical implications. The cuts must indeed be 
implemented during the fiscal year on funds that have not been already disbursed. This 
means that       
 
 is actually not time independent. The original expression (1) must 
be transformed to take into account this fact: 
     
       
       
 
       
232 
 
where     
 
, a stock, represent the amount of money left in the public coffers after time 
θ.  
The expression      
 
 is however cumbersome to carry on as such. It is more elegant 
to switch its implications to constraints, so that the column-vector      we use in 
subsequent paragraphs is bounded by the amount of funds left in the coffer at time θ, 
the time at which the decision to cut budgets is made.  
 
These two findings (that the SAM-MOLP model is (i) dependent on the budget voted 
for the entire fiscal year and (ii) dependent on how much time passed since the 
beginning of the fiscal year) are an important reminder that policy making is never 
done into a vacuum.  
 
5.4.2 The Constraints of the Multiobjective Linear Programming 
Model  
 
VARIATIONS IN THE VECTOR OF POLICY INSTRUMENT  
 
The difficulty, then, is to develop a precise sense of what is politically feasible in 
terms of fiscal retrenchment. In other words, we must get a sense of the constraints 
that limit the amount of budget cuts that can be realized in any single program. The 
best way to do so is to offer a cross-sectional analysis of cutback management and 
identify the typical distribution of mid-year budget cuts in the United States. Ideally, 
this should be combined with a time series analysis focusing on New York State only. 
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Episodes of fiscal crises and data covering them are however scarce, and it is thus 
dubious that such a model could be created. 
 
Even in the presence of strong statistical evidences favoring a particular distribution of 
budget cuts, it is unclear whether or not the findings should be systematically applied. 
Poterba (1994) found that fiscal adjustments are dependent not only on institutions but 
also on political factors. Governmental budgetary processes in the states 
characteristically rest on a divided budget authority whose actors can have 
incompatible interests and goals. For instance, theoretical and empirical suggest that 
while bureaucracies tend to aim at increasing the amount of resources they control, 
elected officials tend to value more a politically beneficial distribution of scarce 
resources and acceptable levels of deficit (Niskanen, 1971; Niskanen, 1975; Fields et 
al., 1997; Bealey and Coate, 2000; Alesina and Tabellini, 2004). Moreover, the 
unprecedented size of the mid-year budget gaps faced by the state of New York 
following the 2007 recession implies that history may not be a good indicator of how 
deficits should be handled.    
 
That being said, the exercise of defining the constraints of our linear program is made 
easier by the very nature of budget cuts. They indeed are the result of intense political 
negotiations, bargaining and lobbying. Accordingly, enacted budget cuts tend to 
reflect prevailing preferences and dominating influences in the political establishment. 
In the case of New York State, the initiative for budget talks lies in the hands of the 
governor. This is all the more true when budget deficits emerge during the course of 
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the fiscal year since the Executive is constitutionally required to manage the finances 
of the state (and guarantee they remain balanced) after the annual budget has been 
enacted. The propositions drafted by the Governor‘s staff thus irrefutably constitute 
the starting point of budget negotiations, and the Deficit Reduction Plan under study 
here is no exception. It is consequently realistic to interpret the constraints on the 
policy instrument as potential deviations from the values proposed in the Deficit 
Reduction Plan. Then, the model not only determines a set of optimal distributions of 
budget cuts across spending domains, it also contribute to identify the areas where 
marginal improvements should be negotiated. Using the Deficit Reduction Plan has a 
basis to elaborate the constraints of the model has another advantage with respect to 
the fact that mid-year budget cuts are time dependent (see previous section). Because 
the plan is drafted for implementation, it already takes into account the possibility that 
some programs have already spent important amounts of the funds they were allocated 
at the beginning of the fiscal year.  
 
In this light, the very nature of multiobjective linear programming becomes evident. 
Its calibration is the result of an intense exchange between the decision maker and the 
modeler. This interactive aspect of MOLP is present for both policy objectives and 
constraints, as we have just illustrated. Because we were unable to meet the actors of 
the budgetary process in New York State, we argue that the Deficit Reduction Plan 
offers a good proxy for interaction, as it already incorporates a range of what is 
realistically feasible to close the mid-year budget gap.  
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Quantitatively, we will assume that fiscal retrenchment policies targeting any given 
program cannot deviate by more than 15% from the values they takes in the Deficit 
Reduction plan, or 
 
                      
 
It is implied here that a change toward the upper bound        would not violate the 
time-dependency condition established in the previous section. That is: 
 
            
          
 
We may briefly mention a danger with this approach. The Governor‘s propositions 
could indeed target only specific programs and leave out others, in which case the 
formulation of our vector of policy instrument would be biased by construction. This 
is typically not the case with mid-year budget cuts because they practically always 
involve across-the-board spending reductions. Another criticism could be addressed to 
the model if the figures presented in the Governor‘s plan are demonstrated to be 
overly skewed to accomplish political motives. Once again, this is rarely the case with 
mid-year budget cuts, since there is not much leeway left after several rounds of fiscal 
management under severe stress
128
. And the space to maneuver is all the more limited 
that state budgets are heavily dominated by three programs: education, Medicaid and 
assistance to local governments. Hence, cuts large enough to balance a budget 
                                                 
128
 Mid-year budget gaps appear after deficits already manifested themselves for the full fiscal year.  
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spiraling into deficit must be realized in a restricted number of areas, mainly education 
(cumulating K-12 and higher education) and Medicaid.   
 
Figure 5.2. Structure of New York State‘s general fund for FY2009 
 
a. in million dollars (total general fund expenditures: $54.6 billion)                                        b. in percentage       
* AFDC/TANF and other cash expenditures 
** including CAPEX 
*** State government and aid to local governments 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
 
RESPECTING THE “GOLDEN RULE”  
 
Of course, close attention to the set of constraints defined up until now will reveal a 
major inconsistency. Given the social accounting matrix‘s positive and linear 
multipliers, optimizing the budget cuts will simply result in the model converging 
toward the lower bound of our set of constraints. Logically, the lower the cuts, the 
lower the impact on the state‘s economy. Henceforth, another constraint must be 
added in order for the SAM-MOLP model to yield another policy mix than zero cuts 
everywhere.  
 
The primary objective of mid-year fiscal retrenchment is to eliminate the budget gap 
that appeared during the fiscal year. But then, shouldn‘t this consideration be modeled 
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through an objective? This could be done, but in fact it is simpler and theoretically 
more correct to introduce the balanced budget as a constraint rather than as an 
objective
129
. Therefore, we have that: 
      
 
   
 
where BG is the budget gap.  
 
Incorporating the ―Golden Rule‖ into the constraints ensures that the model must meet 
this specification, and that it is not the object of any potential tradeoff.   
  
5.4.3 Policy Objectives  
 
A very common type of public policy analysis is the study of the implications of new 
spending program on an economy, not just the traditional impact analysis concerned 
with aggregate output level. It is a more comprehensive examination of a wide variety 
of factors associated with that spending program, from its impact on employment to 
variation in private capital expenditures and pollution. In times of fiscal stress, 
however, states are much more likely to implement fiscal retrenchment measures than 
new spending programs. The literature on the impact and objectives of fiscal 
consolidation is abundant (for a survey, see Bibow, 2004; Briotti, 2005), and boomed 
after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. When managing episodes of fiscal 
                                                 
129
 Theoretically, the problem of a “balanced budget” objective function has to do with preferences. By 
essence, in states where there is a constitutional requirement for balanced budget, there cannot be 
any tradeoff between this objective and say, employment or economic growth. And if there is no 
tradeoff, then multiobjective optimization has no purpose being used.  
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retrenchment, the attention of policy makers is focused on a certain number of 
macroeconomic indicators, chiefly economic growth and employment. Those are 
tantamount to policy objectives in a multiobjective linear programming model.  
 
HOUSEHOLDS INCOME  
 
The typology established by Alesina and Perroti in their influential 1996 paper is 
useful to frame what could be relevant policy objectives for decision maker 
implementing budget cuts. ―Type I‖ fiscal adjustment, which relies mostly on 
spending cuts – and in particular on reduction in transfers, social security and 
government wages and employment – appears to be the most relevant category. It is 
possible to associate with this type of fiscal adjustment specific policy objectives. The 
two authors remark that the classical Keynesian approach put heavy emphasis on how 
variations in wealth affect consumption (and thus growth). Budget cuts indeed reduce 
the government‘s payroll and negatively impact households‘ income. Limiting the 
impact of budget cuts on households is thus a policy objective. In this perspective, 
there is a need for us to develop a direct impact coefficient matrix for households‘ 
income
130
, such that: 
 
         
     
    
where D
WE
 denotes the total impact of the budget cuts on households‘ income, and 
where n is the row dimension of the SAM. 
                                                 
130
 This reason can also be invoked to justify the use of a SAM framework over a more simple input-
output model.  
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We may recall from our presentation of the SAM framework in Chapter III that the 
row vector     can be assimilated to a sum of the elements in    corresponding to 
the nine existing household groups
131
. Notice that because IMPLAN provides us with 
households categorized according to their income, it is actually possible to observe the 
income equalities that fiscal retrenchment policies may cause.  
 
EMPLOYMENT  
 
The biggest concern of policy makers, however, is to preserve employment. In the 
same manner as labor income, employment impact can be estimated through a vector 
of the form: 
 
        
    
   
 
The associated objective function is specified as a maximization of the aggregate 
measure combining total gross output and employment. Supposing that the number of 
workers employed in each of the two sectors of a hypothetical economy is known, a 
1×2 row vector l’ of physical labor input coefficients can be created, each of its cells 
representing workers per dollar of output. 
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    is the vector of change in output.  
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where Ei is the number of workers employed in industry i. Post-multiplying this row 
vector by the column vector of output   provides the total employment level in the 
economy. Having previously demonstrated that in equilibrium           , pre-
multiplying both side of the equation with the vector w’ do not change its roots. 
 
               
 
In this context, the term     can be interpreted as the employment effect given a 
specific level of final demand at a prevailing technological structure captured by the 
Leontief inverse matrix. More importantly, it translates an output impact into an 
impact on the number of workers hired when a shock to the final demand vector is 
administered: 
 
            
 
                 
 
From this, it may be deduced that total change in output ∆x is linearly related with the 
physical labor input coefficients. The magnitude of the impact of a change in final 
demand on employment will however differ from the magnitude of the impact on 
output if the sorted
132
 array elements of w, the transpose column vector of w’, follow a 
different distribution from the similarly ordered sorted array elements of the column 
                                                 
132
 Ascending or descending order.  
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vector ∆x. This condition may be expected to arise as the level of disaggregation of 
the SAM increases. Labor intensity is tempting to use as a basis for assessing the 
employment effects of a particular policy. Sectors that make extensive use of labor – 
and in particular unskilled labor – are not necessarily those which will yield the 
highest change in output when they are shocked through a modification of final 
demand. Intuitively, one may also anticipate that these labor-intensive sectors will be 
the primary drivers of job creation.  
 
In a social accounting matrix general equilibrium framework where capital is 
endogenously determined, one must however take into account the indirect effects 
generated by a given shock. When considered endogenous, capital is indeed an 
intermediate input whose increased production leads to a higher demand for labor. 
This can be generally argued to be the case in the long-run (Galenson and Leibenstein, 
1955; Sen, 1965; Morley and Kumar, 1989). Because our model deals with the short-
run effects of budget cuts on a state economy, the idea of payments to capital as a 
leakage for job creation is more attractive though. Furthermore, state governments 
usually implement budget cutbacks in a context of economic crisis, when excess 
capacity is pervasive. As such, capital should be considered an exogenous variable in 
our model, and a case can be made that in the short term cushioning the negative 
impact of fiscal austerity on employment is not necessarily an objective consistent 
with gross output maximization.  
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ECONOMIC GROWTH  
 
The government might also be interested in protecting the level of economic activity 
in the state, as reflected by variation in gross output. This feature figures prominently 
in social accounting matrices, and is found on the right-hand side of the framework 
under its planning form. It is possible to transform this measure of change in economic 
activity to a growth rate: 
 
      
                             
           
  
 
where Total Output is New York State‘s gross regional product before the model is 
shocked. The result g is however difficult to interpret. Indeed, it might be understood 
that g represents a growth rate over a specific period of time and can thus be readily 
compared with macroeconomic indicators decision makers are accustomed to (for 
instance the yearly or quarterly growth rate). This is not the case however, as g 
denotes the instantaneous percentage change in gross output from one state of 
equilibrium to the other. In such circumstances, it turns out that thinking in monetary 
terms may actually be preferable.   
 
PRESERVATION OF THE TAX BASE  
 
With these three objectives in mind (employment, labor income and growth), it is 
possible to brush aside the preservation of tax revenues as a policy objective since it 
can be argued that the tax base is overwhelmingly determined by the (i) 
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unemployment rate, (ii) households‘ income and (iii) the economic activity of the 
private sector (Rao, 1979). By optimizing these three objectives, the tax base should 
be optimized as well.  
 
OTHER OBJECTIVES  
 
Besides labor income, output and employment, policy makers can be interested in 
limiting the negative impact of their policies on private investment and capital 
formation. This, however, cannot be captured in the SAM framework. Nor can 
variations in economic productivity, except if a series of posterior social accounting 
matrices could be found for New York State (Miller and Blair, 2009).   
 
Another potentially important policy objective identified by Alesina and Perotti is the 
so-called credibility effect
133
. It could be important for states owing large stocks of 
debt or for those which must refinance a consequent portion of their outstanding debt 
in the months that directly follow the episode of mid-year budget cuts. The theory is 
that the better the management of fiscal adjustments, the larger the impact on interest 
rates. The argument, although intensely debated among economists, does not hold for 
New York State. The interest rate could be swapped for the interest on municipal 
bonds but up to our knowledge there is no study establishing a clear link between 
budget deficits, fiscal retrenchment and the market performance of ―munis‖. Johnson 
and Kritz (2005) found evidence that some institutional factors – expenditure limits, 
                                                 
133
 Paul Krugman, a detractor of the idea, repeatedly assimilated the concept to that of a “confidence 
fairy” in is New York Times’ editorials.  
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balanced budget requirements and restrictions on debt issuance – are correlated with 
lower borrowing costs through better credit ratings, but they are by essence irrelevant 
to short term management of fiscal deficits. The credibility effect will be ignored in 
this dissertation.   
 
Of course, it is possible to add objective functions ad infinitum. It may be particularly 
interesting to complete the purely socio-economic objective functions we just 
described by a set of political criteria. A governor, for instance, might rely on a body 
of constituents he wishes not to alienate. In such a case, reducing as much as possible 
the amount of budget cuts asked to a specific program could well be considered a valid 
criterion. But each additional objective function comes at a technical and 
computational cost
134
.  
 
5.4.4 Mathematical Formulation of the Problem  
 
For the purpose of this dissertation, we feel that a simple focus on three economic 
variables, employment, labor income and growth is sufficient. The SAM model 
presented above allows us to express the criteria as functions of the policy instrument 
vector. The social accounting matrix multiobjective linear programming model for 
New York State can be written as follow
135
: 
 
                                                 
134
 For example, the augmented weighted Tchebycheff procedure described in Chapter III is less 
effective when the number of objective functions considered is larger than 3.  
135
 The superscript prime of a vector indicates it is a row vector.  
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Objective functions: 
         
              Employment (a scalar
136
) 
         
               Labor income (a scalar) 
                   Economic growth (the summation of a column 
vector) 
where                
 
Constraints: 
                                       
                    
 
    
                                             
                                         
 
Notice that because the feasible region of this particular problem is located in the 
bottom-back-left (-,-,-) octant of the    Euclidean three-dimensional coordinate 
system
137
 used to represent graphically the criterion space
138
, the optimization problem 
is actually one of maximization and not one of minimization, as we may intuitively 
think. This is because it is better to achieve a loss of ten jobs than the loss of a hundred 
jobs (         .   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
136
 Notice the dimensions. Multiplication of these matrices will result in a scalar.  
137
 In the familiar   Euclidean two-dimensional space, the problem would be located in the third 
quandrant.  
138
 The decision space cannot be represented graphically, as it is a convex 6-polytope. Convexity 
derives from the purely linear characters of social accounting matrices and their attached total direct-
impact coefficient vectors.  
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5.5 Results  
 
5.5.1 The Set of Pareto Optimal Policies  
 
As illustrated in Chapter III, it is always beneficial to begin the solution of a 
multiobjective program by computing a payoff matrix. Through the payoff matrix we 
will be able to identify an ideal point from which the algorithm will start investigating 
the feasible region and a Nadir point which will bind the research of the algorithm
139
. 
The tables presented hereunder display the values taken by the different objective 
functions when they are optimized individually, i.e. notwithstanding other criteria. It 
can be seen immediately that optimizing output and employment separately reaches 
the same result. This is probably an effect of the IMPLAN matrix theoretical 
framework, which instead of econometrically or statistically calibrating the 
employment multipliers simply postulate a linear ordered relationship with output 
multipliers. 
 
We may consequently eliminate either employment or output because they are not 
contradicting criteria. The employment objective function is removed from the model, 
enabling us to get rid of a cumbersome vector of direct impact. Interestingly enough, 
we observe that taxes appear to be conflicting with both labor income and output. It 
will be included in the final model, since it can be argued that a fiscal retrenchment 
strategy sabotaging tax revenues would be self-defeating. From now on, we will thus 
                                                 
139
 The model is solved using the 2007 version of the Excel Solver add-in.  
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assume that Z1 corresponds to tax, while the two other criterion vectors remain 
unchanged, so that: 
 
         
               
 
It is also noteworthy that in the perspective of a single objective linear programming 
optimization and no matter what objective is selected, the Deficit Reduction Plan is 
always non optimal in equilibrium. Indeed, the Simplex algorithm used by Excel to 
solve the program picks up room for improvement by proposing an entirely different 
set of values for the decision variables. This implies that with respect to monobjective 
programming, the Deficit Reduction plan consists in a set
140
 of dominated solutions. 
However, this might simply be the result of the existence of multiple conflicting 
objectives the Governor wished to accomplish.  
 
It is instructive to record the equilibrium values taken by the different policy 
objectives when the Deficit Reduction Plan is implemented (we will come back to it 
more thoroughly in section 5.6 hereunder): 
               indirect business tax 
            labor income 
            total output 
When compared with the results obtained from individual optimization presented in 
table 5.9, one can clearly see why the Deficit Reduction Plan is an inefficient fiscal 
                                                 
140
 By set, we mean the collection of all Z vectors optimized individually.  
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retrenchment policy for New York State. If the Governor‘s objectives were limited to 
a strict minimization of the negative impact of his policy on aggregate output, then it 
would be possible to contain the contraction of the state‘s GRP to -1.024% instead of -
1.029%. In dollar terms, this represents saving $55 million or 3.1% of the total budget 
cuts. This policy however leads to a larger decrease in labor income ($9.714 billion 
against $9.672 billion), even though it performs better from the perspective of the 
indirect business tax. The same demonstration holds for every objective, which steers 
us toward the conclusions that:  
(i) there exists a conflict between the three objectives, as none of the 
optimized solution vectors simultaneously dominate the others with 
respect to all objectives (i.e. all are non-dominated);  
(ii) the Deficit Reduction Plan is not optimal in the Pareto sense. 
 
In order to achieve the highest level of growth possible, it appears that the decision 
maker should redistribute the budget cuts in favor of the state agencies and local 
governments and to the detriment of health care and transportation. The same holds 
true for employment. On the other hand, if the decision maker prefers to protect labor 
income, she should emphasize cuts in education and governmental functions while 
preserving health care and transportation. Finally, a pro-tax revenue fiscal 
retrenchment strategy would privilege non-education programs and transportation over 
elementary/secondary education and health care.  
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Table 5.5. Optimization of aggregate output ($ in millions)  
 
 
Table 5.6. Optimization of Employment  
 
 
Table 5.7. Optimization of Labor Income ($ in millions) 
 
 
Table 5.8. Optimization of Indirect Business Tax ($ in millions) 
 
 
The payoff matrix is presented below. The first row records the values for all three 
criterions when the policy maker aims at minimizing the loss in indirect business tax 
revenues only. The second row and third row present the criterion values for labor 
income maximization and output/employment maximization respectively. The 
coordinates of the ideal point in the    three-dimensional Euclidean criterion space 
are found on the diagonal of the payoff matrix.   
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Table 5.9. Payoff matrix 
 Tax     Labor income     Output     
Max       -1,161,526.7 -9,714.0 -10,535.7 
Max      -1,547,919.5 -9,602.6 -10,531.2 
Max      -1,349,004.3 -9,737.1 -10,465.8 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Two 3-D scatter plots of the solution vectors (monobjective optimizations)   
 
 
The policy implications of the tradeoffs presented in the table above are difficult to 
draw without knowing the preferences of the policy maker. Indeed, no fiscal 
retrenchment strategy ends up hurting significantly one criterion to boost another. 
Perhaps in these circumstances alternatives could be judged a priori similar, and the 
analyst could limit herself to a monobjective linear program of the kind we just solved. 
It seems however to us that given the variations in  , the tax revenues, any decision 
maker with even a slight interest in this objective may find a strategy where the stress 
is put on labor income undesirable.      
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5.5.2 Algorithms  
 
A solution to this problem, the simplest one, is to transfer the original multiobjective 
linear program to a goal programming framework (Charnes, Cooper and Ferguson, 
1955; Charnes and Cooper, 1961; Jones and Tamiz, 2010). In this case, a preferred 
objective usually referred to as the achievement function would be optimized, while 
the other objective functions would be converted to constraints. These constraints take 
the form of target levels under which the value of the former objectives must not 
fall
141
. The concept behind goal programming is to obtain the best value for one 
objective, for instance labor income, while the others are constrained parametrically. 
This method is illustrated hereunder.  
 
It is by no means the only one available however, as we have seen in chapter III. In 
particular, evolutionary multicriterion optimization offers a very powerful instrument 
to solve large scale economic models such as a disaggregated SAM. They are indeed 
capable of meeting efficiently two of the most important requirements of 
multiobjective optimization (Deb, 2001): 
(i) finding a pool of solutions as close as possible to the Pareto front; 
(ii) finding a pool of solutions as diverse as possible. 
Evolutionary algorithms (EAs), including genetic algorithms, have three principal 
characteristics (Tan, Khor and Lee, 2005): 
                                                 
141
 For an example of input-output model combined with goal programming, see chapter 10 in Miller 
and Blair (2009).  
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- They are population-based, in the sense that they maintain a set of solutions 
called a population; 
- They are fitness-oriented, as they assign a gene representation (called a code) 
and an estimate of performance (the fitness value) to each member (the 
individuals) of the solution set. The fitness orientation of evolutionary 
algorithms is what drive the optimization process and enables programs to 
converge to a solution, as EAs are based on a Darwinian ―survival of the 
fittest‖ principle; 
- They are variation-driven, because the codes of the individuals belonging to 
the set of feasible solutions are allowed to mutate.   
Among evolutionary algorithms, Tan, Khor and Lee (2005) find that those 
incorporating elitism
142
 tend to outperform others when it comes to convergence and 
the revelation of the Pareto front. This superior performance is however achieved at a 
computational cost.  
 
AN ELITIST GENETIC ALGORITHM: NGSA-II   
 
The original method adopted to solve the three-dimensional multiobjective 
optimization problem was the Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II (NSGA-
II), a genetic algorithm based on non-dominated sorting (Deb et al., 2000). The 
principle of genetic algorithm is relatively simple: it maintains a population of 
                                                 
142
 For example the Pareto Archived Evolution Strategy (PAES), the Pareto Envelope-based Selection 
Algorithm (PESA), the Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II (NSGA-II), the Strength Pareto 
Evolutionary Algorithm 2 (SPEA2), IMOEA and CCEA.  
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chromosomes (solutions) from which it selects, mutates and crossovers
143
 according to 
parameters chosen by the analyst. The larger the population of chromosomes the 
algorithm can pool from, the more computationally intensive the program
144
.   
 
The genes in the genetic algorithm are formed by the decision variables, which taken 
together create the chromosomes and thus the set of optimal solutions. Thanks to a 
mutation rate determined by the analyst, NSGA-II is able to escape locally Pareto 
optimal solutions and can converge to global optimums scattered across the tradeoff 
surface. Mutation is operated at random on one of the genes composing a 
chromosome, and the new value taken by the chromosome is itself determined 
randomly within the constraints of the gene.  
 
Solutions are then classified according to the so-called method of the ―crowded 
tournament‖, where a set of solutions is chosen at random from the population and 
ordered. The concept of the ―crowded tournament‖ is based on a measure of density 
which takes the average distance of two individuals on either side of another 
individual along each of the objectives. But this measure of density comes second in 
importance to the rank value assigned to each individual by the fast nondominated 
sorting component of the algorithm.    
 
                                                 
143
 Crossover designates the chromosome splicing procedure through which the algorithm spread 
information between individuals to create new solutions that reproduce some of the attributes of 
their parents.  
144
 The overall complexity of the algorithm is dependent on both the population size and the number 
of policy objectives.  
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The mechanics of the NGSA-II algorithm are easier to understand once its general 
structure is presented. An overview of the main features of the NGSA-II is provided 
by Tan, Khor and Lee (2005:24) and is reproduced hereunder: 
 
Initialize generation counter: n = 0. 
Create a parent population, Ppop of size P. 
Initialize offspring population as Opop = [ ] 
Repeat while stopping criterion is not met. 
 Cpop = Ppop U Opop. 
 rank = FNDomSort(Cpop). 
 Function (rank) = FNDomSort(Pop) 
     Repeat for each solution i in Pop.  
   ni is the number of solutions dominating the individual i. 
   Si is a set of individuals dominated by individual i. 
  End Repeat 
  Q = set of individuals in Pop with ni = 0. 
  CurRank = 0. 
  Repeat while Q is not [ ]. 
   R = [ ]. 
   CurRank = CurRank + 1. 
   Repeat for each individual i in Q.  
   rank(i) = CurRank.  
   Repeat for each solution j in set Si. 
   nj = nj -1. 
   If nj = 0 
   Put individual j in R. 
   End If 
   End Repeat 
   End Repeat 
   Q = R. 
  End Repeat 
  Return (rank). 
 End Function 
 Ppop = [ ]. 
 rankP = the rank value of the Pth individual in Cpop sorted in ascending order of 
rank. 
 Ppop = individuals from Cpop with the rank < rankP. 
 Ppopsize = number of individuals in Ppop. 
 Tpop = individuals from Cpop with rank value of rankP. 
 CDtc = CrwdDA(Tpop). 
 Function (CDtc) = CrwdDA(Pop) 
 F(i,j) = the normalized jth objective function of individual i in population 
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Pop. 
   
                            . 
   
                            . 
 P = number of individuals in Pop. 
 CDtc(i) = 0,    = 1,2, …, P. 
 Repeat for each objective j. 
 Idx = index vector based on the sorting of vector              
          
 CDtc(Idx(1)) = CDtc(Idx(P)) =   .     % Boundary points are 
always selected 
 Repeat for each individual i from 2 to (P – 1). 
 CDtc(Idx(i)) = CDtc(Idx(i)) +  
         [F(Idx(i+1),j) – F(Idx(i-1),j)]/    
      
    . 
 End Repeat 
 End Repeat 
 Return (CDtc). 
 End Function 
 Ppop = Ppop U {(P – Ppopsize) individuals with the largest CDtc}. 
 Opop = genetic_operators(Ppop). 
 n = n + 1. 
End Repeat 
Return (Ppop, Opop, …).  
 
Ppop, the randomly generated parent population forms the basis of the loop that will 
converge through the ―crowded tournament‖ method to a set of Pareto optimal 
solutions. It generates itself in the first generation (n=0). This parent population is then 
combined to an offspring population Opop (which in an empty set at n=0) to form a 
new population denoted Cpop. The individuals of Cpop are then compared ranked 
according to a fast nondominated sorting function FNDomSort(Cpop). The individuals 
who made the cut are then reintegrated into a new Ppop population of size P. The 
crowding distance assignment function CrwdDA(TPop) is then used before genetic 
operators are applied on the resulting population Ppop, which is actually the parent 
population at the beginning of the second generation (n=1). The loop creates from 
Ppop a non-empty offspring population Opop, while the statement #Repeat while 
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stopping criterion is not met.# ensures that the algorithm repeats the process from 
generation to generation up until a predetermined limit is met. This limit is usually put 
on the number n of generations the algorithm can create.    
 
The implementation of a genetic algorithm is both complex and computationally 
intensive, especially when there are more than two objective functions. Using the free 
SolveXL
145
 add-in for Microsoft Excel, it is possible to obtain a taste of an 
optimization process using the NGSA II genetic algorithm. Unfortunately, the 
software does not support more than two objective functions and thirty decision 
variables, which is well under the requirements of a model as large as ours. 
Consequently, the algorithm is run for two objectives only: output – and by extension 
employment – and labor income. It is possible to adjust the model to fit these criteria 
through a series of manipulation, but we quickly run into the difficulty of customizing 
the constraints.  
 
We partially overcame the problem by imposing strong penalties to the two objective 
functions selected when they deviate significantly from the overall target of budget 
cuts. It is insufficient though. Indeed, after 200 generations the model still fails to 
converge to an optimal solution respecting the constraint of realizing $1.78 billion in 
spending reduction measures. It actually falls short of $136 million, or 7.64%. The 
source of the problem clearly lies in the definition of the constraints, and can be solved 
                                                 
145
 http://www.solvexl.com/ 
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only by implementing the algorithm in MATLAB or in the C programming 
language
146
.  
 
The set of solutions determined by NGSA II is graphically represented hereunder. The 
optimal solution in this configuration has the coordinates (-9,003.3 , -9,639) in the 
criterion space for a total budget cut value of $1.65 billion.  
 
Figure 5.4. Set of solution determined by NGSA II (including non feasible solutions) 
   
Note: Simple one point with crossover rate: 0.95; simple mutator with mutation rate: 0.3; 
200 generations; integer bounded genes 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
146
 It would also be possible to re-integrate the third objective function.  
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CONSTRAINT PROGRAMMING  
 
Without a professional solver software, it is difficult to attempt to solve a problem like 
ours through a genetic algorithm. The same difficulty exists when it comes to 
constraint programming, although the technique is more tractable. To facilitate the 
discovery of the Pareto front, we will drop of the model one of the objective function, 
namely tax.  
 
Objective functions: 
         
               Labor income  
                   Economic growth / Employment 
where                
 
Constraints: 
                                       
                    
 
    
                                             
                                         
 
The set of nondominated solutions is then constructed by transforming output into a 
constraint. Labor income is then maximized using the Simplex algorithm. The 
optimization consists in achieving the smallest loss in total labor income with the 
minimum impairment to economic growth (the change in aggregate output). The 
payoff matrix for such a problem is different from the one presented in table 5.9: 
 
Table 5.10. The payoff matrix for a two-objective constraint program 
 Labor income     Output     
Max      -9,602.6 -10,531.2 
Max      -9,737.1 -10,465.8 
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As for the mathematical optimization model, it is re-written to accommodate 
constraint programming: 
Objective functions: 
         
                Labor income  
where                 
 
Constraints: 
                                       Economic growth / Employment 
                                    
                    
 
    
                                             
                                         
where     is a minimal achievement value for the change in aggregate output set by 
the decision maker (and by extension represents the variation in employment, by 
virtue of the construction of the IMPLAN data set).  
 
The best way to approximate the behavior of the solution set is to create a scatter plot 
recording the value of the change in output expressed as a function of maximized 
labor income on a range that respect the                  constraint. This range is 
bounded by the figures found in the second column of the payoff matrix 5.10: the 
decision maker can set the maximal tolerable output loss to be everywhere between 
$10.53 billion at worse and $10.46 billion at best, the two extreme boundaries values 
taken by output still belonging to the set of feasible solutions S. In the former case, the 
decision maker actually does not care about output growth whereas in the latter case, 
she displays a strong bias toward achieving the best value for output. The graphical 
representation of the Pareto front will thus span an interval covering $65.4 million in 
output. The same logic holds true for labor income, although the interval is far larger 
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($134.5 million) and the value of labor income itself is determined by the Simplex 
algorithm, not the decision maker.  
 
                                      
                                    
 
Twenty-three points    
     
   have been computed, a number that is large enough 
to provide a good approximation of the Pareto front. From figure 5.4 hereunder we see 
that the relationship between labor income and output is monotonic and strictly 
decreasing: the smaller the overall loss in labor income, the larger the contraction of 
the gross regional product and of employment. This is of course expected if we want 
our
147
 problem to be non-trivial.   
 
Another insight we gain from figure 5.4 is that it the Pareto front is non-linear, i.e. the 
slope of the efficient frontier is not constant. The steepness of the Pareto front‘s slope 
appears particularly high for lower values of labor income, before going through three 
―kinks‖ and stabilizing to a quasi-linear state. This implies that the Governor must be 
willing to sacrifice a larger and larger amount of labor income to target higher levels 
of output growth or employment. Put into the wording of an economist, the marginal 
cost of economic growth / employment in terms of labor income is increasing (and at 
                                                 
147
 Monotonicity and a decreasing relationship are not necessary for a goal programming problem to 
be non-trivial. For instance, a state office in charge of energy might deem that increased electrical 
output from a new dam project is beneficial, but that land flooding is nefarious. Assuming a positive 
correlation between the area flooded and electrical output, one can see that two variables can have a 
positive relationship without the problem becoming trivial.   
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an increasing rate). Because the marginal cost is such an important part of decision 
making in economics, being able to identify kinks on the Pareto frontier is crucial. 
Hence the importance of the quality of the algorithm used to solve the multiobjective 
program, and in particular its ability to sample at regular intervals the set of non-
dominated solutions and its ability to circumvent local optima.  
 
Figure 5.4. The Pareto front for a two-objective fiscal retrenchment problem in New 
York State 
 
Note: The ideal vector     is in the upper right corner, in red. The Nadir point is located in the 
lower left corner, in black.  
 
The absence of a vertical segment on the Pareto frontier means that it is not possible to 
improve one objective without sacrificing the other. The slope of the Pareto front, by 
capturing the marginal cost of growth in terms of labor income, thus represents the 
policy trade-off that the Governor of New York State faces when designing his mid-
year budget cuts. The two policy objectives in presence being output/employment and 
labor income, the slope can be interpreted as the rate at which the decision maker 
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should be willing to ―trade‖ a lesser level of employment for an increase in the 
revenue available to households.  
 
5.6 Policy Design  
 
 
The definition of the Pareto front marks the first step of the analysis of mid-year 
budget cuts in New York State. The second step actually involves the production of 
some macroeconomic (or econometric, or at best both) estimates of the impact of the 
policy choices previously established by the decision maker. In our case, the social 
accounting matrix model under its impact form should be run for the Deficit 
Reduction Plan, so as to gain an understanding of the whereabouts of the policy in the 
criterion space, and how far it is from the Pareto front. Put it simply, we want to gain 
an understanding of the performance of the Deficit Reduction Plan by running it 
through the Walrasian general equilibrium framework. Having accomplished this, its 
efficiency can be assessed with regards to our own findings.  
 
The general equilibrium impact of the Deficit Reduction Plan is estimated below: 
            
           
Those are its coordinate in the criterion space.  
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Figure 5.6. Graphical representation of the Deficit Reduction Plan in the criterion 
space 
 
Note: The DRP vector is the yellow point.  
 
The vector representing the Deficit Reduction Plan is clearly located in the set of 
dominated solutions vis-à-vis the two objectives of interest. Using the SAM-MOLP 
model to distribute the mid-year budget cuts among programs, it is possible to 
improve the value of labor income by 0.66%, or $63.7 million, with the same 
contraction of the gross regional product. Keeping labor income constant, the 
efficiency of budget cuts with respect to output would increase by 0.5%, or $52.4 
million.  
 
Policy inefficiencies could be corrected by moving closer to the Pareto front, which 
gathers a set of Pareto optimal budget retrenchment vectors. In order to do so, the 
policy maker must agree to bring significant modifications to the repartition of the 
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budget cuts among programs. Again, it should be forcefully emphasized here that if a 
change can translate into improved economic efficiency, it might not be politically 
feasible. Assuming it is we must fall back to the yet unused decision space to 
investigate the nature of the modifications that should be carried out. Indeed, if the 
criterion space provides the decision maker with the direction she ought to steer her 
policy toward, the helm is to be found in the decision space.   
 
This constant navigation between criterion space and decision space is a prominent 
feature of multiobjective optimization. Having a sense of the set of non-dominated 
solutions is indeed of little help to the decision maker if these esoteric concepts cannot 
be spelled out in terms of concrete policy instruments. The following table is 
employed to this use: 
 
Table 5.11. Toward optimality: a schedule for policy instruments ($ in millions) 
 Budget cut size 
Program DRP 
Pareto optimal 
reference 
Change (%) 
Education -480.3 -408.3 -15.0% 
 
Non-education -786 -874.6 11.3% 
H/C Non-hospitals -196.5 -167 -15.0% 
H/C Hospitals -196.5 -226 15% 
Transportation -125.4 -108.8 -13.2% 
Note: The “Pareto optimal reference” was selected at random among the set of non-
dominated solutions.  
 
It is interesting to note that the reference selected leads to considerable changes in the 
distribution of the budget cuts given the set of established constraints. Four programs 
actually converge to their boundaries (        : education, health care non-hospitals, 
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health care hospitals and transportation. Every single area experiences a change of at 
least 10% in the amount of budget cuts they are expected to implement. This is 
perhaps not surprising considering that the basis of our optimization program is a 
social accounting matrix. Due to the fixed multipliers nature of the SAM, the Simplex 
algorithm indeed exhausts first the programs that lead to the fastest increase in Z1, the 
labor income. That is, it moves from adjacent corner point feasible (CPF) solution to 
adjacent CPF solution using the steepest edges of the feasible region up until it hits a 
new constraint boundary
148
.  
 
5.7 Policy recommendations 
    
Since the purpose of any policy in the theory of ―distance-to-a-reference-objective‖ is 
to get as closely as possible from the ideal point     while respecting the set of 
constraints        , policy recommendations derived from our model would 
include a complete overhaul of the Deficit Reduction Plan. It appears that the 
magnitude of the divergence between the Pareto optimal reference we selected and 
Governor Paterson‘s Deficit Reduction Plan, with respect to output/employment and 
labor income, is abysmal, denoting a high degree of economic inefficiency in the 
proposed budget cuts.   
 
 
                                                 
148
 The geometrical procedure is more complex because the decision space has five dimensions. The 
Simplex algorithm investigates a 5-polytope where CPF solutions are vertices and edges are bounding 
Polychoron facets.  
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Table 5.12. Economic benefits gained through constraint programming optimization 
($ in billions) 
 Budget cut size 
Objective DRP 
Pareto optimal 
reference 
Difference 
Output/Employment -10,521.8 -10,477.1 0.0447 
Labor income -9,672.6 -9,649.5 0.0231 
 
According to the social accounting matrix multiobjective linear programming model 
developed in this chapter, optimization of the fiscal year 2009 mid-year budget cuts 
could have resulted in a $44.7 million increase aggregate output and $23.1 million 
more in labor income throughout the state‘s economy in equilibrium. The figures 
might seem small in comparison of the size of the economy of New York State. But 
the state‘s economy shrunk by $30.3 billion in 2009, or $7.5 billion on a quarterly 
basis, according to data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Assuming that the 
effects of an optimized deficit reduction plan would have taken place during the last 
quarter of 2009, the economy would have performed 0.6 percentage point better. 
Because the impact of mid-year budget cuts on the economy tends to manifest itself 
rapidly, such gains in efficiency are, we believe, worth investigating further.  
 
Moreover, the highly aggregated level of the social accounting matrix may actually 
cause the model to perform less well than it could. Indeed, if more programs could be 
included and if a difference could be made between the activities of the state and local 
governments the ensuing granularity would allow the Simplex algorithm to play on 
more policy instruments. It is possible – even likely – that some of these instruments 
would improve the policy objectives at a faster rate than the one we used.  
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In terms of the program affectation of budget cuts, the policy schedule presented 
above indicates that three areas, ‗education‘, ‗health care non hospitals‘ and 
‗transportation‘ have to shoulder too heavy a burden in the Deficit Reduction Plan. 
This would constitute the low-hanging fruits of efficiency that can be easily reaped by 
marginally decreasing the contribution of these programs to the overall fiscal 
retrenchment policy. On the other hand, it appears that ‗state and local governments 
non-education‘ as well as ‗health care hospitals‘ can be required to realize more 
savings. 
 
This may be touching to a limit of our model. The study of mid-year budget cuts by 
themselves is possible because their sizes are typically sufficiently small compared to 
a regional economy to allow the assumption that prices are fixed and that production is 
characterized by a Leontief economy without returns to scale or input substitutions. 
However, it is highly unlikely that such sectors as ‗education‘ and ‗hospitals‘ have not 
been already asked for significant downsizing in the period preceding the apparition of 
the mid-year deficit. Once again, we come back to the idea – which has been pervasive 
in this chapter – that the definition of the constraints in the linear program, or what is 
economically, socially and politically feasible, is perhaps the single most critical factor 
in the elaboration of an optimization model. To quote Otto von Bismarck, ―Die Politik 
ist die Kunst des Möglichen‖: Politics is the art of the possible.    
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5.8 Adding Policy Objectives  
 
5.8.1 An Extended Model Including Employment and Tax 
 
In order to simplify the demonstration and provide clear graphical illustrations of a 
practical application of the social accounting matrix multiobjective linear 
programming model, we have eliminated in the previous section one of the three 
objective functions initially identified: the indirect business tax. Even before that, we 
argued that optimizing aggregate output and optimizing employment were fully 
consistent and that one could be safely removed from the model. For the sake of 
demonstration, it is now re-integrated.  
 
The extended SAM-MOLP thus includes four policy objectives: labor income ω, 
output γ, unemployment υ and indirect business tax θ.  
 
Objective functions: 
         
              Employment (υ, a scalar) 
         
               Labor income (ω, a scalar) 
                   Economic growth (γ, the summation of a column 
vector) 
         
                Indirect business tax (τ, a scalar) 
where                
 
Constraints: 
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Solving this problem using constraint programming entails the same step already taken 
in section 5.6. The payoff matrix becomes a 4 by 4 table which diagonal elements 
compose the coordinates of the z** ideal vector in the R
4
 dimensional criterion space. 
The redundant character of output and employment can be seen in the table hereunder. 
It follows from the optimization program implemented in the previous section that 
there is a one-to-one correspondence in the trade-off between output and labor income 
and between employment and labor income. Moreover, they appear to be a strong 
conflict between the optimization of tax revenues and employment. The latter indeed 
takes one of its worst values when the negative impact of budget cuts on indirect 
business taxes is minimized. Only when labor income is individually optimized 
employment takes a lower value.   
 
From the perspective of policy-making, those are two distressing findings. During a 
period of economic crisis, employment is a key preoccupation of state government 
officials but as the crisis progresses and impacts the health of the state public finances, 
priorities progressively shift toward managing fiscal stress. In order to do so, 
preserving the tax base is crucial. However, the SAM-MOLP model tells us that this is 
not possible if the decision maker wants to cushion the deterioration of the labor 
market.  
As for the fact that employment suffers when labor income is optimized, it may be 
explained through mechanisms such as lengthened working hours for current 
employees. That is, as labor income increases, employers become more reluctant to 
recruit. In quantitative terms, minimizing the minimum impact of the fiscal 
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retrenchment policy on labor income causes a loss of approximately 1% in 
employment compared with is optimal value.  
 
Table 5.12. The payoff matrix for a four-objective constraint program 
 Tax     Labor income 
    
Output     Employment     
Max       -1,161,526.7 -9,714.0 -10,535.7 -20,326.2 
Max      -1,547,919.5 -9,602.6 -10,531.2 -20,397.9 
Max      -1,349,004.3 -9,737.1 -10,465.8 -20,184.1 
Max      -1,349,004.3 -9,737.1 -10,465.8 -20,184.1 
 
5.8.2 Introducing the Weighted Sum Method 
 
Once these observations have been made, the next step of goal programming consists 
in the systematic analysis of the Pareto frontier. However, the fact that the criterion 
space has four dimensions makes the endeavor particularly challenging. We have 
already seen in chapter III that there existed a number of promising techniques to 
tackle an exponentially growing set of Pareto efficient solutions: the augmented 
weighted Tchebycheff procedure was one of them, but it suffers from exponential 
complexity as the number of constraints increases. A useful alternative may be found 
in general scalarization methods, which we introduced in section 4.3.3 using a 
weighted global criterion method. The most popular and straightforward approach to 
multiobjective optimization remains however the weighted sum method: 
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where U is an achievement function,          is a vector of objective functions and 
   is a vector of weights chosen by the decision maker such that      
 
    and 
   .  
 
One can see that this formula is just a particular form of the general weighted 
exponential sum utility function (Koski and Silvennoinen, 1987): 
     
 
   
       
                   
with p, a value reflecting the importance accorded to optimizing a particular function, 
is set to 1. 
 
Two problems emerge from such formulation of a multiobjective optimization 
problem. The first issue is that the selected objectives can be measured in different 
units.        must therefore be normalized for all i‘s, so that the aggregative 
achievement function U actually makes sense (Kim and de Weck, 2004). We then 
have:  
    
     
  
  
        
  
 
 
The formulas for the normalized objective functions are presented in table 5.13. 
Notice that the denominator is a constant and that the only element allowed to vary – 
and linked to the social accounting matrix – is   . As usual, the problem is made more 
difficult to grasp by its location in the lower left orthant. Theoretically, the normalized 
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objective functions are comprised between 1 (corresponding to the ideal vector   
  ) 
and 0 (corresponding to the Nadir point). In our case, they span the range        
 , with -1 the most desirable value.  
 
Table 5.14. The normalized objective functions for the implementation of the 
weighted sum method   
  
Numerator Denominator Quotient 
Normalized output                    
Normalized labor income                    
Normalized employment                    
Normalized tax                    
 
The second and principal difficulty is to select properly the weights    (Voogd, 1983). 
Even if weights are correctly attributed, nothing guarantees that the final solution 
reached will actually satisfy the decision maker (Messac, 1996). Moreover, varying 
the weights to obtain a picture of the Pareto front is somewhat problematic because the 
resulting points may not spread evenly on the surface (Das and Dennis, 1997). In 
economic policy making, where the respective importance of the different objective 
functions is often difficult to assess, the best method to obtain weights was perhaps 
proposed by Wierzbicki (1986). It is however difficult to implement. 
 
Keeping this in mind, we will postulate that the Governor of New York State is 
agnostic with respect to growth, employment, labor income and tax revenues, so that 
       . The Excel spreadsheet hosting our initial model can easily be transformed 
to perform an optimization of the achievement function U given the weights attributed 
to each of its four components. The advantage of having an aggregate function is that 
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it becomes easier to compare the gain in efficiencies realized through optimization. 
For instance, we have that: 
                     
        
The left-hand side of the expression records the overall efficiency of the Deficit 
Reduction Plan with respect to the Nadir Point, i.e. 0). It can be interpreted that ceteris 
paribus the DRP is 36% more efficient that the worst budget cuts combination 
possible. The right-hand side informs us of the performance of the optimization 
program. Given an agnostic Governor, the model performs 63% better than it does at 
the Nadir point.  The details of the vector solution s as follow: 
 
Table 5.15. Efficiency gains from a weighted sum optimization ($ in millions) 
 Budget cut size 
Objective DRP Solution vector Difference 
Output/Employment -10,521.8 -10,465.8 56 
Labor income -9,672.6 -9,737.1 -64.5 
Employment -20,330 -20,184.1 145.9 
Indirect business tax -1,356 -1,349 27 
 
If there seems to be a consequent gain in efficiency under the existing set of 
preferences of the policy maker, the results are less clear cut when it comes to the 
question of Pareto optimality. Indeed, one can see from table 5.14 that the solution 
vector reached by the weighted sum method is actually worse than the DRP with 
respect to labor income. We can thus conclude that the solution vector does not 
dominate the Deficit Reduction Plan in the R
4
 criterion space. This can be explained 
by the one-to-one correspondence between output and employment, which gives them 
a heavy weight (0.5) compared to labor income and indirect business tax. It is also 
274 
 
possible that some subsets of the Pareto optimal region for this problem are non-
convex. A short investigation supports this hypothesis. Building an optimization based 
on the constrained optimization of output – labor income being relegated to the rank of 
a constraint – we see that the behavior of the Pareto front is quite erratic, and that the 
weighted sum algorithm may be stuck at a local Pareto optimum.  
 
Figure 5.7. The Pareto front for a two-objective fiscal retrenchment problem  
 
 
This is an excellent illustration of the limits of the weighted sum method. Despite its 
relative simplicity, attributing non-arbitrary weights to the objective functions to 
obtain a good picture of the Pareto front is a challenging task. The best method to 
escape this pitfall is to generate a large number of solution vector using randomized 
weights.    
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Chapter VI 
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
 
This dissertation was built on the assumptions that policy decisions, in particular when 
they come to the management of the budget, are better represented through multiple 
criteria than through traditional welfare functions. Indeed, we argued that policy-
makers typically evolve in complex environments which contribute to shape their 
preferences and objectives. These preferences and objectives often turn out to be 
conflicting, rendering classical monobjective optimization powerless. The second 
assumption, made abundantly explicit by the tools we selected to carry out this 
research project, was that numerous policies can be considered inefficient from the 
perspective of mathematical optimization. We thus set out to combine a Walrasian 
general equilibrium model under the form of a social accounting matrix to techniques 
developed in the field o multiobjective linear programming. It was demonstrated in the 
fourth chapter that the approach is theoretically intriguing and particularly appealing 
given the numerous types of vector optimization in existence. We firstly introduced 
the augmented weighted Tchebycheff procedure to support decision-making.  
 
In the spirit of this ―distance-to-a-reference-objective‖ method, a constraint 
programming model was implemented to optimize the structure of mid-year budget 
cuts in New York State and limit their depressive effect on growth, employment and 
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labor income. The approach was completed by a short venture in the realm of genetic 
algorithms and scalarization techniques. We have also argued in favor of the use of a 
social accounting matrix to model the economy of New York State and to capture the 
equilibrium impact on several variables of changes in the values of the policy 
instruments.  
 
The previous chapters contribute to the literature inasmuch as, to the extent of our 
knowledge, they constitute the first attempt made at combining systematically not only 
linear programming and social accounting matrix for investigating non-environmental 
policy issues but also multicriteria decision making and SAM in a theoretical and 
operational framework. The methodological approach we chose to develop throughout 
this dissertation differs significantly from previous empirical work on fiscal policy, 
which usually relies on Structural Vector Autoregressions. SVAR models have 
suffered from several shortcomings however, principally because of their source of 
identification and their over-reliance on exceptional events – in particular wars – when 
simulating shocks to government spending. It would be a particularly interesting 
exercise to combines the two techniques and observe whether or not the optimal 
solutions yielded by the SAM-MOLP model correspond to satisfying results when 
modeled through SVARs.  
 
With respect to results, several goals were accomplished. First, it appears that a model 
can indeed be built on the basis of these two frameworks. Second, the model has been 
shown to be helpful in guiding decision makers toward the elaboration of efficient 
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policies, particularly with respect to the alleviation of certain negative effects they can 
have on selected macroeconomic variables. The magnitude of the amelioration 
generated by the optimization program is nonetheless relatively small. We purported 
that this might be due to the use of the IMPLAN social accounting matrix and its 
supporting database. In this respect, developing a customized SAM is critical.  
 
Perhaps, however, the confinement of this dissertation to a strict and narrow economic 
approach to public policy prevented the extension of the framework elaborated in 
these pages to both social and political dimensions. Especially concerning the former 
the social accounting matrix could have been more comprehensively mobilized. This 
certainly opens the way to further research. As for the political side, we believe that 
the SAM-multiobjective linear programming model is helpful to assess the ―space of 
possibilities‖ of a particular policy. The set of Pareto optimal solutions identified by 
the optimization algorithm offers a view of the directions where the policy should 
bent, and interaction between the decision maker and the analyst certainly can help to 
improve the assumption of the model. 
 
The study of the management of mid-year budget gaps proposed in Chapter V raised 
many questions for complementary research: 
 
(i) The social accounting matrix, although defended in this thesis as an 
appropriate structural economic model to explore the short to mid-term 
impact of public policies on the economy of New York, works only when a 
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number of stringent assumptions are made. It would be beneficial to extend 
the model to a fully-fledged computable general equilibrium. The 
foundations for this line of research have been laid by André et al. (2010). 
In general and concerning the economic modeling dimension of our model, 
it is clear that the axis of research should follow the progressive relaxation 
of the assumptions we made for the social accounting matrix. This is for 
instance clearly the case when it comes to the representation of the state 
government and its tax policy. Public policy is also very much concerned 
with employment, and the IMPLAN framework is clearly unsatisfying to 
tackle this issue. Once again, the development of a CGE model 
incorporating a realistic labor market would come handy.  
 
(ii) In the debate over fiscal policy, the place of rational expectations and time-
related decisions has become central. Employing the static SAM/CGE 
model with other dynamic tools, such as those offered by econometrics, 
would allow further refinement of the framework and a better sense of how 
the economy may move from one equilibrium to the other. 
 
(iii) Focusing on the model presented in this dissertation, a number of variables 
or parameters would benefit from certain improvements. For instance, as 
we explained in the case of the Deficit Reduction Plan proposed by 
Governor Paterson, the amount of budget cuts that must effectively be 
realized is actually less clear than what it can appear at first. Therefore, 
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allowing the budget constraints to display fuzziness would be an important 
step in the good direction (Kahraman, 2008; Sakawa et al., 2011). 
Moreover, stochasticity could be used to render the direct impact variables 
(employment, labor income or even output) more realistic.  
 
Another area of improvement is the social accounting matrix itself. One of the most 
attractive feature of this framework is indeed the possibility of customizing it to the 
needs of the research. By using a pre-constructed SAM from IMPLAN, we have given 
up on the possibility to formulate the model such that it displays an advanced level of 
disaggregation in the sector of interest, primarily state and local governments. A 
disaggregation scheme that would lead to, we believe, better insight and more 
precision in the policy simulation outcomes is proposed for instance in Thorbecke 
(1988).   
 
Finally, this dissertation relied on simplifications in modeling the objectives that 
animate policy maker. Policies are as rarely determined by a unique criterion as by 
two conflicting criteria. Jumping to three-dimensional Euclidean space however 
comes at a heavy computational price and poses numerous technical difficulties. 
Moreover, it is unclear whether or not adding layers of complexity over the relatively 
basic framework would be an improvement in view of the original purpose of this 
dissertation. The goal was indeed to provide policy-makers with a supporting tool to 
orient decision making. It is thus different from creating a model which aims at 
simulating the behavior of the economy.  
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In anyway, it is clear that the social accounting matrix multiobjective linear 
programming model should be extended and tailored to fit the particular situations in 
which it is deployed, always keeping in mind that no single model is exclusive of 
others and that quantitative/qualitative results should always be assessed critically.  
 
